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Abstract
There are four main theories addressing the core mechanisms o f imitation. Two o f these 
theories suggest that imitation is mediated by a special-purpose mechanism and two 
suggest that it is mediated by general learning and motor control mechanisms. The main 
purpose o f this thesis is to examine whether the question o f  how we imitate is best 
answered by specialist or generalist theories.
In order to do this, experiments have been carried out using both intentional and 
automatic imitation paradigms. These paradigms have been used to examine imitation 
skills both in typically developing individuals and individuals with autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD).
The first empirical chapter examines the role o f goals in imitation. Specialist theories 
claim that goals play an integral role in explaining how we imitate. Some o f the best 
evidence in support of this view is provided by error patterns generated in the pen-and- 
cups task. However, the results from variants o f the pen-and-cups task, presented in this 
chapter, are more consistent with the idea that general processes, rather than goals, 
guide imitative behaviour.
Chapters 3 and 4 examine imitative abilities in ASD using intentional and automatic 
imitation paradigms in order to ascertain whether there is an imitation specific 
impairment in ASD. Such an impairment would appear to be consistent with specialist 
theories o f imitation. However, the findings from these chapters imply that the basic 
mechanism mediating imitation is not impaired in ASD, and that poor performance on 
complex intentional imitation tasks in ASD may be due to more generalised deficits, not 
specific to imitation.
The final empirical chapter addresses effector specificity in imitation and whether this 
phenomenon can distinguish between specialist and generalist accounts o f imitation. 
Using an automatic imitation paradigm, partial effector specificity is demonstrated, 
which is consistent with claims made by generalist theories.
The first three empirical chapters therefore challenge some o f the evidence that has been 
put forward to support specialist theories, and the final empirical chapter provides some 
specific support for generalist theories. Thus, the findings reported in this thesis are 
consistent with the hypothesis that imitation is mediated by general processes rather 
than by a special-purpose mechanism.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Imitation
An executed action is said to match an observed action when it is visually similar from 
a third party perspective. Imitation is the term used to refer to behaviour o f this type, 
where one performs an action which matches an observed action and which is causally 
related to having observed that action (Dautenhahn & Nehaniv, 2002).
Imitation is regarded as one o f the most important means whereby skills and behaviour 
are transferred between agents. It is thought to play an important role in language 
acquisition, skill learning, socialization, and enculturation (e.g. Byrne & Russon, 1998; 
Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993; Trevarthen, 1984; 1994). A growing body o f evidence 
suggests that imitation also plays a significant role in our understanding o f both 
ourselves and others (e.g. Meltzoff, 2002; Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993). 
Imitation is, therefore, an important process during early development and throughout 
adulthood.
Imitation is investigated by many researchers with different purposes. For example, 
comparative psychologists are interested in whether animals are capable o f imitation 
(e.g. Custance, Whiten & Bard, 1995; Voelkl & Huber, 2000). Those investigating 
‘observational learning’ address whether and how observing another performing an 
action can accelerate learning o f that action (e.g. Bird & Heyes, 2005; Kelly & Burton, 
2001). Social psychologists are concerned with relationships between imitation and 
other sociocognitive functions such as empathy (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
Cognitive neuroscientists are preoccupied with identifying the neural mechanisms o f 
imitation (e.g. Iacoboni, 2005). Developmental psychologists are interested in the age
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at which children begin to imitate (e.g. Meltzoff & Moore, 1997) and whether 
imitation can reveal mental state understanding capabilities in infants (e.g. Gergely, 
Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002).
Given the importance o f imitative behaviour, a number o f theories have been put 
forward to explain the phenomenon. Investigations into imitation tend to focus on two 
issues; how we are able to imitate and what we imitate. The purpose o f this thesis is to 
address the question o f how we imitate. The first chapter begins in this section by 
discussing the main explanatory challenge faced by research on imitation. Section 1.2 
will outline four theories that attempt to address this issue and section 1.3 will examine 
evidence which has been proposed to support the various theories. Finally, section 1.4 
will summarise the previous research and hypotheses under investigation in this thesis, 
along with ways in which they will be tested in the subsequent empirical chapters.
Although, intuitively, copying another person seems a simple task, understanding how 
we achieve this raises an important problem, known as the correspondence problem 
(Alissandrakis, Nehaniv, & Dautenhahn, 2002; Brass & Heyes, 2005; Nehaniv & 
Dautenhahn, 2001). Many processes are needed for effective imitation, such as vision, 
motor control and working memory. However, the correspondence problem is what 
distinguishes imitation from other types o f perception and action tasks. When we 
observe another person moving we do not see the muscle activation underlying their 
movement but rather the external consequences o f that activation. This visual 
representation o f an action must be translated into the motor commands needed to 
carry out a matching action. Visual and motor representations would appear to be in 
incommensurable codes. How, therefore, does the observer’s motor system ‘know’ 
which muscle activations will lead to the observed movement?
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This problem is particularly difficult for perceptually opaque or ‘invisible’ actions 
(Heyes & Ray, 2000; Piaget, 1962) where the visual feedback generated when 
executing the action oneself differs from the visual feedback generated when observing 
another individual executing the action. In these cases, simple perceptual matching 
cannot be used to produce imitative movements. The correspondence problem is, 
therefore, particularly important for whole body movements and facial gestures where 
the observer receives minimal visual feedback when executing the action.
Consider the following example: a swimming teacher demonstrates butterfly technique 
to a novice swimmer. To imitate the teacher successfully, the swimmer is required to 
perform an action that matches from a third party perspective; however, the two 
actions will not match from the novice’s perspective. The swimmer will perceive the 
teacher’s actions as a whole body movement where the arms, from an outstretched 
position in front o f the body, move under the body with the elbows kept high. When 
the hands reach the hips, the arms are swung forward, above the surface o f the water, 
so that they reach the front again. In contrast, the swimmer’s own actions will be 
perceived as a movement o f their arms from an outstretched position in front o f them 
to an unseen position under their body and then to the unseen arm recovery above the 
water.
Thus, an important challenge for theories o f imitation is to explain how observation of 
action facilitates production o f matching movements. This chapter reviews four 
theories o f imitation which approach this problem in different ways.
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1.2 Theories of imitation
Theories that address imitation fall into two categories: specialist and generalist 
theories (Brass & Heyes, 2005). Specialist theories propose that imitation is mediated 
by a special-purpose mechanism whereas generalist theories suggest that it is mediated 
by task-general learning and motor control mechanisms. Special-purpose mechanisms, 
or ‘cognitive modules’, are hypothesised to explain why and how we develop 
competencies in specific domains in ways that could not be predicted on the basis of 
environmental inputs and general learning mechanisms alone. In direct contrast to this 
view, generalist theories suppose that environmental inputs and general learning are 
sufficient to explain the development of a particular competency. Two specialist 
theories, the active intermodal mapping model (AIM, e.g. Meltzoff & Moore, 1997) 
and the theory o f goal-directed imitation (GO ADI, Bekkering, Wohlschlager & Gattis, 
2000; Wohlschlager & Bekkering 2002; Wohlschlager, Gattis & Bekkering, 2003) 
propose mechanisms specific to imitation that mediate imitative behaviour. There are 
two complementary generalist theories: ideomotor theory (IM, e.g. Brass, Bekkering, 
& Prinz, 2001; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; Prinz, 1997; 2002), 
which subsumes imitation within a general account o f motor control, and the 
associative sequence learning model (ASL, Brass & Heyes, 2005; Heyes, 2001; Heyes, 
2003; Heyes & Ray, 2000), which claims that the capacity to imitate is a product of 
task- and species-general processes of associative learning.
Both specialist and generalist theories propose alternative solutions for solving the 
correspondence problem. Four theories o f imitation and their explanations for how we 
imitate are described below.
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1.2.1 Active intermodal mapping (AIM)
The most prominent specialist theory is Meltzoff & Moore’s AIM model o f imitation 
(e.g. Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). This theory was developed in order to explain the 
imitation o f facial gestures in newborn infants, sometimes as young as 32 hours 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; 1983; 1989; 1997). Meltzoff & Moore (1977; 1997) suggest 
that this phenomenon provides the best evidence in favour o f a special-purpose 
mechanism for imitation because general learning mechanisms and environmental 
input cannot account for a skill present so shortly after birth. The special-purpose 
mechanism proposed is a supramodal representation system which allows a visual 
representation o f an action to be matched with the motor representation o f that action.
The AIM model outlines a number of stages said to account for neonatal imitation: The 
infant’s first response to seeing a modelled action is activation o f their corresponding 
body part. Referred to as ‘organ identification’, this is the process by which infants can 
identify their own and others’ body parts. Meltzoff & Moore argue that an ability to 
identify corresponding body parts renders self and other in commensurate terms, as 
movements o f body parts such as tongues, lips and hands. According to this view, 
organs, or body parts, are cross-modal units o f analysis.
The second stage in generating an imitative response is the movement component. 
Meltzoff & Moore (1997) suggest that newborn infants do not know which muscle 
movements will result in a particular bodily state. They propose that ‘body babbling’ 
enables infants to learn the relationships between muscle movements and the bodily 
states which result. Body babbling may occur in utero and results in learned 
relationships between movements and bodily states. After such experience-dependent 
learning, the infant will have the ability to produce muscle movements leading to
14
specified bodily states. Bodily states are referred to by Meltzoff & Moore as ‘organ- 
relations’ and are said to represent configural relations between organs, for example 
tongue-to-lips. Organ relations constitute the cross-modal metric o f equivalence 
necessary to solve the correspondence problem, and thus explain how imitation is 
done. According to the authors, “organ relations render commensurate the seen but 
unfelt act o f the adult and the felt but unseen act o f the infant” (pi 85, Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1997).
Organ relations provide a nonverbal coding o f human action that is not at the level o f 
motor commands but at the level o f the goal o f  the act. Meltzoff and Moore (1997), 
therefore, claim that imitation is goal-directed. They state that imitative responses are 
not motor units akin to reflexes that are simply released by the appropriate input. 
Rather, imitation is a goal-directed response, the aim o f which is ‘matching the target’.
The AIM model, therefore, offers an explanation for neonatal imitation and is also said 
to form the basis for adult imitative competency (Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). However, 
the model is currently underspecified in a number of ways. First, it is not clear how 
organ relations become cross-modal units, and therefore, able to solve the 
correspondence problem. The hypothesis does not specify a code in which organ 
relations are represented; aside from denying that these codes are modality specific, 
little information is given, therefore, it is not clear how this content is encoded. 
Furthermore, it is not clear how learning via body babbling results in the formation o f 
these cross-modal units o f action.
Second, there is an ambiguity within the theory concerning what constitutes a goal. In 
the original specification o f the theory, it is stated that actions are coded in terms of
15
organ relation end-states. Therefore, goals are observable outcomes of movement; for 
example a fist may be the outcome o f a hand closing movement. However, more 
recently, it has been implied that these goals are higher level cognitive processes 
relying on the understanding o f another’s intentions (Meltzoff, 1995; 2007). Under this 
view, goals are understood to be mental states that the imitator ascribes to the model, 
and as a result, imitation relies on inferring the intentions o f others. Therefore, it is 
unclear exactly what is meant when Meltzoff and Moore state that actions are 
represented at the level o f the goal o f the act (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977).
Goals and their relevance to imitation are also highlighted by the second specialist 
theory addressed in this thesis.
1.2.2 Theory o f goal-directed action (GOADI)
The second specialist theory addressed in this thesis is the theory o f goal-directed 
action (GOADI). GOADI is based on findings from developmental research where 
young children often imitate the ends o f a movement while ignoring the means 
(Wohlschlager & Bekkering 2002; Bekkering et al., 2000; Wohlschlager et al., 2003). 
For example, when copying an adult drinking from a cup, the child will concentrate on 
moving the cup to their lips (ends) without considering the way in which the ends are 
achieved (means), for example, the way in which the cup is manipulated.
GOADI consists o f a number of postulates:
“i) Decomposition. The perceived act is cognitively decomposed into separate 
aspects, ii) Selection o f  goal aspects. Owing to capacity limitations, only a few 
goal aspects are selected, iii) Hierarchical organization. The selected goal 
aspects are hierarchically ordered. The hierarchy o f goals follows the
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functionality o f actions. Ends, if present (e.g. objects and treatments o f the latter) 
are more important than means (e.g. effectors and movement paths), 
iv) Ideomotor principle. The selected goals elicit the motor programme with 
which they are most strongly associated. These motor programmes do not 
necessarily lead to matching movements, although they might do so in many 
everyday cases, v) General validity. There is no essential difference in imitation 
behaviour between children, adults and animals. Differences in accuracy are due 
to differences in working memory.”
(Wohlschlager et al., 2003, p503).
Actions are, therefore, broken down into a number o f sub-goals. Some goals take 
priority over others if processing demands are high. This results in some aspects o f a 
movement being accurately copied at the expense o f other, less important aspects.
GOADI constitutes a specialist theory o f imitation for the following reasons: The 
theory suggests that the goal selection processes mediating imitation are special; that 
is, it suggests that these processes are distinct from those mediating performance of 
other perceptual and motor tasks. GOADI implies that decomposition, selection o f goal 
aspects and hierarchical organisation are imitation-specific processes necessary to 
explain how an observed action is translated into motor output. This claim about the 
distinctiveness o f the goal selection processes mediating imitation is implicit in 
GOADI. It is presented as a theory o f imitation, goal selection processes are key 
features o f the theory, and unlike the ideomotor principle they are not said to 
characterise performance in other non-imitative tasks. Furthermore, the design o f some 
of the experiments conducted by the authors o f GOADI, indicate that the theory is 
intended to apply to imitative and not non-imitative action (e.g. Wohlschlager et al.,
17
2003). Finally, GOADI is explicitly presented as a theory designed to explain how we 
imitate. If these processes apply to other non-imitative tasks, then it is not clear how 
GOADI would constitute a theory o f imitation.
In order to solve the correspondence problem, GOADI assumes that the mirror neuron 
system “transforms movements perceived from others into the actor’s own possible 
action goals”. An action, therefore, becomes represented in terms o f  its goal. Selected 
goals then elicit the motor programme with which they are most strongly associated 
(Bekkering, 2002). Therefore, this theory proposes that goals are necessary as an 
intermediate stage in order to translate visual representations into motor 
representations (Bekkering & Wohlschlager, 2002). However, like AIM, GOADI is 
unclear about the exact meaning o f the term goal. Some o f the authors of GOADI 
suggest that goals are observable action outcomes (Wohlschlager et al., 2003), whereas 
others suppose that goals are inferences about the model’s intentions (Gattis, 
Bekkering & Wohlschlager, 2002).
Both AIM and GOADI highlight the intrinsic role o f goals in imitation and claim that 
imitation is mediated by a special-purpose mechanism. The following sections provide 
an alternative view by describing two generalist theories.
1.2.3 Ideomotor theory (IM)
IM proposes that imitation is mediated by general processes (e.g. Brass et al., 2001; 
Brass et al., 2000; Prinz, 1997; 2002; Hommel, Miisseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 
2001). The theory is based on Greenwald’s (1970a; 1970b) extension o f the ideomotor 
theory o f action (James, 1890). James argued that, “Every representation o f a 
movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object" (James,
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1890, p. 1134); suggesting a model o f action control in which the idea, or mental 
representation, of a movement is sufficient to cause its execution without any further 
need for volition. Greenwald extended this concept to include two central claims; that 
actions are mentally represented in terms o f their perceptual effects, and that these 
effect representations are used to control action production (Greenwald, 1970a; 
1970b). Prinz (1997) argued that IM provides a useful framework to understand 
imitation because it demonstrates how action perception may prompt the production o f 
a matching movement.
IM specifies that perception and action share a common representational framework, 
and therefore does not need to specify a mechanism for translation o f motor and 
perceptual representations. This approach apparently eschews the correspondence 
problem. Under IM, actions are represented in terms of their sensory consequences, 
enabling information received through the senses to be matched to sensory 
consequences contained in action representations. Action representations can, 
therefore, be used to control action production by comparing expected sensory 
feedback with actual sensory feedback (Wolpert & Kawato, 1998). A perceptual 
stimulus activates the action representation with which it exhibits the most ideomotor 
similarity. Ideomotor similarity refers to the degree to which features o f a stimulus 
correspond to sensory features produced by particular actions. As actions are 
represented in terms o f their perceptual effects, perceptual input from the model can be 
compared directly with the observer’s action representation.
This process can be illustrated through imitation of a hand opening movement. Visual 
information received when a hand opening action is observed will activate any action 
representation with which it shares some degree of ideomotor similarity. The action
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representation which exhibits the greatest degree o f similarity will be activated most 
strongly, and in the majority o f cases this will be the ‘hand opening’ action 
representation. When an action representation is activated, the individual will perform 
the action without the need for any further volition unless the action is actively 
inhibited. IM, therefore, does not suppose any special-purpose mechanisms to be 
involved in imitation. It assumes that the ability to imitate is simply due to the general 
organisation o f motor control.
While IM does offer some explanation as to how we imitate, it does not explain how 
we are able to copy perceptually opaque actions because the sensory consequences of 
executing an opaque action will not be similar to the sensory features o f observing that 
action. However, if IM is combined with the hypothesis that actions acquire their 
common codes through associative learning (Eisner & Homme1, 2001; 2004), it may 
be able to explain imitation o f perceptually opaque actions. The idea that actions and 
their sensory consequences become linked through associative learning forms the basis 
for the second generalist theory addressed in this thesis and will be elaborated further 
in the following section.
1.2.4 Associative sequence learning (ASLI
The associative sequence learning model o f imitation (ASL, Brass & Heyes, 2005; 
Heyes, 2001; Heyes, 2003; Heyes & Ray, 2000) also proposes that imitation is guided 
by general-purpose mechanisms. The theory suggests that the ability to imitate 
develops through learning bidirectional links between visual and motor representations 
o f actions, ‘matching vertical associations’. These associations can form whenever an 
individual experiences concurrent observation and execution o f the same movement 
(contiguity). Furthermore, in line with contemporary theories o f associative learning
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(e.g. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Hall, 1994), ASL assumes that in addition to 
contiguity, the formation o f vertical associations relies on contingency between 
observed and executed movements.
Opportunities to associate visual and motor representations o f the same actions are 
abundant during development. For perceptually transparent actions, such as hand and 
arm actions, the opportunities for associative learning can be provided through self 
observation. For example, observation o f oneself performing a hand opening action 
results in the co-activation o f the perceptual and motor representations o f  hand 
opening. This co-activation will result in the perceptual and motor representations 
becoming associated. For perceptually opaque actions, such as face movements, the 
visual input received upon execution differs from that received upon observation o f 
another performing that action. However, there remain many types o f experience 
which provide opportunities for relevant associative learning even for opaque actions.
First, adults frequently imitate infants (Field, Guy & Umbel, 1985; Papousek & 
Papousek, 1989). Second, within our environment there are many reflective surfaces 
and mirrors, allowing direct observation o f action. Third, events in the environment 
may lead to similar reactions in oneself and others at the same time. For example, if 
something unpleasant is present in the environment a number o f  individuals may react 
with an expression o f disgust. One will, therefore, observe a disgusted facial 
expression at the same time as producing such an expression. The examples above all 
provide opportunities for concurrent experience o f ‘seeing’ and ‘doing’, and therefore 
allow matching vertical associations between motor and visual representations to be 
formed. Finally, vertical associations can be established indirectly through common 
associations with other representations o f action. For example, verbal representations
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of action may mediate visual and motor associations; one may often hear the word 
smile when smiling oneself and also when observing someone else smile. Through 
common associations with the word smile, associations may form between the visual 
and motor representations o f a smile (e.g. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).
The ASL model proposes that novel action sequences can be imitated through 
additional processes which are not unique to imitation (Heyes & Ray, 2000). This 
novel imitation, or imitation learning, is possible because an observed action can be 
broken down into constituent familiar elements or movement primitives arranged in a 
sequence. The sequence o f these primitives is leamt through processes which operate 
whenever an individual learns a sequence o f visual stimuli (forming ‘horizontal’ 
associations). When this visual sequence is learned, it is possible to imitate this novel 
sequence through previously learned vertical associations between visual and motor 
representations o f the familiar movement primitives.
The ASL model, therefore, provides an account o f how visual and motor 
representations may be associated, thereby explaining how imitation is possible. IM 
and ASL are largely compatible as both theories describe imitation as a product of 
general processes. Both theories are also compatible with a range o f recent findings 
using automatic imitation paradigms (see section 1.3.4.1). As highlighted above, the 
main difference between them, being that in contrast with ASL, IM does not explain 
how sensorimotor links or common codes are formed. ASL, therefore, takes IM one 
stage further by providing an explanation o f how the correspondence problem is solved 
both for transparent actions, and also for opaque actions.
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1.3 Evidence distinguishing the theories
It may be possible to distinguish between the theories highlighted in this section by 
examining a range o f evidence. Specialist and generalist theories make different claims 
with respect to the properties of imitation (Fodor, 1983).
First, specialist theories assume that environmental input and general learning 
mechanisms cannot sufficiently explain how we imitate. In direct contrast to this view, 
generalist theories suggest that environmental input and general learning mechanisms 
are sufficient to explain imitation. Therefore, generalist theories highlight the role o f 
learning in imitation whereas specialist theories do not.
Although innateness is not necessarily a requirement o f a special-purpose mechanism - 
a module could quite plausibly develop over ontogeny without being pre-specified 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) - discussion o f modules in the cognitive development 
literature commonly assumes that modularity and innateness are directly linked (e.g. 
Fodor, 1983). Therefore, if imitation is demonstrated to be innate, this is more 
consistent with specialist claims than with generalist claims which would undoubtedly 
deny an innate imitation mechanism.
Second, special-purpose mechanisms are assumed to be domain specific, that is, they 
exclusively handle a specific class of stimuli (Fodor, 1983). In the case o f imitation, it 
is likely that this will be human action stimuli. On the contrary, since generalist 
theories deny any special imitation mechanism, they would not expect strict domain 
specificity in imitation.
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Third, at a neurological level, special mechanisms are typically seen as dedicated brain 
areas that subserve specific cognitive functions. Consequently, if  a special-purpose 
mechanism for imitation exists, it should be possible to identify dedicated neural areas 
that mediate imitation-specifically. Furthermore, imitation and brain regions dedicated 
to imitation should be susceptible to selective impairment, that is, deficits in imitation 
that are not associated with more generalised deficits. Alternatively, generalist theories 
would not necessarily expect to find dedicated brain areas that subserve imitation or 
selective imitation impairments.
The following sections will examine a range o f evidence that may allow distinctions to 
be drawn between specialist and generalist theories o f imitation. In section 1.3.1, the 
neural mechanisms o f imitation will be explored. Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 describe 
studies on development, both typical and atypical. Finally, section 1.3.4 examines 
imitation in healthy adults by describing studies investigating automatic imitation 
(1.3.4.1), the effect o f animacy on imitation (1.3.4.2) and training and expertise 
(1.3.4.3).
1.3.1 Neural mechanisms of imitation
A number of studies using electrophysio logical and imaging techniques have identified 
cortical areas that are active both during observation and execution o f a particular 
action. Cells o f  this kind, named ‘mirror neurons’, were first discovered in the 
premotor and parietal cortices of macaques, and fire both when the monkey observes 
and executes an action (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 1992; 
Ferrari, Maiolini, Addessi, Fogassi & Visalberghi, 2005; Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzo latti, & 
Fogassi, 2003; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi & Rizzolatti, 1996; Keysers, Kohler, Umilta,
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Nanetti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2003; Kohler, Umilta, Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzo latti, 2002; 
Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese & Fogassi, 1996; Umilta, Kohler, Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga, 
Keysers & Rizzolatti, 2001).
Increasing evidence suggests that neurons or neural areas with the same properties are 
present in the human brain. These areas have been demonstrated to be active both 
during execution and during passive observation o f action and are thought to be 
homologous to those areas demonstrating mirror properties in the monkey brain. For 
example, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission 
tomography (PET) studies have found premotor and parietal activation when observing 
hands grasping objects (Grezes, Armony, Rowe & Passingham, 2003; Hamzei, 
Dettmers, Glauche, Weiller & Buchel, 2003), hands manipulating objects (Chaminade, 
Meltzoff & Decety, 2002; Decety, Chaminade, Grezes, & Meltzoff, 2002; 
Montgomery, Isenberg & Haxby, 2007), pantomimes o f hand actions with objects 
(Decety, Grezes, Costes, Perani, Jeannerod, Procyk, Grassi & Fazio, 1997; Grezes, 
Costes & Decety, 1999; Grezes, Costes & Decety, 1998), and speech-related and biting 
actions (Buccino, Vogt, Ritzl, Fink, Zilles, Freund & Rizzolatti, 2004). 
Electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) methods also 
provide converging evidence that motor processes operate when observing hand 
actions (Babiloni, Babiloni, Carducci Cocozza, Del Percio, Moretti, Rossini, 2002; 
Cochin, Barthelemy, Roux & Martineu, 1999; Hari, Forss, Avikainen, Kirveskari, 
Salenius, & Rizzolatti, 1998; Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2004; Nishitani & Hari, 
2000), facial expressions (Dapretto, Davies, Pfeifer, Scott, Sigman, Bookheimer & 
Iacoboni, 2006; Nishitani & Hari, 2002) and whole body movements (Cochin, 
Barthelemy, Lejeune, Roux & Martineau, 1998).
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A large body o f evidence, therefore, suggests that observation o f action leads to 
specific activation of motor-related neural populations. Activation o f this kind may 
constitute the neural basis for imitation. Various neural areas, thought to be part o f the 
human mirror system, have been demonstrated to be active during imitation. These 
include the inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis and pars triangularis), the dorsal and 
ventral premotor cortex, the inferior parietal cortex, the superior parietal lobule and the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (Iacoboni, Woods, Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta & 
Rizzolatti, 1999; Iacoboni, Koski, Brass, Bekkering, Woods, & Dubeau, Mazziotta & 
Rizzolatti, 2001; Koski, Wohlschlager, Bekkering, Woods, Dubeau, Mazziotta & 
Iacoboni, 2002; Buccino et al., 2004, Grezes et al., 2003).
The human mirror neuron system is, therefore, a candidate neural circuit specifically 
‘for’ imitation, which appears to be consistent with a specialist view of imitation. 
However, the role o f some o f the areas highlighted above is still controversial and most 
studies have failed to find areas that are reliably active during imitation but not during 
passive observation of action. Since it is expected that special-purpose mechanisms are 
implemented in distinct cortical areas, failure to identify areas that are active during 
imitation but not passive observation, is not consistent with a specialist view. 
However, at the present time only tentative conclusions may be drawn from the 
neuroscience literature. Neuroimaging techniques are not yet sophisticated enough to 
identify the particular cells active at any particular time. Therefore, there may be 
neuronal populations specifically active during imitation but our techniques are not yet 
sensitive enough to detect them. Thus, it is not yet clear whether investigations into the 
neural mechanisms can provide conclusive evidence in favour o f either generalist or 
specialist theories.
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1.3.2 Typical development
1.3.2.1 Neonatal imitation
Some specific support for each o f the specialist theories has been provided by studies 
with infants and older children. The most well-established evidence in support o f AIM 
is the finding that newborn infants can imitate simple facial movements. In 1977, 
Meltzoff and Moore reported that infants between 12 and 21 days old were more likely 
to protrude their tongue if they observed a caregiver protruding their tongue rather than 
opening their mouth. Conversely they were more likely to open their mouth if they 
observed mouth opening than if they observed tongue protrusion. The authors also 
reported similar imitative behaviour in newborn infants as young as 32 hours old 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1983; 1989). Several other studies have provided evidence o f 
neonatal imitation o f a range of actions including mouth opening, hand gestures, head 
movements, eye blinking, cheek and brow movements and facial expressions 
(Heinman, Nelson & Schaller, 1989; Kaitz, Meschulach-Safarty, Aurbach & Eidelman, 
1988, Reissland, 1988; Vinter, 1986; Kugiumutzakis, 1985; Field et al., 1985; Field, 
Woodson, Greenberg & Cohen, 1982).
These findings support the idea that imitation is innate, which is consistent with a 
specialist view of imitation but not with a generalist view. In particular, ASL, which 
assumes that imitation is a product of sensorimotor associative learning, could not 
account for imitation o f a range of movements in infants too young to have formed 
sensorimotor associations. Therefore, the most plausible way to account for the broad 
imitative competence in neonates would be to suppose that a special-purpose 
mechanism mediates imitation.
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However, despite the number of studies claiming to demonstrate neonatal imitation, 
the effect has not always been replicated. In a meta-analysis o f the previous data, 
Anisfeld (1991; 1996) found that the only gesture for which there is reliable evidence 
o f imitation is tongue protrusion. He argued that in the majority o f previous studies, 
authors have looked for two-way interactions o f observed and executed action type, 
where tongue protrusion was one o f the actions. Therefore, any significant effects 
could be driven by an effect on only one action type; in this case, tongue protrusion. 
Furthermore, some studies have suggested that rather than representing an imitative 
response, tongue protrusion may rather be mediated by an arousal process (Ullstadius, 
1998; Jones, 1996; 2006). The arousal hypothesis is supported by experiments 
showing that the frequency of infants’ tongue protrusion is elevated, not only after 
observation o f tongue protrusion, but after a comparable period o f exposure to flashing 
lights or lively music (Jones, 1996; 2006).
While findings from studies with neonates have often been cited as supporting nativist 
and specialist theories, in particular AIM, the problems highlighted above imply that 
strong conclusions cannot be drawn. Consequently, these studies do not provide 
conclusive evidence in support o f specialist theories. However, studies with older 
children have provided some specific support for the theory o f goal-directed imitation.
1.3.2.2 Imitation in children
Evidence for the importance o f goals in guiding imitative behaviour comes from an 
early finding by Head (1920; 1926), who demonstrated an interesting pattern o f errors 
during hand-to-ear imitation tasks. In the hand-to-ear task, a child faces an adult as, on 
each trial, the adult touches his left or right ear with his left or right hand (four trial 
types). From three years o f age, children who were either instructed to mirror imitate
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these actions (e.g. to copy movements o f the model’s right hand with their own, 
spatially compatible, left hand; Bekkering et al., 2000, Gleissner, Meltzoff & 
Bekkering 2000, Gordon 1923, Wapner & Cirillo 1968), or allowed to imitate 
spontaneously (Wohlschlager et al., 2003), made an elevated number o f errors when a 
contralateral movement was required. For example, if the adult touched his left ear 
with his right hand, the child touched her right ear, which is correct, but performed this 
action using her right hand in an ipsilateral movement path, rather than her left hand in 
a contralateral movement path. Thus, children imitate object selection - choice of an 
ear to touch - more reliably than they imitate selection o f  an effector and movement 
path, which causes them to make an ipsilateral movement when a contralateral 
movement is required. These ‘contralateral-to-ipsilateral’ errors were originally 
interpreted to be due to neurological immaturity resulting in inability to perform 
actions crossing the body’s midline (Kephart, 1971). This ‘lateral bifurcation’ 
hypothesis was challenged by a number o f findings such as similar error patterns in 
much older children (Schofield, 1976) and even in adults in a speeded version o f the 
task (Wohlschlager et al., 2003). Furthermore, Bekkering et al. (2000) showed that 
when children were asked to copy a model who touched both ears, using a crossed 
hand movement, fewer contralateral-to-ipsilateral errors were made, indicating that 
children do not have difficulty performing movements which cross the body’s midline.
Bekkering, Wohlschlager and colleagues interpreted errors on contralateral trials as 
evidence that imitation is goal-directed. They explained their findings in terms o f 
decomposition o f  the action into sub-goals which are then hierarchically organised. 
Within this hierarchy, ends take priority over the means. Therefore, the ear, or end 
point, is the dominant goal and the effector and movement path are subordinate goals. 
When processing demands are high, the most important goal, ear selection, is
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preserved resulting in errors in effector and movement path. However, when 
participants are required to touch both ears and use both hands, neither hand nor ear 
selection are necessary, and the number of competing goals is reduced. In this 
situation, the crossing o f the hands becomes a more dominant goal resulting in fewer 
contralateral-to-ipsilateral errors in that condition.
Variations o f the original hand-to-ear experiments described above have provided 
further evidence for GO ADI by again showing that children more accurately reproduce 
the ends of an action than the means (Bekkering et al., 2000). In the dots task, the child 
faced the model/experimenter across a table and was asked to copy the model’s 
movements. On each trial, the model touched the table at a location on her left or her 
right side, using her left or her right hand. The location was marked by a dot, which 
was fixed to the table. As predicted by GOADI, three-year-old children made more 
errors when a contralateral movement was required. On these trials, children used an 
ipsilateral movement to reach the correct goal, thus using the incorrect hand and 
movement.
In a follow-up experiment where children were required to touch a location on the 
table when there were no dots present, these contralateral-to-ipsilateral errors were 
significantly reduced. According to GOADI, objects take precedence as dominant 
goals. In the absence of objects in the no-dots condition, other sub-goals, such as 
effector and movement type, take precedence (Bekkering et al., 2000).
Additional variations o f the hand-and-ear task appear to have been designed to show 
that goal processing o f  the type postulated by GOADI is specific to imitation tasks. In 
a non-imitative version o f the task, when children were shown photographs o f the
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stimulus movements and asked to select matching photographs, rather than to imitate, 
they do not make a disproportionate number o f contralateral-to-ipsilateral errors 
(Wohlschlager et al., 2003). This suggests that the goal selection processes described 
by GOADI are imitation-specific processes.
Finally, in line with GOADI’s final postulate, that there is no difference between 
imitation in adults and children, similar error patterns have been reported in adults. In a 
speeded version o f the dots task, where participants were required to imitate 
contralateral and ipsilateral finger movements, more contralateral-to-ipsilateral errors 
were made when the movements were directed to dots than when they terminated at 
unmarked locations (Wohlschlager & Bekkering 2002).
One task that was designed to specifically test GOADI in adults is the pen-and-cups 
task. The pen-and-cups task allows three features o f action to be manipulated 
independently: object selection, effector selection and grip selection. On each trial in 
this speeded response procedure, the participant sees a model move a centrally located 
pen into one o f two coloured cups (object), using his right or his left hand (effector), 
while grasping the pen with his thumb pointing up or down (grip). Both when they are 
required to mirror imitate and when they are required to transpose (e.g. right hand 
movements are copied with the spatially incompatible right hand), adults make fewer 
cup errors than hand errors and fewer hand errors than grip errors (Avikainen, 
Wohlschlager, Liuhanen, Hanninen, & Hari, 2003; Wohlschlager & Bekkering, 2002). 
Consistent with GOADI, this cup<hand<grip error pattern implies that, when 
processing resources are limited, imitation o f object selection takes priority over 
imitation o f effector selection, which, in turn, takes priority over imitation o f the 
details o f  response topography.
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GOADI implies that the goal selection processes that guide performance on the tasks 
described above are imitation-specific processes. Therefore, the foregoing group of 
studies apparently provide evidence in support of GOADI as well as more general 
support for specialist theories. However, generalist theories o f imitation offer an 
alternative explanation for the findings described above. Generalist models suggest 
that there are no imitation-specific processes, and therefore, that the error patterns seen 
in tasks such as the pen-and-cups task may be a result o f  task-general mechanisms 
such as perceptual and attentional processes, rather than o f imitation-specific processes 
o f goal selection. For example, in the pen-and-cups task, in all implementations o f the 
task described above, the cups, but not the hands or the grips, were o f different colours. 
Thus, the cups were more readily discriminate rthan the hands or the grips. As a result, 
participants may have made fewer cup errors tlhan hand or grip errors because it was 
easier for them to determine which o f the cups; had been selected on any given trial. 
Similarly, previous studies may have found more grip than cup or hand errors because, 
in all versions o f the task used to date, the two grips were applied at approximately the 
same spatial location, and only one o f them was present in the stimulus display at any 
given time. In contrast, the model’s two cups and two hands were simultaneously 
present at distinct spatial locations. Therefore, the relatively high incidence o f grip 
errors may have been due to difficulty in perceiving which of the grips had been 
selected in each trial. Therefore, general perceptual processes, rather than imitation 
specific goal selection processes, could account for the error patterns seen in the pen- 
and-cups task. I f  this is the case, then these error patterns may not be able to provide 
support for specialist goal directed theories.
Some evidence consistent with this idea has recently been provided by Bird, Brindley, 
Leighton & Heyes (2007). However, further investigation o f  this ‘general process
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account’ is necessary to ascertain whether or not tasks like the pen-and-cups task do 
demonstrate goal-directed imitation, and therefore, whether they can be used to support 
the claims o f GOADI and specialist theories. This issue is investigated in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis.
1.3.3 Atypical development
The relationship between atypical development and imitative abilities is highly 
relevant to the topics discussed in this thesis. This section addresses imitative abilities 
in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and whether evidence of impairments in this 
population can inform theories of imitation.
Autism spectrum disorders are developmental disorders which are characterized by 
abnormalities of social interaction, impairments in verbal and non-verbal 
communication, and a restricted repertoire o f interests and activities (American 
Psychiatric Association (APA), 1994). Three main cognitive theories have been 
suggested to explain the core deficits associated with ASD. These are the theory of 
mind hypothesis (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith. 1985; Frith, 2003; Frith & Frith, 
2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Happe, Ehlers, Fletcher, Frith, Johansson, Gillberg, 
Dolan, Frackowiak & Frith, 1996), the weak central coherence account (e.g. Happe, 
1999; for alternative views see: Mottron, Peretz & Menard, 2000; Plaisted, 2001) and 
the theory o f executive dysfunction (e.g. Pennington, & Ozonoff, 1996; Russell, 1997; 
Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991). More recently, it has been suggested that 
impairments in imitative abilities underlie ASD (e.g. Rogers & Pennington, 1991; 
Rogers, 1999; Williams, Whiten & Singh, 2004). This theory and its implications for 
our understanding o f imitation will be discussed in this section.
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As highlighted in Section 1.3, special-purpose mechanisms should be susceptible to 
selective impairment (e.g. Fodor, 1983; Leslie, 1992). That is, an impairment in one 
domain that is not associated with more generalised deficits. Therefore, the presence of 
a selective imitation impairment in ASD may provide support for a special-purpose 
mechanism in imitation. Findings from atypically developing populations have been 
used to address the issue of modularity in the past. Previous theorists have used 
evidence o f a selective impairment in a specific competency to argue in favour of 
innately specified, specialised brain circuits for that competency (e.g. Bellugi, Wang & 
Jemigan, 1994; Gopnik, 1990; Leslie, 1992; 1998; Pinker, 1994). For example, 
evidence o f ‘theory o f mind’ impairments in ASD in the absence o f general intellectual 
impairments has been cited as evidence for a theory o f mind module (Leslie, 1992;
1998). The same logic, if applied to imitation, would suggest that imitation 
impairments in ASD support specialist claims.
Findings from a number o f studies have suggested that imitation impairments are both 
universal and specific in ASD (Charman, Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Cox, Baird & 
Drew, 1997; Dawson & Adams, 1984; DeMyer, Alpem, Barton, Deyer, Churchill, 
Hingtgen, Bryson, Pontius & Kimberlin, 1972; Hammes & Langdell, 1981; Jones & 
Prior, 1985; Ohta, 1987; Rogers, Bennetto, McEvoy, & Pennington, 1996; Sigman & 
Ungerer, 1984; Stone, Ousley, & Littleford, 1997; Whiten & Brown, 1998). In the 
most recent review o f the literature, Williams et al. (2004) reviewed 17 experimental 
studies on imitation in ASD. They calculated the combined p -value o f group 
differences with respect to imitation to an appropriate control group: p  < 0.00005 (n = 
248 subjects). The authors reinforced Rogers et al’s previous (1999) message that 
“ every methodologically rigorous study so far published has found an autism-specific 
deficit in imitation” (p. 294, Williams et al., 2004).
Imitation impairments have been demonstrated in object-directed actions (Hammes & 
Langdell, 1981; Roeyers, Van Oost, & Bothuyne 1998; Stone et al., 1997; Whiten & 
Brown, 1999), pantomime actions (Hammes & Langdell, 1981; Whiten & Brown,
1999), body movements (Stone, Lemanek, Fishel, Fernandez, & Altemeier, 1990), 
gestures (Aldridge, Stone, Sweeney, & Bower, 2000; Whiten & Brown, 1999), 
sequential imitation (Rogers et al., 1996), novel actions (Roeyers et al., 1998), and 
meaningful and meaningless actions (Stone et al., 1997). These impairments have been 
found in children (e.g. Rogers et al., 1996) and in adults (Avikainen et al., 2003).
The reported impairments have led some researchers to suggest that imitation is the 
core impairment in ASD (Williams et al., 2004). This claim has been extended in the 
mirror neuron hypothesis o f ASD, which supposes that the mirror neuron system, 
thought to mediate imitation, is disturbed in individuals with ASD (Williams, Whiten, 
Suddendorf & Perrett, 2001). Mirror neurons and imitation have been suggested to 
underpin the development o f language and social cognitive functions, such as theory o f 
mind and empathy (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Rogers & 
Pennington, 1991). Impairments in these abilities characterise ASD which has led 
theorists to suggest that an imitation impairment, caused by a dysfunctional mirror 
system, leads to a developmental cascade of impairments in these other abilities. Under 
this view, mirror neuron system and imitation impairments are at the root of ASD.
Some evidence o f mirror system abnormalities has been demonstrated using 
neuroimaging techniques, although many o f the results from these studies are 
inconsistent. For example, structural abnormalities in mirror areas have been 
demonstrated in the brains of individuals with ASD although these abnormalities were 
not specific to mirror areas (Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder, & Tager-Flusberg, 2006).
Furthermore, differential neural activation in mirror areas has been demonstrated in 
ASD. Nishitani, Avikainen, & Hari (2004) studied motor cortex excitability using 
MEG and found differential activation patterns in individuals with ASD compared to 
typically developing controls when imitating orofacial movements, which implies 
mirror system abnormalities. However, Avikainen, Kulomaeki, and Hari (1999) found 
no difference in activity between ASD and control participants when observing simple 
hand movements suggesting typical mirror system activity in the ASD group.
Contrary to this finding, Obermann, Hubbard, McCleery, Ramachandran & Pineda 
(2005) reported an absence o f mu-wave suppression, which is thought to be modulated 
by the mirror system, when participants with ASD observed simple hand actions. 
While this finding may suggest reduced mirror system activity it could result from 
poor connectivity between the mirror system and primary motor cortex. The latter 
explanation is consistent with results o f a number o f studies reporting weaker 
connectivity in ASD (Bird, Catmur, Silani, Frith, & Frith, 2006).
Theoret, Halligan, Kobayashi, Fregni, Tager-Flusberg & Pascual-Leone (2005) found 
reduced motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in response to action observation in 
individuals with ASD. However, the reduction in MEPs only occurred when actions 
were observed from the ‘self perspective (fingers pointing away from the participant). 
When actions were observed from the ‘other’ perspective (fingers pointing towards the 
participants) MEPs were not different between the ASD and control groups, making 
this finding difficult to interpret.
Further inconsistent findings have been demonstrated using fMRI. Williams, Waiter, 
Gilchrist, Perrett, Murray & Whiten (2006) compared neural responses during
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imitation tasks between individuals with ASD and control participants. They found 
greater activity in parietal, but not inferior frontal, cortex in the control group. 
However, Dapretto et al. (2006) reported the opposite pattern o f results demonstrating 
that individuals with ASD show normal activity in the parietal mirror area but reduced 
activity in the inferior frontal gyrus. Dapretto et al. (2006) also provided further 
evidence o f a mirror system impairment in ASD by showing a correlation between 
mirror system activity and autistic symptom severity.
Reported imitation impairments combined with evidence o f  mirror neuron dysfunction 
implies impairment o f imitation and the brain structures dedicated to imitation in ASD. 
In ASD, other aspects of the cognitive system are often relatively preserved. For 
example, there are many cases of autistic symptoms in the presence of IQ within and 
even above the normal range. Consequently, this may imply that imitation is 
susceptible to selective impairment which may provide support for the idea that a 
special-purpose mechanism mediates imitation. However, in order to use such 
evidence to support specialist theories, it is necessary to demonstrate that there is 
selective impairment in that domain, that is, it is not a product o f other more 
generalised deficits. In order to do this, it is necessary to address some inconsistencies 
in the literature.
As highlighted above, findings from the neurological literature are somewhat 
inconsistent. Until studies investigating mirror system activity show a more consistent 
pattern, it is unlikely to be possible to relate them coherently to behavioural 
investigations o f  imitation in ASD. In addition to the confusion in the neurological 
literature, there is further confusion in the behavioural literature. Despite the large 
body o f research on the topic, it is not yet clear whether there is a real imitation
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impairment in ASD. First, there are some inconsistencies in the literature with some 
authors failing to find a deficit (e.g. Beadle-Brown & Whiten, 2004; Charman & 
Baron-Cohen, 1994; Hamilton, Brindley & Frith, 2007; Morgan, Cutrer, Coplin & 
Rodrigue, 1989). Second, many o f the early studies contained methodological flaws 
such as inadequate control group matching (e.g. Sigman & Ungerer, 1984) or 
insufficient diagnostic information (e.g. DeMeyer et al., 1972).
Third, the finding o f an imitative impairment in imitation is puzzling in light of 
anecdotal evidence reporting echolalia and echopraxia in ASD. The observation o f 
echolalic (the tendency to automatically imitate the speech patterns o f others with no 
discemable goal), and echopraxic (the tendency to automatically imitate the actions o f 
others) phenomena (Russell, 1997) imply that individuals with ASD have an increased 
tendency to imitate rather than a deficit.
A possible explanation for these inconsistencies in the literature could be the type o f 
tasks used to measure imitative ability. The majority o f tasks used to date are complex 
intentional or voluntary imitation tasks, presented in a rich social context. Successful 
performance on these tasks relies on a number o f other processes such as 
understanding o f social cues, language ability, theory o f mind, perceptual processing 
o f complex stimuli, attentional control, motor control and executive function. These 
processes are not imitation-specific abilities; they are necessary for a range o f imitative 
and non-imitative tasks. Therefore, poor performance on tests o f imitation may be due 
to impairments on these non-specific abilities. Consequently, there may not be an 
imitation-specific impairment in ASD, but rather any apparent imitation impairment 
may be a symptom of other more generalised impairments.
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There are a number o f candidate non-specific abilities that may contribute to poor 
performance on imitative tasks. First, the impairments could simply reflect a lack of 
motivation to engage in imitative exchanges. This idea is consistent with evidence 
highlighting the reluctance to participate in social activities in ASD (e.g. Kanner, 1943; 
Kanner & Eisenberg, 1956). Some evidence in favour o f this idea is provided by 
Ingersoll, Schreibman & Tran (2003) who examined the effect o f sensory feedback 
(e.g., flashing lights and sound) on the imitation performance of children with ASD 
and age matched controls. They found that sensory feedback improved imitative 
performance of the children with ASD but not controls and argued that children with 
ASD are less motivated by social interaction to imitate, but may be motivated to 
imitate if they receive a non-social reward.
Second, task demands such as executive function, working memory, attentional 
control, perceptual and motor abilities that are necessary for complex imitation tasks 
may explain poor performance. Deficits in all o f these abilities have been reported in 
individuals with ASD (e.g. Bertone, Mottron, Jelenic & Faubert, 2003; Greenaway & 
Plaisted, 2005; Ghazuiddin & Butler, 1998; Ghazuiddin, Butler, Tsai & Ghaziuddin, 
1994; Gillberg, 1989; Hill, 2004; Leary & Hill, 1996; Manjiviona & Prior, 1995; 
Rinehart Bradshaw, Brereton & Tonge, 2001; Russel, Jarrold & Henry, 1996).
Some evidence in favour o f this view has been provided by Vanvuchelen, Roeyers & 
De Weerdt (2007) who found that children with ASD performed poorly compared to 
matched controls on a number o f imitation measures. However, imitation performance 
was strongly correlated with general motor ability. Similarly, Motofsky, Dubey, Jerath, 
Jansiewicz, Goldberg & Denckla (2006) found that children with ASD were impaired 
on gestural imitation compared to age and IQ matched controls. However, they were
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similarly impaired when required to make a gesture in response to a command and in a 
tool use task. The authors suggested that ASD is associated with a generalized praxis 
deficit rather than a deficit specific to imitation. Other authors have provided similar 
findings suggesting that imitative performance is strongly related to other non-specific 
abilities such as social reciprocity and attention following (Green, Baird, Barnett, 
Henderson, Huber & Henderson, 2002; McDuffie, Turner, Stone, Yoder, Wolery, 
& Ulman, 2007; Smith & Bryson, 1998).
However, while the foregoing studies demonstrate positive correlations between 
imitation performance and other more general abilities, not all o f the reported deficit in 
imitation can be explained by these other abilities. While in one study 80 percent of 
variance in imitation scores could be accounted for by motor abilities (Vanvuchelen et 
al., 2007), Smith & Bryson (1998) found that motor impairment accounted for only 37 
percent of the variance in imitation performance. Therefore, it is not clear from these 
studies whether the non-specific impairments are able to fully account for the observed 
imitation impairment. Consequently, it is not clear whether there is an imitation 
impairment over and above impairments in other more general processes.
The inconsistencies highlighted above suggest that the present literature is not yet able 
to reliably demonstrate the existence o f an imitation-specific impairment in ASD. It is 
important to try to resolve this confusion in the literature, both in order to better 
understand the core impairments in ASD and also to understand how this issue relates 
to imitation theories.
In order to clarify these issues Chapters 3 and 4 investigated imitative abilities in 
adults with ASD. Chapter 3 investigated whether observed impairments in imitation
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can be accounted for in full by deficits in processes not specific to imitation using an 
intentional imitation task. Given that complex imitation tasks require a number o f 
abilities in addition to imitation, Chapter 4 investigated imitative abilities in ASD 
using a ‘purer’ test o f imitation. In this test, task requirements were reduced, such that 
demands placed on other processes that contribute to performance were minimised. In 
order to reduce task requirements, an automatic imitation task was used in Chapter 4.
In tests o f intentional imitation, the experimenter asks the participants to copy an 
action that has many spatial and temporal features and does not specify the exact 
features to be reproduced. Therefore, successful performance depends, not only on a 
willingness to co-operate with the experimenter, but also on appropriate selection o f 
action dimensions for imitation using contextual, including social, cues for which 
dimensions are relevant in any particular task. A more appropriate way to investigate 
imitation abilities in ASD, therefore, is to use a simple task where imitation is not 
instructed, that is an automatic imitation task. In tests o f automatic imitation, 
participants are not asked, and do not intend, to imitate modelled movements. Instead, 
they are required to merely observe actions, either passively or with a simple 
movement task, while the experimenter measures muscle responses (Heyes, Bird, 
Johnson & Haggard, 2005). Automatic imitation tasks place fewer demands on task- 
general abilities and would constitute a purer test o f imitative ability. Therefore, these 
tasks may be particularly appropriate for assessing imitative ability in ASD. Automatic 
imitation tasks o f this type have been used to investigate imitation in typically 
developing adults and the findings from these studies are highlighted below.
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1.3.4 Imitation in adults
1.3.4.1 Automatic imitation
A tendency to imitate the actions o f others involuntarily or ‘automatically’ is o f  
relevance to imitation theories. Both generalist theories addressed in this thesis suggest 
that observation o f an action performed by someone else automatically leads to an 
activation o f an internal motor representation. Therefore, ASL and IM predict that 
under some circumstances imitation may occur automatically, that is without intention 
(Heyes, 2005; Prinz, 2005). The following studies demonstrate the occurrence of 
automatic imitation and therefore provide support for both o f the generalist theories 
addressed in this thesis.
Recent electro physio logical studies have demonstrated motor facilitation by action 
observation (e.g. Aziz-Zadeh, Maeda, Zaidel, Mazziotta, & Iacoboni, 2002; Catmur, 
Walsh & Heyes, 2007; Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman, & Pascual-Leone, 2002; Strafella & 
Paus, 2000). In these studies, passive participants observed body movements while 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) induced MEPs were recorded from a range o f 
muscles. It was found that MEPs recorded from the muscles involved in execution o f 
the observed movement were greater than those recorded at other muscle sites.
The foregoing examples provide some evidence o f a tendency to imitate automatically, 
but this was only detected in cortical and muscular activation. Evidence o f overt 
unintentional imitation comes from research examining the ‘Chameleon effect’ in 
relatively unconstrained social interactions (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003). Participants in these studies are asked to interact freely with another 
individual whom they believe is a participant, but who is actually a confederate. The
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confederate exhibits a target behaviour during the interaction, such as tapping their 
foot or rubbing their face. The results consistently showed that participants were more 
likely to rub their face in the presence of a face-rubbing confederate than a foot- 
shaking confederate and to shake their foot in the presence o f a foot-shaking 
confederate than a face-rubbing confederate. During post-test debriefing, participants 
reported that they did not notice the target behaviour being demonstrated, that they had 
no intention to imitate the behaviour, and that they were unaware o f doing so.
Research using stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) paradigms also implies that 
movement observation can induce the observer to prepare to perform a matching 
movement even when performance o f such a movement would be detrimental to task 
performance (Brass et al., 2000; Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umilta, 1998; Heyes 
et al., 2005; Sturmer, AschCrsleben, & Prinz, 2000). For example, Brass et al. (2000) 
asked participants to lift (in one test block), or lower (in another test block) their index 
finger as soon as they saw a movement of a stimulus hand (the imperative stimulus). In 
this simple RT procedure, participants were always required to perform the same 
movement throughout a block, irrespective o f the stimulus movement. Stimulus 
movements were either compatible (e.g. finger lift response and finger lift stimulus), or 
incompatible (e.g. finger lift response and finger tap stimulus) with respect to the 
response movement. Participants were faster to respond on compatible than 
incompatible trials, suggesting that perception o f an action primes production o f that 
action even when the identity o f observed movements is technically task-irrelevant. 
More recent investigations have demonstrated that effects o f  this kind are not solely 
due to spatial compatibility (e.g. Bertenthal, Longo & Kosobud, 2006; Brass et al., 
2001; Heyes et al., 2005; Press, Gillmeister & Heyes 2006; Press, Bird, Flach & 
Heyes, 2005; Press, Bird, Walsh & Heyes, under review).
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The preceding studies demonstrate ‘movement compatibility’ effects, such that, 
execution o f a particular movement is faster when accompanied by observation o f a 
compatible movement than when it is accompanied by observation o f an incompatible 
movement. In real life instances of imitation we tend to match both the movement 
made as well as the effector used to make that movement. Therefore, it should be 
possible to demonstrate automatic imitation o f both movement and effector. ‘Effector 
compatibility’, where observation o f a particular effector in motion facilitates a motor 
response with the matching effector, has not been directly investigated. However, 
studies investigating ‘effector priming’ effects suggest that we do automatically match 
the effector used (Berger & Hadley, 1975; Bertenthal et al., 2006; Brass et al., 2000; 
Gillmeister, Catmur, Brass & Heyes, under review). This issue will be explored further 
in Chapter 5.
The studies carried out to date demonstrate unintentional activation and/or production 
of observed body movements. These data are consistent with generalist theories which 
claim that action observation automatically leads to motor activation. Furthermore, 
automatic imitation may be inconsistent with some specific claims made by AIM and 
GOADI. Both theories suggest that imitation occurs via intentional, rather than 
automatic, processes (Neumann, 1984). AIM makes this explicit stating that imitation 
is an ‘active’ process (Meltzoff & Moore, 1994). That is, when a body movement is 
observed with the intention to imitate, the visual representation is converted into a 
supramodal code allowing a matching motor output to be generated (Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1997). If as AIM suggests, the intention to imitate is a necessary component of 
imitation, we should not observe instances o f automatic imitation. It should be noted, 
however, that Meltzoff has recently contradicted this earlier statement by asserting that 
the same mechanisms that mediate imitation in newborn infants, mediate automatic
motor facilitation following action observation (Meltzoff & Decety, 2003). This 
clearly implies that the occurrence o f automatic imitation is not inconsistent with AIM, 
however, Meltzoff & Decety did not explain how AIM is able to accommodate its 
occurrence.
A goal-directed view o f imitation would also seem to be at odds with evidence o f 
automatic imitation since this view implies conscious and effortful processing. 
However, it is not clear in GOADI or AIM whether the goal selection processes 
thought to mediate imitation operate at a conscious level or automatically. It may be 
that we automatically represent actions in terms o f goals. Therefore, it is not apparent 
whether or not GOADI and AIM can account for automatic imitation.
Nevertheless, Brass & Heyes (2005) suggested that evidence o f automatic imitation is 
inconsistent with the idea that a special-purpose mechanism mediates imitation stating 
that “one would expect an efficient specialist imitation mechanism to be ‘switched on’ 
only when needed”, that is, only when one intends to imitate. However, it has been 
argued that special-purpose mechanisms are automatically activated (Fodor, 1983). 
Therefore, in the case of imitation, the intention to imitate may not be critical in 
eliciting this activation. It is more likely that special-purpose mechanism would be 
‘switched on’ by a specific class o f stimuli. This is in line with domain specificity - the 
requirement that special-purpose mechanisms deal exclusively with a single type o f 
information (Fodor, 1983). The following section addresses this issue.
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1.3.4.2 Animacv
Special-purpose mechanisms are commonly assumed to be domain specific (Fodor, 
1983), that is, they deal with a specific type of information. In the case o f imitation it is 
likely that observed human action constitutes the relevant domain o f information. 
Therefore, if imitation is mediated by such a special-purpose mechanism then we 
should expect it to be especially efficient in processing human action stimuli.
There is some evidence that human action stimuli are more effective at eliciting 
imitative responses than robotic stimuli. In an interference paradigm, Castiello, Lusher, 
Mari, Edwards & Humphreys (2002) found that observing human, but not robotic, 
movements influenced subsequent performance of similar reaching and grasping 
movements. Similarly, Castiello (2003) found that the movement dynamics o f an 
observing participant were influenced by a distracter object when the action was 
carried out by a human model but not when it was carried out by a robotic model.
Using an automatic imitation paradigm o f a different kind, Kilner, Paulingnan & 
Blakemore (2003) and Oztop, Franklin, Chaminade & Gordon (2005) found a stronger 
tendency to imitate human than robotic movements. Participants were required to 
perform sinusoidal arm movements in one direction (e.g. vertical) while 
simultaneously observing human or robotic movements in a compatible (vertical) or 
incompatible (horizontal) direction. Participants displayed more variance in the 
pathway o f movements when concurrently observing human movements in an 
incongruent direction, compared with a congruent direction. However, this automatic 
imitation effect was found to be smaller (Ozrop et al., 2004), or not present (Kilner et 
al., 2003), when concurrently observing robotic movements.
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An fMRI study has supported the idea that human movement stimuli are more readily 
imitated than robotic movement stimuli by showing more activation o f cortical areas 
thought to mediate imitation when observing human movements than when observing 
robotic movements (Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, Sawamoto & Castiello, 2004). This finding 
is compatible with other imaging studies which have shown increased activation o f 
cortical areas associated with imitation in response to observing human stimuli 
compared to unnatural stimuli (e.g. Stevens, Fonlupt, Shiffrar & Decety, 2000) and 
animal action stimuli (Buccino et al., 2004).
Some of the foregoing studies, therefore, appear to provide support for specialist 
theories. However, generalist theories can also explain an effect o f animacy on 
imitation. Under ASL, sensorimotor links are formed through concurrent experience of 
seeing and doing. Since we are unlikely to have gained a great deal o f  experience o f 
seeing a robot performing an action while performing an action ourselves, these links 
would not have had a chance to form, and therefore, we would not expect imitation o f 
robots. However, an important feature of associative learning is stimulus 
generalisation: the effects o f learning with a particular stimulus are not only present in 
behaviour toward that stimulus, but also in behaviour elicited by other stimuli to the 
extent that those stimuli have physical characteristics in common with the learned 
stimulus (Pearce, 1994; 1987). Similar predictions would be made by IM which states 
that action observation primes performance o f an action to the extent that the observed 
and executed actions have similar sensory consequences.
Therefore, a generalist account would expect some imitation o f non-human stimuli to 
the extent that they share features with human stimuli. Some evidence in support of 
this idea has recently been presented by Press et al. (2005; 2006). Using a SRC
47
paradigm to investigate automatic imitation, the authors found some evidence o f 
automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli. In a simple RT task participants were required 
to carry out an open or closed movement in response to human or robotic movements. 
A compatibility effect was observed such that open responses were made faster in 
response to open stimuli than closed stimuli and vice versa. This automatic imitation 
effect was present both for human and robotic stimuli, although the effect was greater 
for human stimuli.
Although there are some mixed findings in this area o f the literature, many o f the 
studies reported show at least some imitation o f non-human stimuli (e.g. Oztop et al, 
2004; Press et al., 2005; 2006). Therefore, the foregoing studies may be more 
consistent with generalist theories than specialist theories. The following section 
provides additional support for generalist theories by examining the role o f experience 
on imitation.
1.3.4.3 Training and expertise
Generalist theories, particularly the ASL model, predict that whether and how well a 
person imitates will depend on their past experience. Imitation o f an observed action is 
only possible if the opportunity to form a link between visual and motor 
representations o f action components arises. Specialist theories do not explicitly deny 
the importance o f learning, but the AIM model suggests that the capacity to imitate is 
innate. Since in this model, the links between sensory and motor representations did 
not arise through learning, but rather are hard-wired, it seems unlikely that they should 
be modifiable by experience. Furthermore, at least one prominent author has explicitly 
stated that learning would not be expected to have a significant impact on innate 
special-purpose mechanisms: Pinker (1997) argued that experience-based alteration o f
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special-purpose mechanisms would usually be maladaptive, and therefore natural 
selection is likely to have acted to prevent such modification. Therefore, studies 
demonstrating the effects of learning and experience on imitation are more consistent 
with generalist than with specialist theories.
Evidence from several behavioural studies shows that, as generalist models predict, 
familiar actions are imitated more successfully than novel actions (Tessari & Rumiati, 
2002; 2004). Participants make fewer errors while carrying out actions such as 
combing their hair, than they do while carrying out unfamiliar actions where similar 
movement components were executed near a different part o f the body (e.g. on the 
torso). In a follow up investigation, the authors found that, when participants practised 
imitating the unfamiliar actions, their performance improved such that they were as 
accurate on these actions as the previously familiar actions.
The ASL model proposes that correlated sensorimotor experience is necessary for 
sensorimotor links to be formed. A number o f studies demonstrate modification of 
imitation following sensorimotor training which provides additional support for 
generalist theories (Gillmeister et al., under review; Press et al., 2006; Heyes et al., 
2005). For example, a training study conducted by Heyes et al. (2005) controlled for 
levels o f  perceptual and motor experience and observed effects o f correlated visual and 
motor experience. During a training phase, Heyes et al. (2005) required half o f the 
participants to open their hand as soon as they saw a stimulus hand begin to open, and 
to close their hand as soon as they saw a stimulus hand close (compatible training 
group). The other half were required to open their hand as soon as they saw a stimulus 
hand begin to close and to close their hand as soon as they saw a stimulus hand open 
(incompatible training group) and vice versa in each case. In the subsequent test
session participants in the compatible group showed an automatic imitation effect. 
That is, in a simple RT task, the participants were faster to execute a pre-specified 
action (e.g. opening the hand) when it was compatible with the observed action 
(opening) than when it was incompatible (closing). In contrast, the incompatible group 
did not show an automatic imitation effect. Thus, training resulted in a modification of 
the connections between perceptual and motor representations. This study 
demonstrates that experience can influence imitation o f a stimulus suggesting that links 
between sensory and motor representations arise through experience, thus supporting 
generalist claims.
In addition to these studies highlighting the effects o f training on overt imitative 
behaviour, some recent studies have demonstrated the effects o f training or experience 
on the mirror neuron system, thought to subserve imitation. While mirror neurons may 
represent the link between sensory and motor representation, it is not yet clear how 
these neural areas acquired their mirror properties. It is assumed by specialist theories 
that mirror neurons are ‘for’ imitation i.e. that natural selection has endowed these 
mirror areas with their imitative properties. Under this view, mirror neurons 
themselves are the special mechanism which performs the match or translation o f 
sensory information into motor output. An alternative view is presented by generalists 
who claim that mirror neurons can ‘do’ imitation but are not necessarily ‘for’ 
imitation. Generalists suggest that mirror neurons acquire their mirror properties 
during development as a side-effect o f general associative learning processes (see 
Keysers, & Perrett, 2004 for a similar view). Under this view, the only reason mirror 
neurons become ‘mirror’ neurons is because the environment provides opportunities to 
associate visual and motor representations o f the same action. Mirror neurons could
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theoretically link completely arbitrary (non-matching) sensory and motor 
representations given the appropriate experience.
Some evidence in support of this generalist view has been provided in a recent TMS 
study by Catmur et a l, (2007), where participants were required to passively observe 
little and index finger movements while TMS was applied to their motor cortex. 
During an initial test phase, increased MEPs were recorded in the little finger 
following observation o f little finger movements and in the index finger following 
index finger movements. Participants were then given either compatible sensorimotor 
training or incompatible sensorimotor training. The compatible training group 
repeatedly performed little finger movements while observing little finger movements 
and index finger movements while observing index finger movements. The 
incompatible training group repeatedly performed little finger movements while 
observing index finger movements and index finger movements while observing little 
finger movements. In the post-training phase the original effect in the incompatible 
group was reversed such that increased MEPs were recorded in the little finger 
following observation o f index finger movements and in the index finger following 
little finger movements.
Other functional imaging studies support the hypothesis that training and expertise can 
influence activation in mirror areas. Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham & 
Haggard (2005) conducted an fMRI study with expert ballet and capoeira dancers to 
investigate influences o f expertise on activation o f motor cortices when observing 
action. The authors found that when participants (e.g. ballet dancers) were observing 
dance actions which they had been trained to perform (ballet movements), there was 
greater activation in premotor and parietal cortices than when they were observing
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actions which they had not been trained to perform (capoeira movements). Cross, 
Hamilton & Grafton (2006) observed similar effects o f expertise in dancers.
Therefore, the foregoing studies provide some support for generalist theories of 
imitation, in particular the ASL model. These findings suggest that general learning 
mechanisms and environmental input are sufficient to account for imitative abilities.
1.4 Summary
The main purpose o f this thesis is to investigate how observation o f action facilitates 
production of matching movements. Therefore, this thesis addresses how we are able 
to imitate and whether this question may be better answered by specialist or generalist 
theories o f imitation. In order to do this, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 challenge some evidence 
that has been put forward to support specialist claims. The final experimental chapter 
provides some specific support for generalist theories.
Chapter 2 examines the role o f mentalistic goals in imitation using the pen-and-cups 
task. This chapter aims to distinguish between a goal-directed account o f imitation and 
a generalist account o f imitation and therefore challenges some evidence in favour o f 
GO ADI. Chapters 3 and 4 examine another line o f evidence that may be consistent 
with a specialist view of imitation, that is, the reported imitation impairment in ASD. 
Chapter 3 employs the pen-and-cups task to examine intentional imitation abilities in 
adults with ASD. In Chapter 4, imitative ability o f individuals with ASD is examined 
using an automatic imitation paradigm.
Finally, Chapter 5 provides specific evidence in support o f generalist theories by 
investigating effector-specificity in imitation. In everyday life and in experimental
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examples, imitation is effector-specific; that is we imitate hand movements with our 
hands and foot movements with our feet. This effector-specificity may be able to 
inform us about the structure of the core mechanisms o f imitation. This chapter 
distinguishes specialist from generalist theories by investigating claims made by ASL, 
IM and AIM concerning the degree o f effector-specificity that should be present in 
imitation.
In summary: this thesis examines the question o f whether imitation is mediated by 
special-purpose or task-general psychological processes. To this end, the experiments 
reported in Chapters 2-5 used both intentional and automatic imitation tasks and these 
tasks have been used to test typically developing individuals and individuals with 
ASD.
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Chapter 2: Intentional imitation in typically developing individuals:
Are ‘mentalistic goals’ necessary to explain how we Imitate?
The aim o f this thesis is to address the question o f how we are able to imitate. This 
question raises a fundamental problem since successful imitation requires a translation 
o f sensory information received from observing an action into the motor commands 
necessary to carry out a matching action (the correspondence problem, Brass & Heyes, 
2005).
Many researchers have suggested that ‘goals’ guide imitative behaviour (e.g. Byrne, 
1993; 2003; Meltzoff, 1995; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; Wohlschlager et al., 2003). 
Goals and their relationship to imitation may be relevant when trying to explain how 
the correspondence problem is solved. Goal-directed theories o f imitation suggest that 
intermediate recoding occurs between observation and execution o f a body movement. 
These theories imply that, in addition to the visual representation o f  the observed 
movement and the motor representation that drives muscle movement, imitation 
involves a third kind of representation. This third type o f representation is neither 
sensory nor motor, but is rather at the level o f the goal o f the act. When we observe an 
action, we do not try to sequence the action elements observed into specific 
movements made; rather we extract the goal o f the action. Consequently, such action 
goals make it possible for a relevant motor programme to be activated. Goals, 
potentially, represent the link between the seen but unfelt and the felt but unseen, and 
therefore they may be the solution to the correspondence problem (e.g. Bekkering & 
Wohlschlager, 2002; Byrne, 1993; Byrne & Russon, 1998; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). 
The aim o f this chapter is to investigate the role o f goals in imitation and to discover 
whether goals can provide an explanation for how we imitate.
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Both of the specialist theories addressed in this thesis highlight the role o f goals in 
imitation, and GOADI provides an explicit statement o f this view. According to 
GOADI (e.g. Bekkering et al., 2000; Gleissner et al., 2000; Wohlschlager & 
Bekkering, 2002; Bekkering & Wohlschlager, 2002), goals are extracted from 
perceived movements. The goal representation then activates its most commonly 
associated motor program, irrespective o f whether this matches the movement 
performed by the model. Similarly, under the AIM model (e.g. Meltzoff & Moore, 
1997), perceived actions are actively processed in order to infer the model’s goals. 
These goals are then translated into supramodal representations which are used to 
produce motor commands.
As discussed in Chapter 1, a number o f findings have been argued to demonstrate the 
role o f  goals in imitation and thus provide specific support for GOADI. These findings 
demonstrate that, when required to imitate, children and adults frequently perform 
movements that systematically differ from the model’s movements. It appears that, 
instead of faithfully reproducing all aspects of a movement, individuals reproduce the 
goal of that movement. Bekkering and colleagues have investigated how the goal o f  an 
action (such as touching a dot on a table, or placing a pen in a cup) affects the 
translation from perception to action and have shown that children and adults primarily 
focus on reproducing the goal of the action and not on reproducing the means used 
(Bekkering et al., 2000; Wohlschlager et al., 2003). For example, the pen-and-cups 
task allows three components of action to be manipulated independently: object 
selection, effector selection and grip selection. On each trial in this speeded response 
procedure the participant sees a model move a centrally located pen into one o f two 
coloured cups (object), using his right or his left hand (effector), while grasping the 
pen with his thumb pointing up or down (grip). Adults typically make fewer cup errors
than hand errors and fewer hand errors than grip errors (Avikainen et al., 2003; 
Wohlschlager & Bekkering 2002). If one supposes that the primary goal o f each action 
is to place the pen into a cup, then this cup<hand<grip error pattern supports the view 
that participants code an action in terms o f its goal, and when processing resources are 
limited, this goal is more accurately reproduced than the means by which the goal is 
achieved. This view has been supported by a number o f other similar findings 
(Gleissner et al., 1999; Gattis et al., 2002; Head, 1963; Want & Gattis, 2005).
However, one critical issue is the exact meaning o f the term ‘goal’, since the term has 
been used in a variety of contexts across the literature. While some authors assume that 
it refers to an observable, physical, end-state or outcome, others imply that it is a more 
mentalistic concept relying on intention understanding. Under the latter view, theory o f 
mind abilities are needed to infer a model’s goals. For example, Wohlschlager and 
colleagues (2003) suggest that goals are action outcomes or end-states, stating that 
“although using action goals as the core concept, GOADI does not say anything about 
the representation o f the intentions o f the model in the imitator. In our view the 
representation of intentionality or any theory o f mind is not necessary to explain 
imitation”. However, a contrasting claim was made by Gattis et al. (p202, 2002) who 
explicitly stated that “goals are mental states”. Under this view, a goal is understood to 
be the inferred intention of the model and this view represents a mentalistic 
interpretation o f the GOADI model (henceforth mGOADI).
Thus, according to goal-directed theories, any recoding between perception and action 
may represent either physical, end-state goals or mentalistic goals. Some recent 
evidence, however, suggests that actions are not always coded in terms o f physical, 
end-state goals. Bird et al. (2007) carried out a series o f experiments using the pen-
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and-cups task and demonstrated that the cup<hand<grip error pattern could be altered 
such that the outcome o f an action was not always the most accurately imitated 
component. Whereas in the original version of the pen-and-cups task, the cup 
component is the only component that is differentially coloured (i.e. one cup was 
coloured blue and the other red), Bird and colleagues manipulated the colour coding 
such that either the cup, hand or grip component was differentially coloured. For 
example, in one condition, the cups were both a neutral colour but the model and 
participant wore coloured gloves, such that one hand was blue and one was red. 
Altering which component was coloured resulted in a modification o f the error pattern 
such that the coloured component was always the most accurately reproduced 
component (‘colour minimum error pattern’). Thus, the means (hand or grip selection) 
o f carrying out an action were more accurately imitated than the end-state or goal (cup 
selection) o f that action.
The authors suggested that it is not necessary to represent physical end-state goals in 
order to translate observed actions into executed actions. Rather, imitation 
performance on this task can be explained by more general, perceptual and attentional 
processes. The authors suggested that differentially colouring a particular component 
enhances the discriminability o f that component and this perceptual enhancement, 
rather than goal attribution, explains error patterns in this task.
Thus, if goals are understood to be physical end-states, then Bird et al’s results 
undermine the hypothesis that observed actions are always coded as goals for 
imitation. However, if goals are understood to be intentions, the results o f Bird et al. do 
not bear directly on the goal-directed hypothesis. It is possible that shifting the colour 
cue in the pen and cups task induces a revision o f the imitator’s inferences about the
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model’s intentions. For example, adding colour to the hand may have resulted in the 
observed action being coded as, ‘The model intends to grasp the pen with his red hand 
and put it in a cup”, rather than, ‘The model intends to place the pen in the red cup” 
when the cups are coloured. Therefore, the colour minimum error pattern reported by 
Bird et al. may have been due to inferences about the model’s intentions. Under this 
interpretation o f GOADI, actions are represented in terms o f mentalistic goals, which 
is in line with the mGOADI variant of the model forwarded by Gattis et al. (2002).
Support for the idea that mentalistic goals are intrinsic to imitation has been provided 
by a number o f authors. In a study by Meltzoff (1995), infants either observed a 
demonstrator successfully carrying out a target action on an object or attempting to 
carry out the action but failing to do so. For example, the demonstrator attempted to 
pull apart a dumbbell-shaped toy but their hand ‘accidentally’ slipped off one end o f 
the dumbbell, such that they did not successfully pull it apart. Meltzoff found that 18- 
month-old infants produced target acts as frequently following observation o f these 
“failed attempts” as they did following observation of the demonstrator successfully 
completing the target actions. Meltzoff concluded that 18-month-old infants represent 
an action in terms o f the intended goal and it is this goal that is imitated rather than 
specific movements.
In a second experiment, infants were shown a mechanical device with two pincers that 
mimicked the way the demonstrator had acted on a dumbbell-shaped toy in the failed- 
attempt display (Meltzoff, 1995). Pincers grasped the dumbbell on the two ends and 
pulled them outward, but one pincer slipped off one o f the two ends. After watching 
the unsuccessful acts demonstrated by the mechanical device, infants pulled the 
dumbbell apart less frequently than when the same action was demonstrated by a
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human actor. Given that attribution o f intentions is unlikely when observing a 
mechanical device, this finding represents further evidence that infants’ imitation o f 
target acts in failed attempt conditions is due to the tendency to code actions in terms 
of the underlying intention o f the model and to imitate that intention, rather than 
faithfully to copy the action demonstrated.
However, it could be argued that intention reading is not necessary to explain the 
results from the foregoing studies; general-purpose mechanisms rather than mental- 
state goal inferences could explain imitation in these instances. For example, rather 
than demonstrating that infants were reading and copying the intentions of the actor, 
behavioural reproduction of a modelled action may occur when observation o f the 
manipulations o f the demonstrator draws an individual’s attention to relevant parts of 
objects. Thus, the individual learns to adjust to specific environmental features without 
learning about the observed actions (Tomasello, 1996; Whiten & Ham, 1992).
Some evidence in support of this hypothesis has been provided by Huang, Heyes & 
Charman (2002), who examined the role o f general processes in a failed attempts 
paradigm. To do this, they replicated Meltzoff s (1995) study and included two 
additional conditions. First, in a novel emulation learning condition, infants were 
exposed to the initial and end states of the target display but not to the experimenter’s 
manipulations o f the test objects (which were occluded by a screen). Second, in the 
spatial contiguity condition, the experimenter moved the two individual parts o f the 
object set to bring them in close proximity so that the target-relevant parts were 
spatially contiguous with each other. It was demonstrated that infants in the emulation- 
learning and spatial contiguity conditions produced as many target acts as infants in the
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full-demonstration and failed-attempt conditions. This suggested that intention reading 
was not necessary to explain the results from failed attempt studies.
Therefore, findings which purport to show that mentalistic goals are intrinsic to 
imitation can also be explained with reference to general processes. This ‘general 
process account’, claims that the mechanisms that mediate perception and attention to 
visual stimuli in a range of tasks, both imitative and non-imitative, are sufficient to 
explain the findings that are commonly understood to support a goal-directed view. 
Therefore, representing the intentions o f the model is not necessary to explain certain 
imitative behaviour. For example, when one’s attention is drawn to a particular aspect 
of a movement, one may be more likely to reproduce this aspect, without representing 
the intentions o f the model. Alternatively, if a particular component o f a movement is 
differentially coloured, such as the two cups in the pen-and-cups experiments, one may 
be more accurate in reproducing this component because it is easier to discriminate one 
cup from the other.
This general process account is consistent with a generalist view o f imitation which 
supposes that there are no imitation-specific processes. A generalist account of 
imitation would therefore deny the involvement o f imitation-specific goal attribution 
processes. Consequently, the general process account both challenges claims made by 
specialist theories about the intrinsic role of goals in imitation and is also consistent 
with generalist theories of imitation. Thus, investigating whether goals or general 
processes better account for imitation behaviour is highly relevant to the topics 
discussed in this thesis.
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The aim of this chapter is to distinguish between goal-directed and a general process 
account o f imitation. The experiments carried out by the authors o f GOADI provide 
the best evidence in favour of the idea that goals guide imitative performance. 
Furthermore, mGOADI provides the most clear and well-specified theory highlighting 
the intrinsic role o f mentalistic goals in imitation. Therefore, the experiments carried 
out in this chapter used manipulations o f the pen-and-cups task, a paradigm commonly 
used to support the view that goals are intrinsic to imitation.
Two tasks were used in Experiment 2.1; one where participants were required to 
imitate actions carried out by a human model, and one where participants were 
required to carry out actions in response to moving geometric shapes. Therefore 
participants either responded to naturalistic or geometric stimuli. Likewise, there were 
two tasks in Experiment 2.2; one where participants were required to perform actions 
in response to static geometric shapes and one where participants were required to 
make verbal responses to static geometric shapes. Therefore, participants either carried 
out movement or verbal responses. Furthermore, in these experiments, the colouring o f 
the stimuli was altered, such that, in some conditions the hand or grip was 
differentially coloured instead of the cup. Through these manipulations, I investigated 
the robustness o f the colour minimum error pattern previously observed by Bird et al. 
and sought to distinguish the predictions o f mGOADI from those of a general process 
account. The specific rationale for each experiment is given below.
Experiment 2.1
In Experiment 2.1, participants either carried out a naturalistic or a geometric version 
o f the pen-and-cups task. In both tasks, participants were required to grasp a pen using 
either their left or right hand, with a thumbs-up or thumbs-down grip, and to place the
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pen into one o f two cups. In the naturalistic version, participants were required to copy 
actions carried out by a human model. In the geometric task, participants were required 
to respond to moving, abstract, geometric shapes. Each participant carried out two 
conditions o f the experiment; one where the cups were differentially coloured (one red 
and one blue) and one where the hands were differentially coloured (one red and one 
blue). In these tasks, error patterns were recorded to investigate the source o f the 
colour minimum error pattern.
If, as suggested by mGOADI, this error pattern is due to inferences about the model’s 
intended goals, then the colour minimum error pattern should not be observed in a task 
where participants are required to respond to inanimate geometric stimuli. In this task, 
there is no human model from which to infer intentions, instead, geometric shapes 
specify which movement to make. Abstract geometric shapes are unlikely to support 
the attribution o f intentions. Therefore, one would not expect to observe the colour 
minimum error pattern when participants are responding to geometric stimuli.
However, under the general processes account, the colour minimum error pattern is 
due to general processes. These processes influence a range o f tasks and do not rely on 
attribution o f intentions. Therefore, under this view, the colour minimum error pattern 
should be present in both naturalistic and geometric conditions. That is, in both the 
naturalistic and geometric task, when the cups are differentially coloured, cup selection 
should be the most accurate component, and when the hands are differentially 
coloured, hand selection should be the most accurate component.
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2.1.1 Method
Participants. Twenty-four consenting, healthy participants with an average age of
22.5 years, 13 male, were recruited from the UCL Department o f Psychology database 
and paid a small honorarium for their participation. All were right-handed, had normal 
or correct-to-normal vision, and were proficient in the English language. They were 
naive with respect to the purpose o f the experiment. Participants were randomly 
assigned to two groups; naturalistic and geometric. Each participant was tested under 
both conditions (hands-coloured and cups-coloured) in a counterbalanced order. One 
participant who did not make any errors was replaced. This experiment, and all 
experiments reported in this thesis, was performed with local ethical committee 
approval and in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 
Declaration o f Helsinki.
Stimuli and apparatus. Participants were required to respond to stimuli by performing 
an action involving grasping a pen and inserting it into one o f two cups. Factorial 
combination o f the three components (cup, hand and grip) resulted in 8 possible 
responses. Participants could make a response using either their left or right hand, to 
make a thumbs-up or thumbs-down grip, to place the pen into one o f the two cups.
Participants in the naturalistic group responded to videos o f a model carrying out the 
actions. For participants in the geometric group the correct response on each trial was 
indicated by a short stimulus animation. In these animations, the hands were replaced 
by squares, the grips by short rectangles attached to the squares, and the cups by 
ellipses.
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The geometric shapes were matched to the naturalistic videos in terms of their spatial 
and temporal characteristics. Each geometric shape was approximately the same size 
as the corresponding component in the naturalistic videos. Topographical spatial 
locations o f the shapes were equivalent to spatial locations in the naturalistic stimuli. 
Each shape moved for approximately the same amount of time and with similar 
trajectory to the corresponding naturalistic component. Figure 1 below depicts the 
starting positions o f the stimuli in the naturalistic condition ( la  & lb) and the 
geometric condition (lc  & Id).
Figure 1: Experiment 2.1. Images depicting the starting position of the stimuli for a) the 
cups-coloured; b) the hands-coloured condition in the naturalistic task; c) the cups- 
coloured; and d) the hands-coloured condition in the geometric task.
In the naturalistic task, each video stimulus showed the hands, arms and torso of an 
adult female as she performed an action sequence. At the beginning of the action 
sequence, the pen stood upright on a black marker that was fixed to the table. The 
model grasped the pen using either their left or right hand, with a thumbs-up or 
thumbs-down grip, to place the pen into one of two cups. Following these movements, 
the model carried out the actions described above in reverse to return the pen to the 
black marker. As in previous studies, in the cups-coloured condition, participants saw
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the model performing with ungloved hands, and directing her movements to one red 
cup and one blue cup. The model in the hands-coloured condition wore a red glove on 
their left hand, and a blue glove on their right hand. The cups presented in the hands- 
coloured condition were both a light beige, flesh-like colour.
The mean duration o f action sequences was 4660ms (SEM = 128.0) for the cups- 
coloured condition and 4650ms (SEM = 45.0) for the hands-coloured condition. The 
mean ITI was 1250ms (SEM = 37.5) for the cups-coloured condition, and 1213ms 
(SEM = 36.4) for the hands-coloured condition. Video stimuli were digitally recorded 
and presented in colour on an IBM compatible laptop computer with a 38cm screen 
(resolution 1024 X 678 pixels), at approximately one third o f life size. Video clips 
(720 X 576 pixels) were presented at a frame rate o f 25 fps and a viewing distance o f 
approximately 90cm.
In the geometric task, at the beginning o f each trial one o f the squares moved 
downwards with a curved trajectory until it reached a long rectangle. While moving 
toward the long rectangle the square rotated 45 degrees either clockwise or 
anticlockwise so that the short rectangle attached to it either pointed upwards to the top 
of the screen (i.e. was positioned on the top of the square) or downwards to the bottom 
o f the screen (i.e. was positioned on the bottom of the square) as it reached the long 
rectangle. After it had reached the rectangle, both the long rectangle and square moved 
downwards together with a curved trajectory to one o f the ellipses. While moving 
towards the ellipse, the objects rotated 90 degrees either clockwise or anticlockwise so 
that the long rectangle, and the direction in which the small rectangle was pointing (up 
or down), were inverted when they reached the ellipse. Once the objects had reached 
the ellipse they paused momentarily and then followed the above steps in reverse until
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they had reached their starting state. The reverse movements were the equivalent o f 
those used by the human model in the naturalistic task to replace the pen on the black 
marker.
In the cups-coloured condition the squares (and small rectangles attached to them) 
were a neutral off-white colour and the ellipses were coloured, one red and one blue. In 
the hands-coloured condition the ellipses were a neutral off-white colour and the 
squares (and small rectangles attached to them) were coloured, one red and one blue. 
In all conditions the blue component was on the left hand side o f the stimulus set and 
the red component was on the right. The mean duration o f each action sequence, from 
shape movement onset until the shapes returned to their initial configuration, was 
4500ms (SEM = 165.0) and the ITI was 1100ms (SEM = 39.8). The animation stimuli 
were presented in colour on an IBM compatible laptop computer with a 38 cm screen 
(resolution 1024 X 678 pixels), at a viewing distance of approximately 90cm.
To make their responses participants sat at a table upon which was placed a pen and 
two cups, in the same spatial configuration as used in previous versions o f the pen-and- 
cups task. Figure 2 depicts the spatial relationships between the objects and the 
effectors at the beginning o f a trial in the naturalistic condition.
66
"Lr ,‘7/i J f r / f
=o =0 O
-• o <3 O
0,
a) b)
Figure 2: Experiment 2.1. Diagrams indicating the spatial relationships between the 
model’s and observer’s objects and effectors at the beginning of each trial for a) the 
cups-coloured condition and b) the hands-coloured condition in the naturalistic 
condition. The small dark circles represent pen locations. The larger circles represent 
cups with handles. There were equivalent spatial relationships between the shape 
stimuli and the response objects and effectors in the geometric condition.
The cups were placed 35cm from the front of the participant’s body, 30cm apart, and 
equidistant from the participant’s midline. At the beginning o f each trial, the pen was 
placed on a marker, a black dot, directly in front of the participant and 23cm from their 
body. Each cup was 8cm in diameter and 10cm high. The pens (1.5cm diameter, 14cm 
high) were white with green caps. A transparent plastic disk, 4.8cm in diameter, was 
attached to the base of each pen to increase its stability when at rest in the upright 
position. In the cups-coloured condition one cup was blue and one red. In the hands- 
coloured condition subjects wore a red glove on their left hand and a blue glove on 
their right hand. The cups were both a neutral off-white colour. The red cup or glove 
was placed on the participant’s left hand side and the blue cup or glove on their right 
hand side.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. Each sat at a table 
bearing the object set and, beyond it, the laptop computer on which the stimulus
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animations were presented. They were told that they would be required to make some 
movements involving placing a pen into one o f the cups.
Participants in the naturalistic group were told that they should copy the movements 
shown on the screen and participants in the geometric group were told that they would 
see shapes moving on the screen that would indicate which movement to make. 
Participants were asked to pay equal attention to three aspects o f their response: In the 
cups-coloured condition these were the hand (left/right), the grip (up/down) and the 
cup (red/blue) and in the hands-coloured condition these were the hand (red/blue), the 
grip (up/down) and the cup (left/right).
More specifically, the instructions for those in the naturalistic group were as follows: 
the cups-coloured group was instructed 1) to use their left hand when the model used 
her left hand, and to use their right hand when the model used her right hand; 2) to grip 
the pen in the same thumb up or thumb down configuration as the model; and 3) to 
place the pen in the cup o f the same colour as the model. The hands-coloured group 
was instructed 1) to use their red-coloured hand when the model used her red-coloured 
hand, and to use their blue-coloured hand when the model used her blue-coloured 
hand; 2) to grip the pen in the same thumb up or thumb down configuration as the 
model; and 3) to place the pen in the cup on their left when the model placed the pen in 
the cup on her left, and to place the pen in the cup on their right when the model placed 
the pen in the cup on her right.
Instructions for those in the geometric group were as follows: in the cups-coloured 
condition, participants were instructed 1) to use their left hand when the square on the 
right moved, and to use their right hand when the square on the left moved; 2) to grip
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the pen in the thumbs up position when the small rectangle was positioned on the top 
o f the square and to use the thumbs down position when the small rectangle was 
positioned on the bottom of the square; and 3) to place the pen in the red cup when the 
objects moved to the red ellipse and in the blue cup when the objects moved to the blue 
ellipse. In the hands-coloured condition participants were instructed 1) to use their red 
hand when the red square moved, and to use their blue hand when the blue square 
moved; 2) to grip the pen in the thumbs up position when the small rectangle was 
positioned on the top of the square and to use the thumbs down position when the 
small rectangle was positioned on the bottom o f the square; and 3) to place the pen in 
the cup on their left when the objects moved to the ellipse on the right o f the screen 
and in the cup on their right when the objects moved to the ellipse on the left o f the 
screen.
Thus, in both tasks participants’ responses were spatially incompatible with the 
movements o f the stimuli. For example, in the naturalistic task, if the model used their 
left hand, which was located on the right hand side o f the screen, participants were 
required to use their spatially incompatible left hand. Similarly, in the geometric 
condition if the shape on the right moved, participants were required to use their 
spatially incompatible left hand. Spatially incompatible stimulus-response mappings 
were used here, as in some previous pen-and-cups experiments (Bird et al., in 2007; 
Wohlschlager & Bekkering, 2002), because this arrangement yields more errors, and 
therefore reduces the risk of ceiling effects in this task (Avikainen et al., 2003).
Each participant completed 10 practice trials followed by 80 test trials in each o f the 
two conditions. The test trials comprised 10 presentations o f each o f the eight action 
sequences in the cups-coloured or the hands-coloured set, in random order.
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Performance was videotaped and the experimenter recorded, for each trial, which 
hand, grip and cup had been selected by the participant. An error was recorded if the 
participant selected the incorrect hand or cup or used the incorrect grip as specified by 
the instructions. Thus, there were three types o f errors, relating to the hand, grip and 
cup components o f the task.
2.1.2 Results and discussion
The percentage error score for each component (cup, hand and grip) in each condition 
was calculated by dividing the number o f errors made when responding to the target 
component in the target condition by the total number o f errors made across all 
components in both conditions. For example, percentage cup error was calculated by 
dividing the number of trials on which the participant selected the wrong cup by the 
total number o f cup, hand and grip errors made by that participant across all trials in 
both conditions.
As indicated in Figure 3, similar error patterns were observed for both the naturalistic 
and geometric tasks. In the cups-coloured condition participants showed the 
cup<hand<grip error pattern, while errors in the hands-coloured condition followed a 
different pattern, with the frequencies o f cup and grip errors both exceeding the 
frequency o f hand errors. Thus, a colour minimum error pattern was observed in both 
the naturalistic and geometric tasks.
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Figure 3: Experiment 2.1. Mean percentage of errors in the naturalistic and geometric 
versions of the task. Grey bars represent errors on the cup component, white bars 
represent errors on the hand component and black bars represent errors on the grip 
component. Vertical bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with colour (cups-coloured, hands-coloured), and 
error type (cup, hand, grip) as within-subjects factors and task (naturalistic, geometric) 
as a between-subjects factor revealed significant main effects o f colour (F(2,22) = 6.80, 
p=.016), error type (F(2,22) = 19.78, p<.001), and a significant colour x error type 
interaction (F(2,22)= 13.11, p<.000). There were no significant effects or interactions 
involving the task variable (F < 1). Within-subjects contrasts, applied separately to the 
data from each condition, indicated that for the naturalistic task, in the cups-coloured 
condition there was a linear increase in percentage error across the cup, hand and grip
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categories (F (l, 11) = 33.11, p<.001), and in the hands-coloured condition the 
relationship between percentage error and error type was quadratic (F (l, 11) = 11.77, 
p=.006). Similarly, for the geometric task, in the cups-coloured condition, there was a 
linear increase in percentage error across the cup, hand and grip categories (F(l,l 1) = 
18.60, p=.001), and in the hands-coloured condition the relationship between 
percentage error and error type was quadratic (F(l,11) = 25.62, p<.000). In these 
analyses no other polynomial contrasts approached significance.
All o f the foregoing analyses were repeated using absolute numbers o f errors, rather 
than percentage error. In all cases, all and only the effects reported above reached 
significance. Thus, there were no differences between the absolute error and 
percentage error analyses.
In summary, the same pattern of performance was observed in the naturalistic and 
geometric versions of the task where abstract geometric stimuli, rather than 
observation of human action, specified the target response. In both tasks a colour 
minimum error pattern emerged. According to mGOADI, this error pattern is due to 
inferences about the models intentions. Since the stimuli used in the geometric task 
were unlikely to support attribution of intentions, mGOADI would not expect a colour 
minimum error to occur in the geometric task. Therefore, the present results are 
inconsistent with the predictions made by mGOADI. They are, however, consistent 
with the general processes account which suggests that the processes that guide 
imitation are general and are likely to guide a range o f tasks. These processes do not 
rely on the attribution o f  intentions and should, therefore, be present both when 
responding to naturalistic human stimuli and geometric stimuli.
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Experiment 2.2
In Experiment 2.1, performance did not differ between the naturalistic and geometric 
version o f the task, thus providing evidence inconsistent with the idea that mentalistic 
goals are necessary for imitative performance.
However, this conclusion rests on the assumption that abstract geometric shapes do not 
support attribution o f intentions and this assumption may not be valid for the stimuli 
used in Experiment 2.1. It is therefore plausible that performance in the geometric task 
did not differ from performance in the naturalistic task because participants were 
attributing intentions to the moving geometric shapes. If this is the case then the results 
presented in Experiment 2.1 may not be inconsistent with mGOADI.
It has been demonstrated that viewing animated sequences of simple shapes conveys 
the impression o f intentional goal-directed movements in typically developing 
individuals (Heider & Simmel, 1944). More recent studies investigating theory o f mind 
abilities have shown that participants engage in mentalising when asked to describe the 
movements o f geometric shapes (Castelli, Happe, Frith & Frith, 2002, Castelli, Frith, 
Happe & Frith, 2000). It has also been demonstrated that the attribution o f agency is 
based on the type o f motion or on interaction between objects (Tremoulet & Feldman, 
2000; Heider & Simmel, 1944; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). Therefore, shapes that do 
not move and do not interact with each other are less likely to support the attribution of 
mental states.
In Experiment 2.2, static geometric stimuli were used in order to minimise the 
possibility that participants would attribute intentions to the shapes. I f  inferences about 
mentalistic goals were responsible for the error patterns observed in both conditions in
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Experiment 2.1, then one would not expect the same pattern to be observed in 
Experiment 2.2 because the stimuli used in Experiment 2.2 do not afford the attribution 
of mentalistic goals. Conversely, if general processes are responsible for the error 
patterns observed in both conditions in Experiment 2.1, then the same error patterns 
should be observed in Experiment 2.2: that is, the smallest proportion o f errors should 
be made on the coloured dimension, e.g. fewest cup errors in the cups-coloured 
condition, and fewest hand errors in the hands-co loured condition.
Experiment 2.2 also contrasted movement responses to the static geometric stimuli, in 
which participants moved a pen into a cup, with verbal responses to the same stimuli. 
When responding verbally, participants named the task components, for example, by 
saying “red” when the red shape flashed, and “blue” when the blue shape flashed. The 
verbal task was introduced as an additional test of the hypothesis that mentalistic goal 
processing is an integral component o f imitation. Some researchers have suggested that 
goal processing is an integral component of imitation in the sense that it occurs only, 
or plays a more important role, when participants are imitating - making isomorphic 
responses to action stimuli - than when they are responding symbolically or in a non­
isomorphic way to action stimuli (e.g. Wohlschlager et al., 2003). If this is correct, 
then even if participants attribute intentions to the static geometric stimuli in the 
movement task, they should not do so in the verbal task. Therefore, a colour minimum 
error pattern in the movement task and not in the verbal task, would suggest that 
mentalistic goals were attributed to the static geometric stimuli in the movement task, 
and that this was responsible for the colour minimum error pattern. In contrast, a 
colour minimum error pattern in both movement and verbal tasks would confirm that 
this pattern is due to general perceptual and attentional processes, rather than to goal 
attribution.
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Finally, a grips-coloured manipulation was added to Experiment 2.2 to check the 
generality o f the finding, predicted by the general processes account and reported in 
Experiment 2.1, that the smallest proportion o f errors will be made on the coloured 
component. If this is a general principal, then one would expect, not only minimum 
cup errors in the cups-coloured condition and minimal hand errors in the hands- 
co loured condition, but also minimal grip errors in the grips-co loured condition. In 
order to vary grip colour in a manner analogous to that in which cup and hand colour 
were varied, the grip variable was changed such that, instead o f a thumbs up or thumbs 
down grip, participants were required to use an inside or outside grip. For an inside 
grip, participants were required to grip the pen between their index and middle fingers 
and for the outside grip they held the pen between their ring and little fingers.
2.2.1 Method
Participants. A further 24 consenting, healthy participants with an average age o f
22.6 years, 8 male, were recruited from the UCL Department o f Psychology database 
and paid a small honorarium for their participation. All were right-handed, had normal 
or correct-to-normal vision, and were proficient in the English language. They were 
naive with respect to the purpose of the experiment. Participants were randomly 
assigned to two groups; movement task and verbal task. Each participant was tested 
under all three conditions (hands-co loured, cups-coloured and grips-co loured) in a 
counterbalanced order. Two participants, who made no errors during the test trials, 
were replaced.
Apparatus and stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were similar to those in the 
geometric condition o f Experiment 2.1 except that the shapes on the screen did not 
change their positions in the course o f each trial. Instead, they flashed to indicate the
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correct response. Figure 4 depicts the layout of the new stimuli. The spatial 
configuration o f the objects on the screen and the temporal properties o f the flashing 
were matched to the movements from Experiment 2.1, i.e. each shape flashed for the 
same amount of time as it had moved in Experiment 2.1.
To enhance grip discriminability, Experiment 2.2 used a new grip manipulation. 
Instead of being required to perform an up or down grip, participants were required to 
use an inside or outside grip. For an inside grip the participant held the pen between 
their index and middle fingers and for the outside grip they held the pen between their 
ring and little fingers. The new grip manipulation was represented in the stimulus 
layout by two rectangles attached to the bottom of the square. These indicated the use 
of either an inside or outside grip.
H I 1 *BZB 0 1 aC__3• # . 0 o b 0 0 .
Figure 4: Experiment 2.2. Images depicting the starting position o f the stimuli in a) the 
cups-coloured condition, b) the hands-co loured and c) the grips-co loured condition.
During each trial, consecutive stimulus flashes indicated which action to perform. 
Initially, one o f the squares flashed on and off the screen (specifying which hand was 
to be used), followed by the long rectangular object (representing the pen) and finally 
one of the two ellipses (specifying the target cup). While the square flashed, one o f the 
small rectangles attached to the squares disappeared briefly so that only one remained 
visible (specifying which grip to select). After the ellipse flashed, the shapes then 
followed the above steps in reverse, finishing with the square flashing. The reverse
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flashes were the equivalent of those used by the human model in the naturalistic task to 
replace the pen on the black marker.
For participants in the movement group, the response apparatus was the same as that 
used in Experiment 2.1 for the cups-coloured and hands-coloured conditions except 
that in the grips-co loured condition the participant wore gloves with coloured fingers. 
The gloves were an off-white neutral colour except for blue index and middle fingers 
and red ring and little fingers. There was no pen and cup apparatus present for 
participants in the verbal group.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2.1 except as follows. Each 
participant was tested under three conditions: cups-co loured, hands-coloured and 
grips-co loured. The order of cups-co loured, hands-coloured and grips-co loured 
conditions was counterbalanced across participants.
In the movement task participants were told to make movements in response to the 
flashing shapes. More specifically, in the cups-coloured condition the instructions 
distinguished cups by their colour and distinguished hands and grips using spatial 
codes. Thus, participants were told 1) to use their left hand when the square on the 
right flashed, and to use their right hand when the square on the left flashed; 2) to use 
an inside grip when the rectangle on the inside remained visible or an outside grip 
when the rectangle on the outside remained visible; and 3) to place the pen in the red 
cup when the red ellipse flashed and in the blue cup when the blue ellipse flashed.
In the hands-coloured conditions, the instructions distinguished hands by their colour 
and distinguished hands and grips using spatial codes. Thus, participants were told 1)
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to use their red hand when the red square flashed, and to use their blue hand when the 
blue square flashed; 2) to use an inside grip when the rectangle on the inside remained 
visible or an outside grip when the rectangle on the outside remained visible; and 3) to 
place the pen in the cup on the left when the square on the right flashed, and in the cup 
on the right when the square on the left flashed.
In the grips-co loured conditions, the instructions distinguished grips by their colour 
and distinguished hands and cups using spatial codes. Thus, participants were told 1) to 
use their left hand when the square on the right flashed, and to use their right hand 
when the square on the left flashed; 2) to use their red fingers to grip when the red 
rectangle remained visible and their blue fingers when the blue rectangle remained 
visible; and 3) to place the pen in the cup on the left when the square on the right 
flashed, and to place the pen in the cup on the right when the square on the left flashed.
In the verbal task, participants were required to respond verbally to the flashing shapes. 
More specifically, in the cups-coloured conditions the instructions distinguished cups 
by their colour and distinguished hands and grips using spatial codes. Thus, 
participants were told 1) to say “left”, when the square on the right flashed, and to say 
“right” when the square on the left flashed; 2) to say “inside” when the rectangle on 
the inside remained visible and “outside” when the rectangle on the outside remained 
visible; and 3) to say “red” when the red ellipse flashed and “blue” when the blue 
ellipse flashed.
In the hands-coloured condition, the instructions distinguished hands by their colour 
and distinguished hands and grips using spatial codes. Thus, participants were told 1) 
to say “red” when the red square flashed, and to say “blue” when the blue square
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flashed; 2) to say “inside” when the rectangle on the inside remained visible and 
“outside” when the rectangle on the outside remained visible; and 3) to say “left” when 
the ellipse on the right flashed, and “right” when the ellipse on the left flashed.
In the grips-co loured condition, the instructions distinguished grips by their colour and 
distinguished hands and cups using spatial codes. Thus, participants were told 1) to say 
“left” when the square on the right flashed, and to say “right” when the square on the 
left flashed; 2) to say “red” when the red rectangle remained visible and “blue” when 
the blue rectangle remained visible; and 3) to say “left” when the ellipse on the right 
flashed, and “right” when the ellipse on the left flashed.
2.2.2 Results and discussion
As in Experiment 2.1, the percentage error score for each component (cup, hand and 
grip) in each condition was calculated by dividing the number o f errors made when 
responding to the target component in the target condition by the total number of errors 
made across all components in both conditions.
As indicated in Figure 5, similar error patterns were observed in the movement and 
verbal tasks, in that the coloured component was the most accurate component in all 
three conditions of both tasks. In the cups-coloured condition the frequency o f hand 
and grip errors both exceeded the frequency of cup errors, while errors in the hands- 
coloured and grips-co loured conditions followed a different pattern. In the hands- 
coloured condition, the frequencies of cup and grip errors both exceeded the frequency 
of hand errors, and in the grips-co loured condition the frequency o f hand and cup 
errors both exceeded the frequency of grip errors.
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Figure 5: Experiment 2.2. Mean percentage of errors in the movement and verbal 
response versions o f the task. Grey bars represent errors on the cup component, white 
bars represent errors on the hand component and black bars represent errors on the grip 
component. Vertical bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
ANOVA was applied to the percentage error scores, with colour (cups-coloured, 
hands-coloured, grips-co loured), and error type (cup, hand, grip) as within-subjects 
factors and task (movement, verbal) as a between-subjects factor revealed a significant 
main effect of colour (F(2,22) = 4.23, p=.021), a significant coloured x error type 
interaction (F(2,22) = 16.712, p<.001) and a significant colour x error type x task 
interaction (F(2,22) = 3.98, p=.005). Inspection of the means suggests that the three- 
way interaction was due to different proportions of cup and grip errors, across tasks, in 
the hands-coloured condition. This may reflect the difference in difficulty between 
identification and execution of the grip component. Importantly, however, in both 
tasks, the hand represents the most accurate component in the hands-coloured
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condition, and thus, the three-way interaction result does not represent a departure 
from the colour minimum error pattern.
Within-subjects contrasts, applied separately to the data from each condition, indicated 
that for the movement task, in the cups-coloured condition, there was a linear increase 
in percentage error across the cup, hand and grip categories (F(l,l 1) = 2.64, p=018), 
in the hands-coloured condition the relationship between percentage error and error 
type was quadratic (F (l,l 1) = 21.71, p=.001), and in the grips-co loured condition there 
was a linear decrease in percentage error across the cup, hand and grip categories 
(F(l,l 1) = 37.63, p<.000). Similarly in the verbal task, in the cups-coloured condition 
there was a linear increase in percentage error across the cup, hand and grip categories 
(F (l,11) = 13.63, p=.004), in the hands-coloured condition the relationship between 
percentage error and error type was quadratic (F(l, 11) = 7.75, p=.018), and in the 
grips-co loured condition there was a linear decrease in percentage error across the cup, 
hand and grip categories (F(l,l 1) = 5.11, p=.045).
As in Experiment 2.1, the foregoing analyses were repeated using absolute errors as 
opposed to the percentage error score described above. In these analyses, all and only 
the effects reported above reached significance. Thus, there were no differences 
between the absolute error and percentage error analyses.
In summary: in this experiment where participants responded to static geometric 
stimuli, similar patterns of performance were observed both in the movement and 
verbal versions o f the task such that the coloured component always represented the 
most accurate component. These findings are not consistent with the idea that
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mentalistic goals guide performance but rather suggest that general processes guide 
performance on this task.
2.3 General discussion
Several accounts o f imitation suggest that actions are coded in terms o f goals, and that 
these goals are used to translate sensory representations into matching motor outputs 
(e.g. AIM, Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; GOADI, Wohlschlager et al., 2003). The goal- 
directed theory o f imitation (GOADI) provides the most explicit statement o f this 
view. In one version o f this theory, goals are presumed to be action outcomes. Support 
for this position was provided by the well-replicated finding that, in the pen-and-cups 
task, participants imitate object selection more accurately than effector selection, 
which is imitated more accurately then grip selection. This is manifested in the pen- 
and-cups task as a cup<hand<grip error pattern. However, an alternative explanation 
was presented by Bird et al. (in press), who argued that this error pattern was due to 
more general processes, specifically stimulus discriminability. They found that when 
the colour cue was moved from the cups to the hands or the grips, these components 
became the most accurately imitated components of the action, thus demonstrating a 
colour minimum error pattern. Such a pattern of errors is clearly inconsistent with 
GOADI’s claim o f a strict hierarchy o f action goals where objects and their treatments 
are always imitated more accurately than the means used to achieve those goals.
However, the mentalistic version o f GOADI (mGOADI) is compatible with the results 
o f Bird et al. (2007). Under mGOADI, goals are not defined as observable action end- 
states, but rather as inferred mental states o f the model. Therefore, the effect o f the 
colour cue in the experiments reported by Bird et al., may have been to alter which 
action component was inferred by the participant to be the goal o f the movement.
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To test mGOADI against a general processes account, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 
participants responded to abstract geometric shapes, which are unlikely to support the 
attribution o f mental states. In Experiment 2.1, participants were either required to 
respond to naturalistic stimuli or moving geometric stimuli. If  the colour minimum 
error pattern was due to inference of mental state goals, this pattern should not have 
been present in this non-mentalistic version of the task. Contrary to this prediction, the 
colour minimum error pattern was found both when participants were required to make 
movements in response to naturalistic and to geometric stimuli. In Experiment 2.2, 
static geometric shapes were used as stimuli to further reduce the possibility that 
participants attributed intentions to the shapes. Furthermore, in this task, participants 
either carried out movements or responded verbally. The colour minimum error pattern 
was observed both in the movement and verbal versions of the task. This observation 
o f the colour minimum error pattern in both tasks where responses were made to static 
stimuli provides evidence against mGOADI. Furthermore, the observation o f this error 
pattern in the verbal task which contains no action stimuli or action responses provides 
further evidence inconsistent with the idea that mentalistic goals are responsible for 
this error pattern. The current results are consistent with the idea that general processes 
guide performance, since these processes are thought to influence a range o f tasks and 
do not rely on inferences about mental states. These results imply that the coloured 
components represented the most accurate component because colour enhanced 
discriminability or drew attention to that particular component o f the stimulus 
sequence.
It has been suggested that error patterns in tasks, like the pen-and-cups task, provide 
support for the view that goals guide imitation. However, the results o f the present 
study suggest that, contrary to this hypothesis, it is not necessary to invoke goal
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processing to explain imitation performance on this task. Consequently, the error 
patterns seen in the pen-and-cups task do not provide specific support for goal-directed 
theories. Thus, the results from this chapter challenge evidence put forward to support 
the claims o f specialist theories.
The results from this chapter are consistent with a general process account which 
supposes that imitation is guided by general processes that influence a range o f tasks 
rather than any processes specific to imitation. They are therefore consistent with both 
generalist theories described in this thesis. Both ASL and IM suggest that sensory and 
motor representations become linked with no intermediate goal processing stage. 
Accordingly, goals are not necessary to solve the correspondence problem. Thus, these 
theories imply that there is no special relationship between goals and imitation. 
However, neither generalist theory explicitly denies that goal processing and intention 
reading may sometimes be involved in the performance o f imitative tasks, as they are 
involved in the performance o f non-imitative tasks. Introspection leaves little doubt 
that many o f our imitative actions are guided by goals and intentions; we commonly 
perform imitative and non-imitative actions with some purpose in mind. However, 
simply because goals play a role in our imitative behaviour does not imply that they 
are a necessary component of imitation or that they play a role in solving the 
correspondence problem. Therefore, it is not necessary to evoke goals in order to 
explain how we imitate. Inferring the intentions of another or understanding the 
expected outcome of a certain action might, on some occasions, help to explain why I 
did the same thing as a model, but it does not explain how I was able to do it. 
Consequently, goals are more likely in inform what we imitate and not how we imitate.
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Chapter 3: Intentional imitation in individuals with ASP: 
Observed imitation impairments in ASP can be explained bv non-specific factors
The aim of the following two chapters is to investigate imitative abilities in individuals 
with ASD in order to ascertain whether an imitation-specific impairment exists in 
ASD. Accordingly, Chapters 3 and 4 examine another line o f evidence that has been 
suggested to support a specialist view of imitation.
Imitation has been extensively studied in ASD (e.g. Williams et al., 2004). The 
majority o f studies have reported poor performance in imitation tasks, and therefore, 
the general consensus is of an imitation impairment in ASD (Williams et al., 2004). 
However, despite the wealth o f studies, some are contradictory; not all studies have 
found an impairment (e.g. D'Entremont & Yazbek, in press; Hamilton et al., 2007).
Imitation is relevant to theories o f ASD, because it has been suggested to underpin the 
development of social cognition, including theory o f mind, empathy, and the 
development of language (Rogers & Pennington, 1991). Impairments in these abilities 
characterise individuals with ASD, which has prompted some theorists to suggest that 
an imitation impairment is the core deficit in ASD (Williams et al., 2001).
Additionally, ASD is relevant to theories o f imitation. The existence o f an imitation 
impairment in ASD would appear to be consistent with the idea that imitation is 
mediated by a special-purpose mechanism, since such a mechanism should be 
susceptible to selective impairment, that is, an impairment in one domain that is not 
associated with more generalised deficits (Fodor, 1983).
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It is, therefore, important to make sense o f the conflicted findings in the literature and 
to establish whether there is compelling evidence for an imitation impairment in ASD. 
In order to do this, it is necessary to explore possible explanations for the conflicting 
findings.
Mixed findings may reflect the substantial heterogeneity within the autism spectrum; it 
is possible that some individuals with ASD have an imitation impairment while others 
do not. Repeated sampling o f this heterogeneous population with the relatively small 
number of participants typically used in studies o f imitation would lead to some studies 
demonstrating imitation impairments in ASD and some not.
An alternative source of the variance in imitation performance across studies may be 
the types of tests used to measure imitation. The majority o f tasks used to date have 
been complex intentional imitation tasks. These tasks require a number o f abilities in 
addition to imitation: the understanding o f social cues and language to judge when 
imitation is required and what dimensions o f action are to be imitated; theory o f mind 
to understand the pretence and intention behind pantomimed transitive actions; 
executive functions to organise and interpret sequences o f actions correctly; effective 
perceptual processing to perceive complex moving stimuli, and motor control to carry 
out observed movements. All o f these abilities may be taxed to a greater or lesser 
extent in the experimental tasks used to study imitation.
Understanding social cues, language, theory of mind, executive functions, perceptual 
and motor skills are not imitation-specific abilities. They are necessary for a large 
number of imitative and non-imitative tasks. Thus, poor performance on tests of 
imitation due to problems with these non-specific abilities would not constitute an
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imitation-specific impairment. As highlighted throughout this thesis, there is one 
problem unique to imitation: motor output must be produced which matches perceptual 
input. Two seemingly incommensurate codes, one relating to patterns o f stimulation 
received through the distal senses and the other to muscle activations, must be made 
commensurate (the 'correspondence problem', Heyes, 2001). The ability to solve this 
problem, i.e. to translate perceptual representations o f action into motor commands, is, 
therefore, the key test o f imitation. If  imitation represents the core deficit in ASD, it is 
this mechanism that is disturbed.
Thus, there are two possible explanations for the mixed findings in the ASD imitation 
literature. First, there is an imitation-specific impairment in ASD; that is the 
mechanism by which motor outputs are matched to perceptual input is in some way 
disturbed. Second, there is no specific imitative impairment in ASD. Rather, poor 
performance on tests o f imitation is due to impairments of non-specific mechanisms - 
such as theory o f mind, executive function - which are required for successful 
performance on these tests. The current chapter sought to distinguish these two 
possibilities by investigating whether observed impairments in imitative performance 
can be accounted for by more general abilities not specific to imitation.
A group of high functioning adults with ASD was compared to a matched typically 
developing control group on an intentional imitation task. The pen-and-cups task was 
used because individuals with ASD have been shown to make more errors than 
controls on this task (Avikainen et al., 2003). As described in Chapter 2, this task is 
demanding because, in order to minimise errors, the participant needs to keep track of 
three dimensions o f action: object selection, effector selection and grip selection.
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Experiment 3.1 replicated the finding (Avikainen et al., 2003) that individuals with 
ASD make more errors in the pen-and-cups tasks. Experiment 3.2 sought to establish 
whether this finding reflects an imitation-specific impairment, or instead an 
impairment in non-specific mechanisms. In Experiment 3.2, participants completed 
two non-imitative versions o f the pen-and-cups task which dissociated the components 
o f the imitative stimulus-response relationship involved in the original pen-and-cups 
task. In the original version, action responses are made to action stimuli. In Experiment 
3.2, one task involved action responses being made to abstract geometric stimuli, while 
the other required participants to describe verbally the original action stimuli. Thus, the 
action stimulus and action response components were separately removed while all 
other aspects of the task were held constant. Since neither o f the tasks in Experiment
3.2 involved making a matching action in response to an observed action, neither o f 
these tasks could be described as an imitative task. Therefore, if the impaired 
performance on the pen-and-cups task in ASD is due to an imitation-specific 
impairment, one would expect improved performance on these, non-imitative, versions 
of the task. Alternatively, if the impaired performance on the pen-and-cups task is due 
to non-specific mechanisms, then similarly impaired performance is also expected on 
the non-imitative versions o f the task.
Experiment 3.1
The aim o f Experiment 3.1 was to establish whether the current sample of individuals 
with ASD demonstrated impaired performance in a test of intentional imitation. If this 
is the case, then the specificity o f this deficit could be tested in Experiment 3.2. 
Accordingly, Experiment 3.1 sought to replicate the finding o f impaired imitation on 
the pen-and-cups task by individuals with ASD reported by Avikainen et al. (2003). In 
this experiment, two conditions were completed by participants. Both were imitative,
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but the two conditions differed in terms o f their imitative frame o f reference. In the 
‘mirror’ condition, participants were asked to imitate as if in a mirror; that is they were 
to imitate an action completed by the model’s right hand with their spatially 
compatible left hand, and vice versa. Similarly, if the pen was placed into the cup on 
the model’s right side, then the participant was to place their pen in the spatially 
compatible cup which was on the participant’s left side. Conversely, the ‘transpose’ 
condition required participants to use an anatomical frame o f reference; actions 
completed by the model with their right hand should be imitated with the participants 
own right hand. Similarly, if the pen was placed in the cup on the right side of the 
model, the participant must place their pen in the cup on their own right side (see 
Figure 1). Avikainen et al. found that although the control group showed better 
performance when required to mirror imitate (in comparison with the transpose 
condition), the ASD group showed no such improvement. The secondary aim o f 
Experiment 3.1 was, therefore, to establish whether this effect of condition could be 
replicated.
The experiment was performed as by Avikainen et al. with one exception; video 
recordings o f the actions (rather than a live demonstrator performing the actions) were 
presented to increase stimulus control. Use of video stimuli allows the interval between 
actions and their durations to be standardized across conditions and groups, and it has 
previously been shown that presenting video stimuli does not alter either the error rate 
or error pattern on the pen-and-cups task (Bird et al., in press).
As highlighted in Chapter 2, a particular error pattern typically emerges in the pen- 
and-cups task. Adults usually make fewer cup errors than hand errors and fewer hand 
errors than grip errors (Avikainen et al., 2003, Wohlschlager & Bekkering 2002). This
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cup<hand<grip error pattern has been suggested to reflect the importance o f goals, and 
in particular mentalistic goals, in imitation (Gattis et a l, 2002). Given the widely 
reported deficits in mentalising in ASD (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Frith & Frith, 
2003), on the basis o f specialist claims that this error pattern is due to mentalistic goal 
attribution, one may expect a different error pattern to emerge in individuals with 
ASD. However, the findings from the previous chapter and from Bird et al. (2007) 
imply that general perceptual and attentional processes, rather than goals, drive this 
error pattern. If this is the case then one may not expect individuals with ASD to be 
any less susceptible to these cues than typically developing individuals and one should, 
therefore, expect them to show a similar cup<hand<grip error pattern. Consequently, a 
demonstration of this error pattern in the ASD group in the current experiment would 
be consistent with the findings in the previous chapter.
Finally, the cup<hand<grip error pattern indicates that the participant is carrying out 
the task correctly; for example, if a participant only attends to two components o f the 
task, different error patterns may emerge. It is important to demonstrate that 
individuals with ASD are engaging in the task and following task instructions properly 
to ensure that any poor performance is not purely motivational or due to a failure to 
understand task instructions. Therefore, if individuals with ASD demonstrate the 
typical cup<hand<grip error pattern this will imply that they are carrying out the task 
correctly and any group differences are more likely to be interpretable.
3.1.1 Methods
Participants. Thirty-two individuals participated in the study: 16 participants with 
autism spectrum disorder (14 male; 2 female) and 16 typically developing control 
participants (14 male; 2 female). Participants were recruited from the UCL, Institute of
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Cognitive Neuroscience database. The groups were matched on gender, age (ASD M: 
37 years SEM: 3.4, control M: 35 years, SEM: 3.7), and IQ (ASD FSIQ M: 119, SEM: 
3, VIQ M: 117, SEM: 3, PIQ M: 116, SEM: 4 Control FSIQ M 118, SEM: 3, VIQ M: 
117, SEM: 3, PIQ M: 112, SEM: 2). IQ was measured using the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-3rd UK Edition (Wechsler, 1999). All participants in the ASD group 
had previously received a diagnosis from an independent clinician according to 
standard criteria. The autism diagnostic observational schedule -  Generic (ADOS-G, 
Lord et al., 2000), was used in order to characterize the participants. On this measure 
ten participants met criteria for autism, while six participants met criteria for autism 
spectrum disorder. All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to- 
normal vision and were naive with respect to the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli and apparatus. Stimuli and apparatus were identical to the naturalistic task in 
experiment 2.1 except as follows: The spatial relationship o f the model’s and 
participant’s cups varied according to condition. In the mirror condition the cups were 
arranged so that they were spatially compatible from the participant’s perspective, i.e. 
both the participant’s and the model’s blue cup was on the participants' left side (see 
Figure 6b). In the transpose condition the cups were arranged so that they were 
spatially incompatible from the participant's perspective (i.e. the participant’s blue cup 
was on their left side but the model’s blue cup was on the participant’s right side, see 
Figure 6a).
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Figure 6: Experiment 3.1. Diagrams indicating the spatial relationships between the 
model’s and observer’s objects and effectors at the beginning of each trial for a) the 
transpose condition and b) the mirror condition
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. Each sat at a table
bearing the object set and, beyond it, the laptop computer on which the video stimuli 
were presented. They were told that they would be shown a video and that, while 
watching it, they should imitate the movement sequences as simultaneously as 
possible, paying equal attention to three aspects: the hand (left/right), the grip 
(up/down) and the cup (red/blue). Specific instructions varied according to condition. 
In the transpose condition participants were instructed 1) to use their left hand when 
the model used her left hand, and to use their right hand when the model used her right 
hand; 2) to grip the pen in the same thumb up or thumb down configuration as the 
model; and 3) to place the pen in the cup of the same colour as the model. In the mirror 
condition participants were instructed 1) to use their left hand when the model used her 
right hand, and to use their right hand when the model used her left hand; 2) to grip the 
pen in the same thumb up or thumb down configuration as the model; and 3) to place 
the pen in the cup o f the same colour as the model. After giving the instructions, the 
experimenter demonstrated the correct response in each condition until the participants 
reported that they understood the task.
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Each participant completed 10 practice trials followed by 80 test trials. The test trials 
comprised 10 presentations o f each of the eight action sequences in random order. 
Each participant completed both the mirror and transposition conditions and the order 
of the conditions was counterbalanced across participants in each group.
Performance was videotaped and the experimenter recorded, for each trial, which 
hand, grip and cup had been selected by the participant. An error was recorded if  the 
participant’s selection did not match that o f the model as specified in the instructions. 
Thus, there were three types o f errors, relating to the hand, grip and cup components of 
the task, respectively. These were summed for each participant to give a total error 
score. Absolute numbers of errors were used, instead of the percentage measure used 
in the previous chapter, so that direct comparisons o f imitative performance could be 
made across groups.
3.1.2 Results and discussion
The mean total number o f errors made by each group in both the mirror and transpose 
conditions is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Experiment 3.1 Mean number of errors (out of a possible 240) made by the 
ASD and control groups in both the mirror (black bars) and transpose (grey bars) 
conditions in the imitative version o f the task. Vertical bars indicate the standard error 
of the mean.
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These data were entered into an ANOVA with a within-subjects factor o f condition 
(transpose and mirror), and a between-subjects factor o f group (ASD and control). The 
main effect o f group was significant (F(l,30) = 5.7, p = 0.023), indicating that the ASD 
group made significantly more errors than the control group. The main effect of 
condition was also significant (F(l,30) = 25.3, p<0.001), revealing that the transpose 
condition was more challenging than the mirror condition. The interaction between 
condition and group was not significant (F(l,30) = 1.9, p=0.183) indicating that the 
degree o f impairment shown by the ASD group, relative to the control group, did not 
vary as a function o f task condition. Simple effects analyses were used to test whether 
the groups’ performance differed significantly in each o f the conditions. This analysis 
confirmed that the performance o f the ASD group was significantly less accurate than 
that of the controls in both the transpose (F(l,30) = 4.2, p=0.049) and the mirror 
(F(l,30) = 4.7, p=0.038) conditions.
Both groups showed the usual cup<hand<grip error pattern (as shown in Table 1 
below) in both mirror and transpose conditions, as tested using linear contrasts (ASD 
mirror: F(1,15) = 14.1 p=0.002 ASD transpose: F(l,15) = 44.3 p<0.001 control mirror: 
F(1,15) = 18.7 p = 0.001 control transpose: F(1,15) = 8.5 p = 0.011).
ASD Control
Mirror Transpose Mirror Transpose
Cup Hand Grip Cup Hand Grip Cup Hand Grip Cup Hand Grip
0.38 2.75 6.06 2.38 9.94 17.38 0.38 0.63 2.63 2.38 4.88 8.13
0.15 1.44 1.42 0.57 2.24 2.28 0.20 0.30 0.45 1.39 1.92 2.39
Table 1: Experiment 3.1. Mean (and standard error of the mean) number o f cup, hand 
and grip errors in Experiment 3.1 for the ASD and control Groups.
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The primary purpose of Experiment 3.1 was to establish whether the particular sample 
o f adults with ASD who took part in this study showed an impairment on both the 
mirror and transpose conditions of the pen-and-cups task. The results clearly show that 
the ASD group made more errors than the control group in both conditions.
The secondary purpose of Experiment 3.1 was to examine the pattern o f performance 
in mirror and transpose conditions in both groups. Avikainen et al. (2003) reported 
that, in contrast to the control group, individuals with ASD did not show better 
performance in their imitation performance when required to mirror imitate. Such a 
pattern of results would have been manifested in Experiment 3.1 by a significant 
interaction between the condition and group factors, indicating that the difference in 
performance between the groups depended on whether imitating in a mirror or 
transposition fashion. However, this interaction was not significant. Indeed, the ASD 
group tended to show a greater impairment on the transpose condition, and therefore, 
the finding of a selective impairment in mirror imitation in ASD was not replicated.
Finally the cup<hand<grip error pattern, that is typically shown by participants on this 
task, was observed in this experiment. This is consistent with the findings from 
Chapter 2, as it implies that this error pattern does not rely on mentalising skills, and 
also confirms that the participants were following task instructions correctly.
Experiment 3.2
Experiment 3.1 demonstrated impaired performance on the pen-and-cups intentional 
imitation task by a group o f adults with ASD. Experiment 3.2 aimed to identify 
whether the poor performance observed in Experiment 3.1 was due to a deficit in an 
imitation-specific mechanism which translates observed actions into motor output, or
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whether the poor performance was due to non-specific mechanisms which are 
necessary for accurate task performance but which are not specific to imitation.
The same participants who had completed Experiment 3.1 were asked to complete two 
versions of the pen-and-cups task which did not require imitation, but which included 
the same non-specific task demands as in the original, imitative, pen-and-cups task. In 
an imitation task, matching action responses are made to action stimuli. In order to 
remove the requirement to imitate in the pen-and-cups task, the imitative stimulus- 
response relationship was altered in two alternative versions o f the task. In the 
‘geometric’ version of the pen-and-cups task participants were required to make the 
same action responses as in the imitative version o f the task, but in response to the 
movement of abstract geometric shapes rather than to action stimuli. In the ‘verbal’ 
version o f the pen-and-cups task, participants observed the same action stimuli as in 
the imitative version o f the task but were asked to describe the sequences rather than to 
make action responses.
In order to test the specificity o f any imitation deficit in ASD the performance o f the 
ASD group in each of the non-imitative versions of the task was compared to their 
performance in the imitative version of the task. If the impaired performance shown by 
the ASD group in the imitative version of the task is due to an imitation-specific 
deficit, then removing the imitative nature of the task should result in improved 
performance relative to that of the control group. However, if the poor performance of 
the ASD group in Experiment 3.1 was due to non-specific factors, then one would 
expect the performance o f the ASD group to be as impaired in the alternative versions 
as in the imitative version of the task. This is because these non-specific task 
components are preserved in both non-imitative versions.
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3.2.1 Method
Participants. Twenty-four of the original thirty-two individuals were able to attend the 
second testing session, 12 participants with autism spectrum disorder (11 male; 1 
female) and 12 typically developing control participants (11 male; 1 female). Groups 
were matched on gender, age (ASD M: 38 years SEM: 3.3, control M: 37 years, SEM:
3.4), and IQ (ASD FSIQ M: 118, SEM: 4, VIQ M: 117, SEM: 4, PIQ M: 113, SEM: 5 
Control FSIQ M 118, SEM: 3, VIQ M: 117, SEM: 3, PIQ M: 110, SEM: 2 ). Of the 12 
participants with ASD who returned for the second session, seven participants met 
criteria for autism, while five participants met criteria for autism spectrum disorder as 
measured by the ADOS-G.
Participants completed both the geometric and verbal version of the pen-and-cups task 
in a second session, which was scheduled between one and four months after the initial 
testing session.
Stimuli and Apparatus: Geometric Version. Participants made the same responses, 
using the same apparatus, as in Experiment 3.1. The correct response on each trial was 
communicated to the participant by presenting a short stimulus animation. These 
animations were identical to those used in the cups-coloured condition of the 
geometric task in experiment 2.1 (see Fig. 8).
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Figure 8: Experiment 3.1. Image depicting the starting position of the animation 
stimulus specifying the action response to be made by the participants in the geometric 
version of the task.
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The animation stimuli for the mirror and transpose versions were distinguished 
according to the colouring o f the ellipses (‘cups’). In the transpose condition the colour 
of the ellipses and the cups with which participants made their responses was spatially 
compatible from the participant’s perspective. For example, if the participant’s red cup 
was on their left, and the blue cup on their right, then the blue stimulus ellipse was on 
the left o f the screen and the red stimulus ellipse was on the right o f the screen. In the 
mirror condition the location of the stimulus ellipses and the cups was spatially 
compatible, for example both the blue cup and blue stimulus ellipse was on the left of 
the screen while the red cup and red ellipse was on the right of the screen.
Procedure: Geometric Version. The procedure was the same as the geometric version 
of Experiment 2.1 except as follows. In the transpose condition, participants were 
instructed 1) to use their left hand when the square on the right o f the screen moved, 
and to use their right hand when the square on the left moved; 2) to grip the pen in the 
thumbs up position when the small rectangle was positioned on the top of the square 
and to use the thumbs down position when the small rectangle was positioned on the 
bottom of the square; and 3) to place the pen in the red cup when the objects moved to 
the red ellipse and in the blue cup when the objects moved to the blue ellipse. In the 
mirror condition, participants were instructed 1) to use their left hand when the square 
on the left moved, and to use their right hand when the square on the right moved; 2) to 
grip the pen in the thumbs up position when the small rectangle was positioned on the 
top of the square and to use the thumbs down position when the small rectangle was 
positioned on the bottom of the square; and 3) to place the pen in the red cup when the 
objects moved to the red ellipse and in the blue cup when the objects moved to the blue 
ellipse.
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Stimuli and Apparatus: Verbal Version. The stimuli were identical to those presented 
in Experiment 3.1. The participants were not given the object set (cups and pen) 
because action responses were not required.
Procedure: Verbal Version. The procedure was the same as that o f Experiment 3.1 
except as follows. All participants were instructed to describe, rather than to imitate, 
the model’s movements. In the mirror condition participants were told 1) to say ‘left 
hand’ when the model used her hand on the participant’s left, and to say ‘right hand’ 
when the model used her hand on the participant’s right; 2) to say ‘up grip’ or ‘down 
grip’ according to the orientation of the model’s thumb; and 3) to say ‘red cup’ or 
‘blue cup’ in response to the model’s object selection. In the transpose condition 
participants were instructed 1) to say ‘left hand’ when the model used her hand on the 
participant’s right, and to say ‘right hand’ when the model used her hand on the 
participant’s left; 2) to say ‘up grip’ or ‘down grip’ according to the orientation o f the 
model’s thumb; and 3) to say ‘red cup’ or ‘blue cup’ in response to the model’s object 
selection.
3.2.2 Results and discussion
The aim of Experiment 3.2 was to compare the performance of the ASD group, 
relative to controls, in two non-imitative versions of the task with their performance in 
the imitative version completed in Experiment 3.1. The mean number o f errors made 
by each group, in each condition, is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Experiment 3.2. Mean number of errors (out of a possible 240) made by the 
ASD and control groups in both the mirror (black bars) and transpose (grey bars) 
conditions in the imitative, geometric and verbal versions of the task. Vertical bars 
indicate the standard error of the mean.
These data were entered into an ANOVA with within-subjects factors of version 
(imitative, geometric, and verbal), and condition (mirror and transpose), and a 
between-subjects factor o f group (ASD and control). This analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of condition (F(l,22) = 21.5, p<.001), reflecting the increased 
error rate in the transpose condition, and a significant main effect of group (F(l,22) =
6.1, p=.022), due to the greater number or errors made by the ASD group. The 
interaction between condition and group was significant (F(l,22) = 4.4, p=.047), 
indicating that the ASD group showed a greater impairment, relative to controls, in the 
transpose condition than in the mirror condition. The interaction between the version 
and condition factors was also significant (F(2,44) = 6.2, p=.004). The requirement to 
transpose (i.e. to respond in a spatially incompatible manner) had a less detrimental 
effect on accuracy o f responding in the verbal condition, where manual responses were 
not required.
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If the poor performance of the ASD group in the imitative version o f the task was due 
to an imitation-specific deficit, then the performance o f the ASD group should have 
improved in the non-imitative versions of the pen-and-cups-task relative to any 
improvement shown by the control group. This would be manifested as a significant 
interaction between the version and group factors. This interaction was not significant 
(F(2,44) < 1). O f further theoretical interest is the three-way interaction between the 
version, group and condition factors, which could indicate improvement from the 
imitative to non-imitative version o f the task in only one of the conditions. However, 
this interaction was also not significant (F(2,44) < 1).
The results o f this analysis suggest that the ASD group were as impaired, relative to
the control group, on both of the non-imitative versions o f the task as on the original, 
imitative version. However, to test this conclusion further, analyses were carried out 
which separately compared each non-imitative version o f the task with the imitative 
version.
ANOVA applied to the data from the geometric and imitative versions revealed 
significant main effects of group (F(l,22) = 5.00, p=.036) and condition (F(l,22) = 
30.00, p<.001), reflecting the greater number of errors made by the ASD group in 
comparison to the control group and the increased difficulty o f the transpose condition 
compared to the mirror condition. However, neither the interaction between the version 
and group factors (F(l,22) < 1), nor the three-way interaction between the version,
group and condition factors (F(l,22) < 1) were significant.
Comparison o f the verbal and imitative versions o f the task using the same method 
demonstrated significant main effects of group (F(l,22) = 6.2, p=.020) and condition
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(F(l,22) = 13.8, p= 001), reflecting the greater number o f errors made by the ASD 
group in comparison to the control group and the increased difficulty o f the transpose 
condition compared to the mirror condition. In addition, the interaction between 
version and condition (F(l,22) = 10.0, p=.005) was significant, reflecting the greater 
effect of condition in the imitative version than in the verbal non-imitative version. 
Again however, neither the interaction between the version and group factors (F(l,22) 
< 1), nor the three-way interaction between the version, group and condition factors 
(F(l,22) < 1), was significant.
Participants in Experiment 3.2 completed two non-imitative versions of the pen-and- 
cups task and their performance was compared to that on the original, imitative version 
of the task. Since the initial purpose of this study was to investigate a previous finding, 
the order o f tasks was not counterbalanced. However, this lack of counterbalancing is 
unlikely to have problematic implications for the conclusions o f these experiments. 
One may expect performance to improve across tasks due to practice effects. 
Therefore, this feature o f the design only served to make Experiment 3.2 a more 
conservative test of the hypothesis that there would be no improvement across tasks.
The results indicated that the ASD group was as impaired, relative to the control 
group, on the non-imitative versions o f the task as they were on the imitative version 
of the task. Such a pattern of results suggests that this impairment is not imitation- 
specific. Although performance differences between the groups did not vary according 
to whether they completed imitative or non-imitative versions o f the task, there was an 
overall tendency for the ASD group to show relatively poorer performance in the 
transpose conditions o f the task.
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3.3 General discussion
This chapter examined whether the impairments on tests o f intentional imitation which 
have frequently been reported in ASD represent an imitation-specific impairment. To 
address this question, the performance o f a group of high-functioning adults with ASD 
was compared with that of matched, typically-developing controls on an imitative, and 
two non-imitative, versions o f the pen-and-cups task.
In common with previous reports of poor performance on imitation tasks, the ASD 
group made more errors than controls in Experiment 3.1, on the imitative version o f 
the task. Experiment 3.2 tested whether this impairment was due to imitation-specific, 
or task-general, factors by asking the same participants to complete two non-imitative 
versions o f the task. If the poor performance on the imitative version o f the task was 
due to an imitation-specific impairment, one would expect improved performance 
when the task is changed so that it presents equally challenging general task demands, 
but is non-imitative. However, the ASD group was as impaired, relative to the control 
group, on each of the non-imitative versions of the pen-and-cups task. This pattern of 
results is inconsistent with claims of an imitation-specific impairment in ASD and 
suggests that impairments in general abilities, not specific to imitation, can account for 
the observed imitation impairments.
The present results are relevant both for theories of ASD as well as for theories o f 
imitation. Some theories o f ASD suggest that imitation represents the core deficit in 
ASD (e.g. Williams et al., 2001; 2004; Rogers & Pennington, 1991). In suggesting that 
observed imitation impairments may be accounted for by impairments in other general 
abilities, this chapter casts doubt on the idea that there is an imitation-specific 
impairment at the root o f autism.
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The present results are also of relevance to theories of imitation and specifically to the 
topics discussed in this thesis. An imitation-specific impairment in ASD would appear 
consistent with the idea that there is a special-purpose mechanism mediating imitation 
because this mechanism should be susceptible to selective impairment. Therefore, 
insofar as the results cast doubt on the existence of such an imitation-specific 
impairment, the present results suggest that the ASD literature may not provide any 
specific support for specialist claims. Therefore, the results from this chapter challenge 
evidence that can be used to support specialist theories o f imitation.
The results from this chapter further challenge evidence used to support specialist 
claims in demonstrating the typical cup<hand<grip error pattern among individuals 
with ASD. If  this error pattern relies on mentalistic goal attribution, one would not 
expect to see this error pattern in individuals with ASD who typically show 
mentalising impairments (e.g. Frith & Frith, 2003). However, if this pattern is due to 
general perceptual and attentional processes then one may expect similar patterns to be 
observed in individuals with ASD. This finding, therefore, supports the conclusions o f 
Chapter 2 that the cup<hand<grip error pattern in the pen-and-cups task is due to the 
operation o f general, perceptual and attentional processes, and not to the operation o f 
an imitation-specific process which prioritises mentalistic goals.
The results from this study are consistent with some previous findings within the ASD 
imitation literature but are inconsistent with others. It is important to try to make sense 
of conflicting findings so that these experiments do not add confusion to a body of 
literature which already contains much disagreement.
104
The results o f Experiment 3.1, which showed poor imitative performance among 
individuals with ASD, are consistent with the majority o f previous findings. Like the 
present study, the majority of previous studies have employed complex intentional 
imitation tasks to assess imitative abilities in ASD. Given that the results from the 
present study suggest that poor performance on complex imitation tasks may be 
explained by non-specific impairments, poor performance observed in previous studies 
may also have been due to these non-specific factors. As highlighted in the first 
chapter, this idea has already been suggested by a number o f authors who have found 
correlations between imitation performance and processes not specific to imitation, 
such as motor control and social reciprocity (Smith & Bryson, 1998; Green et al., 
2002; McDuffie et al., 2007). However, previous studies were not able to determine 
whether there is an imitation impairment over and above these other more general 
processes. In Experiment 3.2, no differences were observed between the imitative and 
non-imitative tasks in the individuals with ASD. The present findings, therefore, 
suggest that, at least in the pen-and-cups task, the observed imitation impairment can 
be fully explained by processes not specific to imitation and that there is no additional 
imitation impairment associated with ASD.
The idea that any observed imitation impairment is a product o f other, more general 
impairments may explain some o f the mixed findings in the ASD literature. It is 
possible that in studies reporting equivalent performance on intentional imitation tasks 
for ASD and control groups (Aldridge, Stone, Sweeney, Bower, 2000; Carpenter, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 2001; Hamilton et al., 2007), general task demands were not 
sufficient to create group differences. Alternatively, the substantial heterogeneity 
within ASD could explain the mixed findings.
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Experiment 3.1 did not replicate the particular pattern o f errors reported by Avikainen 
et al. (2003), who found that the ASD group failed to benefit from imitating in a mirror 
fashion. In contrast, the ASD group in the present chapter benefited as much as the 
control group from mirror imitation. In fact, the ASD group showed a greater 
impairment in performance on the transpose versions o f the pen-and-cups task. An 
impairment in transposition imitation is consistent with the inhibition problems 
reported in ASD (Russell, 1997). Many studies have demonstrated that spatially 
compatible responses are faster and more accurate than spatially incompatible 
responses (Simon, 1969). In the transpose condition, the tendency to make a spatially 
compatible response (which would result in mirror imitation) has to be inhibited. An 
inhibition impairment would result in increased mirror imitating, and therefore more 
errors in the transpose condition. However, this explanation is at odds with the findings 
of Avikainen et al. One possible reason for the conflicting results may be differences in 
the instructions used for the mirror condition. In the present experiment participants 
were explicitly told how to map stimuli onto responses (e.g. to use their right hand 
when the model used her left hand, and to use their left hand when the model used her 
right hand), while in the Avikainen et al. study participants were told only to “imitate 
as if looking in a mirror”. The less explicit instructions used in the Avikainen et al. 
study may have caused uncertainty in the ASD group, and thereby masked any 
performance improvement which could have been observed when mirror imitating. 
This explanation is clearly speculative, and the effect o f imitative frame o f reference is 
a potential area for future research in ASD.
In summary, Experiment 3.1 demonstrated that this particular sample of high- 
functioning adults with ASD showed impaired performance on a test of intentional 
imitation. The results o f Experiment 3.2 implied that the impaired performance shown
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by this group on the test o f imitation was not due to an imitation-specific impairment, 
because performance was equally impaired on two non-imitative versions of the task. 
Therefore, these experiments demonstrated that individuals with ASD may show 
impairments on tests of intentional imitation, not because of an imitation-specific 
impairment, but because of impairments in task-general mechanisms. The current 
results, therefore, challenge one line of evidence that has been used to support the idea 
that imitation is mediated by a special-purpose mechanism by suggesting that the core 
mechanisms of imitation are intact in ASD. This hypothesis will be further examined 
in the following chapter.
107
Chapter 4: Automatic imitation in individuals with ASD: 
Intact imitation performance in ASD
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the poor performance on imitation tasks o f individuals 
with ASD can be explained with reference to general processes, not specific to 
imitation. If  this is correct, then there may not be an imitation-specific impairment in 
ASD. The purpose o f this chapter was to provide a further test o f whether or not 
individuals with ASD exhibit an imitation-specific impairment by using an automatic 
imitation task.
As highlighted throughout this thesis, successful imitation requires the translation o f 
sensory information received from observing an action into the motor output required 
to perform a matching action. This translation represents the core mechanism of 
imitation and if there is an imitation-specific impairment in ASD, it is this mechanism 
that is disturbed. Alternatively, as suggested in Chapter 3, impairments in processes 
not specific to imitation create apparent imitation impairments. Under this view, there 
is no imitation-specific impairment in ASD.
The large body of literature demonstrating poor performance on a range of imitation 
tasks and the increasing number of studies showing mirror neuron dysfunction, in 
ASD, have been used to support the idea that individuals with ASD exhibit imitation- 
specific impairments (e.g. Williams et al., 2001; Dapretto et al., 2006). However, there 
are many inconsistent findings within this literature and the neurological literature, in 
particular, does not yet provide a clear message.
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Furthermore, as highlighted in Chapters 1 and 3, the majority o f studies investigating 
imitative abilities in ASD have used complex intentional imitation tasks. If poor 
performance on these tasks can be explained by impairments in other processes, not 
specific to imitation, then these studies do not tell us whether there is an imitation- 
specific impairment in ASD.
The previous chapter suggested that performance on these tasks can be explained by 
impairments in non specific processes, and therefore, complex intentional imitation 
tasks are not the best means for examining imitation skills in ASD. Automatic 
imitation tasks may be more informative than intentional imitation tasks in resolving 
whether or not there is an imitation-specific impairment in ASD. In tests of intentional 
imitation, the experimenter asks the participant to copy an action that has many 
temporal and spatial features, and does not specify exactly which features o f the action 
are to be reproduced. Determining the appropriate action dimensions for imitation, and 
therefore, what constitutes successful performance, is accomplished through the 
interpretation o f subtle cues relating to the social context and the experimenter’s 
mental states. The ability to focus on the selected action dimensions, so that 
performance is not impaired by imitation of task-irrelevant action dimensions, relies on 
good executive function and attentional control. Interpretation o f social cues, theory of 
mind, executive functions and attentional control have all been shown to be impaired 
in ASD (Bird et al., 2006; Frith & Frith, 2003; Russell, 1997). Therefore, poor 
performance in these intentional tasks may be due to impairments in these processes 
which are not specific to imitation.
In contrast, in tests of automatic imitation, participants are not asked, and do not 
intend, to imitate modelled movements. Instead, they are required merely to observe
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actions, either passively or with a simple non-imitative movement task, while the 
experimenter measures muscular responses (e.g. Brass et al., 2001; Heyes et al., 2005). 
Consequently, automatic imitation tasks minimise the demands made on non-specific 
mechanisms.
The present study assessed imitation in high-functioning adults with ASD using an 
automatic imitation procedure. Only one study to date has tried to investigate 
automatic imitation in ASD. McIntosh, Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman & Wilbarger 
(2006) used electromyography (EMG) to measure muscular activity in the face while 
participants were presented with emotional facial expressions. Compared with 
controls, individuals with ASD showed less expression-compatible muscular 
activation. However, this study did not distinguish automatic imitation from emotional 
contagion. It is not clear whether, in the controls, observation o f a smiling face 
promoted smiling directly, or by inducing positive affect. The results are also difficult 
to interpret because face stimuli were presented, and there is a growing body of 
evidence that gaze patterns to faces are abnormal in ASD (Klin, Jones, Schultz, 
Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002). Specifically, individuals with ASD spend less time looking 
at the eye-region of the face, which has been shown to be crucial in emotion 
recognition (Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 2006).
To overcome these problems, affectively-neutral hand movements were used in the 
present study. Participants were required to perform a pre-specified hand movement 
(opening or closing) as soon as they saw a hand stimulus begin to move. They were, 
therefore, required to make the same movement (opening or closing) throughout each 
block. The movement o f the hand stimulus was either the same as (compatible trials), 
or the opposite of, the pre-specified response (incompatible trials).
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This task represents a more ‘pure’ test of imitation for a number of reasons. First, this 
paradigm investigates automatic imitation, thereby reducing the many task demands 
necessary for intentional imitation tasks, as highlighted above. Second, the required 
movements are very simple, and therefore, make few demands on motor control. 
Third, since participants are required to make one pre-specified movement per block, 
the instructions are simple and easy to comprehend. Therefore, the task does not 
require complex language comprehension skills. Furthermore, since there is only one 
simple task instruction and one movement to perform per block, the present task does 
not place many demands on working memory.
Previous studies using this paradigm have found two effects. First, a basic automatic 
imitation effect: responding is faster on compatible than on incompatible trials (Heyes 
et al., 2005). Second, an ‘animacy effect’: the automatic imitation effect is greater 
when the observed action is performed by a human effector than when it is performed 
by a human-like mechanical device, or ‘robot’ (Press et al., 2005; Kilner et al., 2003). 
It has been argued that the latter effect is a direct consequence o f increased mirror 
system activity in response to observation of human, compared to robotic, action (Tai 
et al., 2004). Thus, Experiment 4.1 sought to investigate automatic imitation and the 
animacy effect in a group of high-functioning adults with ASD and typically- 
developing matched controls. If an imitation-specific impairment exists in ASD, 
individuals should show a smaller automatic imitation effect and a smaller animacy 
effect than controls. Conversely, if  there is no imitation-specific impairment, 
individuals with ASD should show automatic imitation and animacy effects 
comparable to those of controls.
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Experiment 4.1
4.1.1. Method
Participants. Thirty-two individuals participated in the study: 16 with ASD (15 male; 
1 female) and 16 typically developing controls (15 male; 1 female). Participants were 
recruited from the UCL, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience database. Groups were 
matched on gender, age (ASD M: 34.9 years SEM: 3.2, control M: 33.2 years, SEM:
3.4), and IQ (ASD FSIQ M: 110, SEM: 3, VIQ M: 110, SEM: 3, PIQ M: 106, SEM: 4 
Control FSIQ M 112, SEM: 3, VIQ M: 111, SEM: 3, PIQ M: 108, SEM: 2). IQ was 
measured using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-3rd UK Edition (Wechsler, 
1999). All participants in the ASD group had previously received a diagnosis from an 
independent clinician according to standard criteria. The Autism Diagnostic 
Observational Schedule-G (Lord et al., 2000) was used in order to characterize the 
participants. On this measure, nine participants met criteria for autism, while seven 
participants met criteria for autism spectrum disorder. All participants were right- 
handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive with respect to the 
purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli. All stimuli were presented on an LCD laptop computer screen (60Hz, 
400mm, 96 DPI) in colour on a black background (see Figure 1). Each imperative 
stimulus was a photograph of a human or a robotic hand in an opened or a closed 
posture. It was preceded by a warning stimulus representing a neutral posture o f the 
same hand type (human or robotic). The transition from the warning to the imperative 
stimulus induced apparent motion so that the hand appeared to start in the neutral 
position and then to open or to close.
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Figure 10: Experiment 4.1. Images depicting the warning stimuli (top) and opening 
and closing stimuli for a ) the human and b) the robot stimulus types.
Data recording and analysis. For both open and close responses, response onset was 
measured by recording the electromyogram (EMG) from the first dorsal interosseus 
(FDI) muscle o f the right hand. Signals were amplified, high-pass filtered at 20Hz, 
mains-hum filtered at 50Hz and digitised at 2.5kHz. They were rectified and smoothed 
using a dual-pass Butterworth filter, with a cut-off frequency o f 50Hz. Signals were 
not low-pass filtered. To define a baseline, EMG activity was registered for 100ms 
when the participant was not moving at the beginning of each trial. A window of 20ms 
was then shifted progressively over the raw data in 1ms steps. Response onset was 
defined by the beginning of the first 20ms window after the imperative stimulus in 
which the standard deviation for that window, and for the following 20ms epoch, was 
greater than 2.75 times the standard deviation of the baseline. This criterion was 
chosen during initial calibration of the equipment as the most effective in 
discriminating false positives from misses. Whether the criterion correctly defined 
movement onset in the present experiment was verified by sight for every trial 
performed by each participant. Stimulus onset marked the beginning, and EMG onset 
marked the end, of the response time (RT) interval. Errors were recorded manually.
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Procedure. Each participant was tested individually in a dimly lit room. The 
participant’s right forearm lay in a horizontal position across their body, parallel with 
the stimulus monitor. It was supported by an armrest which allowed the hand to move. 
The wrist was rotated so that the fingers moved upwards during opening responses and 
downwards when closing. Stimulus postures were presented in the lateral plane (left- 
right), and therefore, the direction of response movements was orthogonal to that of 
stimulus movements. This feature of the design allowed automatic imitation to be 
isolated from left-right spatial compatibility. After each response, participants returned 
their hand to the neutral starting position. In each block participants were instructed to 
make a pre-specified response (open or close) as soon as possible after the movement 
stimulus appeared. Thus, although voluntary actions were performed, any effect of 
imitation on those actions was automatic in the sense that participants were neither 
instructed nor intended to imitate. Participants were instructed to refrain from moving 
their hands in catch trials, when the imperative stimulus was not presented.
All trials began with presentation o f the warning stimulus. In stimulus trials, this was 
replaced 800-1500ms later by the movement stimulus, which was o f 480ms duration. 
The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) varied randomly between 800 and 1500ms. 
After the movement stimulus, a blank screen was presented (3000ms) before the next 
trial. In catch trials, the warning stimulus remained on the screen for 1980ms before 
the blank screen was presented for 3000ms. Each block presented, in random order, 15 
trials in which the hand stimulus opened, 15 trials in which the hand stimulus closed, 
and 6 catch trials. Thus, in each block, there were 15 trials in which the response and 
stimulus movements matched (‘compatible trials’) and 15 in which the stimulus and 
response movements did not match (‘incompatible trials’).
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Human and robotic stimuli were presented in separate blocks. Participants, therefore, 
completed four blocks in total, two in which closing was the required response and two 
in which opening was the required response. Response order (open or close first), and 
stimulus type (human or robotic) were balanced across participants. Before each block, 
participants completed five practice trials with the response, and the stimuli, to be used 
in that block.
4.1.2. Results
Incorrect responses (e.g. hand opening when closing was required, 0.05%) were 
excluded from the analysis, as were all RTs smaller than 100 ms and greater than 1000 
ms (0.05%). On each trial, the stimulus movement was either the same as (compatible) 
or different from (incompatible) the pre-specified response. The RT data are given in 
Table 2, and the compatibility effects (the difference in RT between compatible and 
incompatible trials) are shown in Figure 11.
Human Action Robotic Action |
Group Compatible Incompatible Compatible Incompatible I
Trials Trials Trials Trials 1
ASD 347(18) 403 (22) 345 (18) 365 (17) I
Control 303 (16) 342(17) 313(19) 337 (17) 1
Table 2: Experiment 4.1. Mean (and standard error of the mean) RT (ms) for both 
groups on compatible and incompatible trials in response to human and robotic action
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Figure 11: Experiment 4.1. The mean compatibility effect (RT on incompatible trials - 
RT on compatible trials) for human (black bars) and robot stimuli (grey bars) in the 
ASD and control groups. Vertical bars indicate standard error or the mean.
The RT data were analysed using ANOVA with within-subject factors of trial type 
(compatible and incompatible), stimulus type (human and robotic) and a between- 
subjects factor of group (ASD and control). This analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of trial type (F(l,30) = 79.0, p<0.001) due to faster responses on compatible 
trials (mean: 327.1, SEM: 11.9) than incompatible trials (mean: 361.6, SEM: 12.6). 
The interaction between trial type and stimulus type was also significant (F(l,30) =
29.6, p<0.001): the compatibility effect was greater when responding to a human 
(mean: 47.2, SEM: 1.9) compared with a robot stimulus (mean: 21.9, SEM: 1.1). The 
three-way interaction between group, trial type, and stimulus type was also significant 
(F(l,30) = 4.6, p = 0.04), indicating that the difference between the human and robotic 
compatibility effect was larger in the ASD group (mean: 35.3, SEM: 3.9) than in the 
control group (mean: 15.3, SEM: 3.9). No other main effects or interactions were 
significant (all p values >= .10).
Simple effects analysis was used to examine the three-way interaction between group, 
trial type and stimulus type. This revealed that the compatibility effect (control
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F(l,15) = 57.9, p<0.001; ASD F(l,15) = 32.9, p<0.001), and the animacy bias (control 
F(1,15) = 5.6, p = 0.03; ASD F(1,15) = 27.8, p<0.001) were both significant in each 
group. The ASD group exhibited a trend towards a greater compatibility effect when 
responding to observed human actions (F(l,30) = 3.0, p = 0.09) than the control group. 
The groups did not differ in the magnitude of their compatibility effect when 
responding to observed robotic actions.
4.2 Discussion
Experiment 4.1 examined automatic imitation o f simple hand actions in ASD. Like 
typically-developing controls, the ASD group showed a significant automatic imitation 
effect and a significant animacy bias effect. Furthermore, the results from this study 
demonstrated a surprising finding, whereby individuals with ASD showed an increased 
animacy bias compared to controls.
The first o f these findings, and the principal finding of this experiment, is that 
individuals with ASD showed intact automatic imitation. This was demonstrated both 
by a compatibility effect and an animacy bias comparable to the effects observed in 
controls. The results from this chapter are, therefore, consistent with the hypothesis 
that individuals with ASD do not exhibit an imitation-specific impairment.
In this respect, the current results are consistent with some other studies that have 
found intact imitative performance among individuals with ASD (e.g. Carpenter et al., 
2001; Hamilton et al., 2007). However, they are not consistent with the majority o f 
research in this area (Williams et al., 2004). However, because the majority o f previous 
tasks used tests o f intentional imitation, the fact that they found impaired performance 
does not necessarily mean that individuals with ASD exhibit an imitation-specific
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impairment. As suggested in Chapter 3, performance in tests of intentional imitation is 
vulnerable to the effects of non-specific factors such as theory o f mind and executive 
function impairments. Therefore, poor performance on these complex intentional tasks 
may have been due to impairments in these abilities rather than to impairments in 
imitation-specifically. By reducing task demands, such as executive function, theory o f 
mind and motor control, the present study allowed imitative abilities of individuals 
with ASD to be examined using a more pure test of imitation. Thus, this task permitted 
a demonstration of intact imitative performance in this group.
However, it is necessary to consider the possibility that the equivalent performance 
shown by the ASD and control groups in Experiment 4.1 was not an artifactual ‘null 
result’ due to insufficient statistical power. Several factors suggest that this was not the 
case. First, the ASD group were significantly faster to make a pre-specified hand 
movement when it was imitative, than when it was non-imitative, and thus 
demonstrated an automatic imitation effect. Second, the ASD group showed a greater 
degree of automatic imitation in response to human than to robotic actions, and thus 
showed the typical animacy bias effect. Third, group comparisons revealed that the 
amount of automatic imitation shown by the ASD group in response to human actions 
was numerically greater than that of the control group and this difference approached 
statistical significance. Fourth, the ASD group showed a significantly greater animacy 
bias than the control group, i.e. the extent to which human actions were imitated more 
than robotic actions was significantly greater in the ASD group than the control group.
The second interesting finding generated by this study was that individuals with ASD 
displayed an increased animacy bias compared to controls. On this basis, it could be 
argued that individuals with ASD showed a greater tendency to imitate than controls.
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Inspection o f the mean RT data suggests that this increased animacy bias was largely 
due to enhanced automatic imitation o f human actions. This finding should be 
interpreted with caution as the simple interaction between the group and trial type 
factors with human stimuli only approached statistical significance. However, this 
pattern of data is interpretable.
Enhanced automatic imitation of human stimuli may arise from an inability to inhibit 
an imitative response. This idea is consistent with recent evidence suggesting a link 
between theory of mind and the ability to inhibit imitation. It has been shown that 
imitation inhibition and theory of mind are mediated by overlapping areas o f the 
prefrontal cortex (Brass, Derrfuss & von Cramon, 2005), and a positive correlation 
between the ability to inhibit imitation and performance on theory o f mind tasks has 
been found in patients with both frontal and posterior brain lesions (Brass, Derrfuss, 
Matthes-von Cramon, & von Cramon, 2003). The authors o f these studies argue that 
representing both the self and other, which relies on the theory o f mind system, is a 
crucial component o f imitation inhibition. Theory o f mind deficits are well- 
documented in ASD (e.g. Frith & Frith, 2003), and therefore it is plausible that the 
ASD group showed a greater compatibility effect due to problems inhibiting imitation 
on incompatible trials. Such a suggestion is also consistent with two clinical features of 
ASD which suggest imitation inhibition problems: echolalia and echopraxia.
The imitation inhibition hypothesis was tested by separately analysing incompatible 
trials (which require imitation inhibition) and compatible trials (which do not). In 
accordance with the prediction o f the imitation inhibition hypothesis, the ASD group 
showed an increased animacy bias only on incompatible trials (group x animacy 
interaction: incompatible trials: F(l,30) = 5.5, p =.026; compatible trials: F(l,30) < 1),
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and this was due to significantly slower responses on incompatible trials with human 
stimuli (F(l,30) = 4.7, p=0.037). This finding is therefore consistent with the idea that 
individuals with ASD have imitation inhibition deficits.
It is important to note that an imitation inhibition deficit in ASD would not constitute a 
specific imitation impairment because imitation inhibition is thought to rely on theory 
of mind skills. It is, therefore, likely that observed inhibition impairments are caused 
by impaired theory of mind abilities in individuals with ASD. Therefore, the imitation 
inhibition account of the enhanced animacy effect in ASD is consistent with the 
principal message of this chapter, that is, that there is no imitation-specific impairment 
in ASD.
In summary: the specificity o f reported imitation impairments in ASD was investigated 
using an automatic imitation task. Rather than showing impairments, participants with 
ASD showed a typical automatic imitation effect and a typical animacy bias. This 
suggests that, in accordance with Chapter 3, previous findings of poor performance on 
tests of imitation may have been due to impairments of non-specific mechanisms that 
are recruited by both imitative and non-imitative tasks. The present findings imply that 
the core mechanisms of imitation, those that translate observed into executed actions, 
are intact in individuals with ASD.
Evidence o f  a specific imitation impairment in ASD has been used to support claims 
that imitation is mediated by a special-purpose mechanism. The findings from this 
chapter and the previous chapter, therefore, challenge these claims by suggesting that 
there is no specific imitation impairment in ASD. Consequently, the ASD literature 
may not be able to provide support for specialist claims.
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Chapter 5: Automatic imitation in typically developing individuals:
Effector-specificitv in imitation: Support for generalist theories.
Intentional imitation is typically effector-specific. In everyday life and in the 
laboratory, when a person imitates an action, they reproduce the features o f the 
modelled movement using the same part of the body. Hand movements are imitated 
with the hands, foot movements with the feet, and mouth movements with the mouth. 
This chapter examines effector-specificity in imitation to ascertain whether the 
effector-specificity o f intentional imitation reflects the structure of the core 
mechanisms o f imitation and, if so, what it can tell us about the specialist or generalist 
nature o f those mechanisms.
A number o f studies demonstrate that, when required to imitate, children and adults 
reproduce modelled movements using the modelled effector system (Franz, Ford & 
Werner, 2007; Head 1920; Wapner & Cirillo, 1968; Wohlschlager et al., 2003). This is 
the case even when instructions are non-specific; that is, when it is not specified 
exactly which features of an action should be imitated. For example, when an adult 
model faces a child, says ‘Do this’ or ‘Do as I do’, and raises a hand above his head, 
the child raises one of her own hands (Wapner & Cirillo, 1968); she does not raise a 
foot, or an eyebrow. Actions may be carried out using the spatially compatible or 
anatomically compatible side o f the body and this laterality of participants’ responses 
may vary according to age and task demands. For example, younger children, and 
adults under time pressure, tend to imitate right hand movements with the (spatially 
compatible) left hand and vice versa (Wapner & Cirillo, 1968; Wohlschlager et al., 
2003). While laterality effects of this kind show that intentional imitation performance 
is flexible with respect to the side o f the body used to reproduce the model’s
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movement, and that it is susceptible to spatial compatibility effects (Bird et al., 2007, 
Heyes & Ray, 2000), they do not represent a departure from effector-specificity, i.e. 
imitation o f movements using the same effector system.
The effector-specificity o f intentional imitation may reflect the structure o f core 
mechanisms o f imitation, or it may be largely conventional. As highlighted in previous 
chapters, the core mechanisms o f imitation are those that solve the correspondence 
problem (Brass & Heyes 2005), translating visual input from observed body 
movements into matching motor output, and thus explaining how we imitate. It is 
possible that these mechanisms are effector-specific; for example, they may be 
incapable o f  translating observed movements o f one effector system into motor output 
in another effector system. If so, then effector-specificity at the mechanism level could 
be responsible for the effector-specificity observed in intentional imitation 
performance. Alternatively, it may be that the core mechanisms o f imitation are fully 
or partially effector-independent, and that intentional imitation behaviour is influenced 
by cultural knowledge. This hypothesis suggests that, within anatomical constraints, a 
participant observing a hand movement is enabled by core imitation mechanisms to 
reproduce the movement either with their hand or with an alternative effector system. 
However, when the participant is instructed to imitate, she chooses to use the same 
effector as the model because she understands, that effective imitation requires both 
movement and effector matching.
Studies o f imitation in infancy suggest that the effector-specificity o f intentional 
imitation is not purely conventional. Effector-specific imitative responses have been 
observed in young infants. For example, observation of tongue protrusion increases the 
probability o f tongue protrusion, but not of lip protrusion (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977;
122
1983; 1989; 1997). Given the age o f the infants in these studies (some as young as 72 
hours), it is highly unlikely that their behaviour was guided by inferences about what 
was required in the test situation or what is required for effective imitation. However, 
these findings do not provide conclusive evidence that the mechanisms o f imitation are 
effector-specific, because, as discussed in section 1.2.2, the tendency o f infants to 
respond to tongue protrusion with tongue protrusion may be mediated by arousal 
processes, rather than by the mechanisms that mediate imitation later in development 
(Anisfeld, 1991; 1996; Jones, 1996; 2006; Ullstadius, 1998).
Like infancy research, some recent studies o f automatic imitation in adults provide 
suggestive evidence that it is the mechanisms o f imitation which are effector-specific. 
Performance in automatic imitation tasks is unlikely to be influenced by inferences 
about the experimenter’s expectations because these tasks examine imitation under 
conditions in which participants are not told to imitate, may not be aware that they are 
imitating, and in which imitation can interfere with the efficient execution o f task 
instructions (e.g. Brass et al., 2000; Craighero et al., 1998; Heyes et al., 2005; Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003; Stanley, Gowen, Miall, in press; Sturmer et al., 2000). In a study of 
this kind, Chartrand & Barge (1999) found that, when a model and an observer were in 
conversation, observation o f face rubbing elicited more face rubbing than foot shaking, 
and vice versa for observation of foot shaking. Similarly, in a choice RT task, Bach & 
Tipper (2007) asked participants to identify a model as either ‘George’ or ‘John’ by 
pressing a button with their foot or with their hand, and found that observation o f the 
model performing foot actions (kicking a ball) facilitated foot responses, whereas 
observation o f the model performing hand actions (typing on a keyboard) facilitated 
hand responding. These studies, and others like them (Berger & Hadley, 1975; 
Bertenthal et al., 2007; Brass et al., 2000; Gillmeister et al., under review), suggest that
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observation o f an effector in motion selectively activates responses made with the 
same effector. However, they do not tell us whether this ‘effector priming’ effect is 
specific to movements that match those observed. Therefore, although effector priming 
is o f interest in its own right, its occurrence does not necessarily imply that the 
mechanisms mediating imitation are effector-specific. To find out whether this is the 
case, it would be necessary to dissociate movement type (e.g. rubbing vs. shaking, 
kicking vs. typing) from effector type (e.g. feet vs. hands), and to show that 
observation of a particular movement type is more likely to elicit an imitative response 
when the response is performed with the modelled effector than when it is performed 
with an alternative effector. This logic was applied in Experiments 5.1 and 5.2.
The effector-specificity of imitation was investigated using a SRC automatic imitation 
procedure (e.g. Bertenthal et al., 2006; Brass et al., 2000; Heyes et al., 2005; Kilner et 
al., 2003; Press et al., 2005; Sturmer et al., 2000). In each trial o f  the choice RT task, 
participants were required to make one o f four responses: to open their hand, to close 
their hand, to open their mouth, or to close their mouth. The correct response for each 
trial was indicated by a pair o f letters presented on a computer screen. The letters were 
accompanied by one o f four, task-irrelevant action stimuli: a photographic image of an 
open hand, a closed hand, an open mouth, or a closed mouth. Thus, the irrelevant 
action stimulus and the correct response were either effector compatible and movement 
compatible (e.g. open hand stimulus and open hand response), effector compatible and 
movement incompatible (e.g. close hand stimulus and open hand response), effector 
incompatible and movement compatible (e.g. open mouth stimulus and open hand 
response) or effector incompatible and movement incompatible (e.g. close mouth 
stimulus and open hand response).
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Previous SRC studies, in which responses were effector compatible, have shown a 
movement compatibility effect for hand opening and closing responses; e.g. hand 
opening is initiated faster in response to a hand opening than to a hand closing stimulus 
(Heyes et al., 2005; Sturmer et al., 2000). They have also shown that this effect is not 
due to left-right or orthogonal spatial relations between the stimuli and responses 
(Press et al., under review). In line with these findings, in the present chapter, a 
movement compatibility effect was expected when the stimulus and the response 
effector were compatible. The primary focus o f interest was the relative magnitude of 
any movement compatibility effect in the effector compatible and the effector 
incompatible conditions. If imitation mechanisms are effector-independent, rather than 
effector-specific, then the movement compatibility effect should be equally strong in 
the effector compatible and the effector incompatible conditions. This would be a 
surprising result, given previous evidence o f effector priming, but it would be 
interpretable, suggesting that the effector-specificity o f intentional imitation is 
conventional or, more broadly, a product o f high-level cognitive processes influencing 
the output from core mechanisms o f imitation.
Three o f the theories o f imitation addressed in this thesis, the ASL model, (Heyes & 
Ray, 2000; Heyes, 2001), IM (Prinz 1997; 2002) and the AIM theory (Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1997) suggest that imitation mechanisms are effector-specific. Thus, these 
theories would predict an interaction between movement compatibility and effector 
compatibility in the present study. However, whereas ASL and IM predict partial 
effector-specificity, AIM predicts total effector-specificity. Therefore, the generalist 
theories predict a smaller but detectable movement compatibility effect in the effector 
incompatible condition, and the AIM model predicts the absence o f any movement 
compatibility effect when responses are made with an incompatible effector.
These predictions follow from the assumptions of each theory. The ASL model (Heyes 
& Ray, 2000; Heyes, 2001) assumes that imitation is mediated by a repertoire o f 
‘vertical associations’, each linking a sensory representation o f an action with a motor 
representation o f the same action. Sensory and motor representations can each include 
information about the movement and the effector properties o f the represented action, 
and the links between them are acquired in the course o f development through 
associative learning. Their formation depends on correlated experience o f observing 
and executing the same action. Responses that are based on associative learning are 
known to show stimulus generalization; stimuli that were not present during training 
elicit the response to the extent that they are physically similar to the training stimuli 
(Pearce, 1987; 1994). Therefore, although it is unlikely that participants will have 
experienced a reliable correlation between observation o f hand opening and execution 
of mouth opening, for example, the ASL model predicts some facilitation o f mouth 
opening by observation of hand opening because, when they are observed, hand 
opening resembles mouth opening. For example, both movements involve the 
separation o f two salient objects, the lips in the case of mouth opening, and the fingers 
and thumb in the case o f hand opening. Stimulus generalization, therefore, should lead 
to partial effector-specificity o f imitation.
Partial effector-specificity o f imitation would also be predicted by IM, which suggests 
that actions are represented in terms of their sensory consequences, and that action 
observation primes performance o f an action to the extent that the observed and 
executed actions have similar sensory consequences. Therefore, the observation o f a 
hand opening will activate any action representation with which it shares some degree 
of ideomotor similarity. The action representation which exhibits the greatest degree of 
similarity will be activated most strongly, and this is likely to be the ‘hand opening’
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action representation. However, since mouth opening and hand opening share some 
physical characteristics, and therefore, some ideomotor similarity, observation o f a 
hand opening action may activate a ‘mouth opening’ action representation, and 
therefore, prime a mouth opening response, but to a lesser extent.
In contrast with the partial effector-specificity proposed by ASL and IM, the AIM 
theory assumes that imitation is a two-stage process: “an imitative act is not one 
indissociable unit. It can be differentiated into organ [effector] identification and 
movement components” (Meltzoff & Moore, 1997, pi 84). The first, ‘organ 
identification’, stage identifies the effector system used by the model, leads to 
generalized activation of the observer’s corresponding effector system (effector 
priming), and to inhibition or ‘quietening’ of the observer’s other effector systems. The 
second stage, the ‘movement component’, identifies the movement properties o f the 
modelled action, codes these as ‘organ relations’ (e.g. ‘tongue-to-lips’), and, via this 
coding, activates or facilitates execution o f the same movement by the observer. This 
model implies that the second stage mechanisms, those that mediate movement 
imitation, are effector-specific; that they apply effector-specific codes (e.g. tongue-to- 
lips), and enable matching movements only o f the effector system selected at the organ 
identification stage. If, as AIM proposes, the movement matching process is based on 
effector-specific codes, then, in the present study, one would not expect an effect of 
movement compatibility when responses are made with the incompatible effector.
To summarize, an automatic imitation SRC procedure was used to investigate the 
effector-specificity o f the mechanisms that mediate imitation. In this procedure, 
participants made opening and closing movements of the hand and o f the mouth in the 
presence o f task-irrelevant action images that were effector and movement compatible,
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effector compatible and movement incompatible, effector incompatible and movement 
compatible, or effector and movement incompatible with the required response. A 
movement compatibility effect in the effector compatible condition (e.g. faster hand 
opening responses in the presence o f open than o f close hand stimuli) was expected on 
the basis o f previous studies. An equally strong movement compatibility effect in the 
effector incompatible condition (e.g. faster hand opening responses in the presence of 
open than o f close mouth stimuli), would suggest that imitation mechanisms are 
effector-independent. A weaker, but significant, movement compatibility effect in the 
effector incompatible than in the effector compatible condition would indicate that 
movement imitation is partially effector-specific, and would be consistent with the 
views of ASL and IM regarding the mechanisms that mediate imitation. The absence 
o f a movement compatibility effect in the effector incompatible condition would 
indicate that movement imitation is wholly effector-specific, and would be consistent 
with the account o f imitation mechanisms provided by AIM.
Experiment 5.1
Participants were instructed to make one of four responses to letters on a computer 
screen. They were told to open their mouth if  the letters were ‘om’, to close their 
mouth in response to ‘cm’, to open their hand in response to ‘oh’ and to close then- 
hand in response to ‘ch’. Participants were also told that the letters would appear with 
irrelevant images o f hand and mouth movements, which they should ignore. The 
irrelevant stimuli depicted a hand either opening or closing or a mouth opening or 
closing. Therefore, for any given trial, the response effector was either compatible or 
incompatible with the irrelevant stimulus effector and the response movement was 
either compatible or incompatible with the irrelevant stimulus movement. There were,
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therefore, two types o f compatibility (effector and movement), and each had two levels 
(compatible and incompatible).
5.1.1 Method
Participants. Thirteen consenting, healthy participants with an average age o f 25.7 
years, 7 male, were recruited from the UCL Department o f Psychology database and 
paid a small honorarium for their participation. All were right-handed, had normal or 
correct-to-normal vision, and were proficient in the English language. They were naive 
with respect to the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli and apparatus. All stimuli were presented on an LCD laptop computer screen 
(60Hz, 400mm, 96 DPI) in colour on a black background. Viewing was unrestrained at 
a distance o f approximately 600mm. Warning stimuli consisted o f photographic 
images o f two effectors side-by-side, a mouth and a right hand, each in a neutral 
posture (Figure 12). In half o f the trials the hand was on the left o f the screen with the 
mouth on the right, and in the other half, this configuration was reversed.
Each imperative stimulus consisted o f the hand and mouth images in the same left- 
right position as in the preceding warning stimulus, but one effector was displayed in 
an open or close posture, whereas the other remained in the neutral posture. 
Additionally, between the effectors, in the centre o f the screen, two letters were 
displayed, one above the other.
The letters were in Arial font size 28, lower case, and printed in white on a black 
background. The two letters combined occupied 1.0° (width) x 2.4° (height) of 
viewing angle. The hand and mouth stimuli were matched in terms o f the overall area
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of the stimulus in the neutral position, the open position and the close position. In the 
neutral position, the hand occupied 3.3° (width) x 5.7° (height) of viewing angle and 
the mouth occupied 3.3° (width) x 5.2° (height) of viewing angle. The distance 
between the middle finger and thumb when the hand was in the neutral position 
occupied 1.4° o f viewing angle and the distance between the top and bottom lip when 
the mouth was in the neutral position occupied 1.6° of viewing angle. The distance 
between the middle finger and thumb when the hand was in the open position occupied 
5.2° o f viewing angle and the distance between the top and bottom lip when the mouth 
was in the open position occupied 5.0° of viewing angle. In the close position, the 
distance between the lips and between the fingers occupied 0° of viewing angle.
There were four letter pairs (ho, he, mo, me), each consisting of a letter indicating the 
correct response effector (h for hand or m for mouth) and a letter indicating the correct 
response movement (o for open or c for close). In half o f the imperative stimuli the 
letter representing the effector was placed above the letter representing the movement, 
and in the other half this configuration was reversed.
Figure 12: Experiment 5.1. Images depicting a) the neutral warning stimulus, b) and c) 
two examples of imperative stimuli. In Figure 12b the irrelevant stimulus (open mouth) 
is effector compatible and movement incompatible with the required response (close 
mouth). In Figure 12c the irrelevant stimulus (close mouth) is effector incompatible 
and movement incompatible with the required response (open hand).
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Data recording and analysis. For both open and close responses, response onset was
measured by recording the electromyogram (EMG) from the first dorsal interosseus 
(FDI) muscle in the hand and the orbicularis oris (OO) in the mouth using disposable 
Ag/AgCl surface electrodes. Recording electrodes were placed on the OO on the right 
hand comer o f the mouth and on the FDI on the right hand. The signal pre-processing 
and EMG recoding procedures were identical to those described in Chapter 4.
Procedure. Each participant was tested individually in a dimly lit room. Participants 
were told that they would see some pictures of hands and mouths on either side o f the 
screen, but that they should ignore the movements o f these body parts and respond to 
the letters in the centre of the screen. It was explained that they should open their 
mouth in response to the letters ‘om’, close their mouth in response to ‘cm’, open their 
hand in response to ‘oh’ and close their hand in response to ‘ch’. Participants were told 
to make their response as soon as the letter appeared on the screen but to keep as still 
as possible at all other times.
The participant’s right forearm lay in a horizontal position across his/her body, parallel 
with the stimulus monitor. It was supported from elbow to wrist by an armrest such 
that the hand was free to move. The wrist was rotated so that the fingers moved 
upwards during opening responses and downwards when closing. Participants were 
shown the correct neutral positions for the hand and the mouth. In the neutral mouth 
position, participants were required to have their lips slightly parted. They were asked 
to return to the neutral position after they had made each response.
All trials began with presentation of the warning stimulus which was replaced 800- 
2000ms later by an imperative stimulus o f 480ms duration. The SOA varied randomly
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between 1200 and 2400ms in 400ms steps. After the imperative stimulus the screen 
went black for 3000ms before the warning stimulus for the next trial appeared.
Each block contained 128 trials in total, 32 trials o f each o f the four principal types 
(effector and movement compatible; effector compatible and movement incompatible; 
effector incompatible and movement compatible; effector and movement 
incompatible) in random order. In half o f the trials o f each type, the hand stimulus was 
on the left o f the mouth stimulus, and in the other half it was on the right. Each 
participant completed two blocks of trials, one in which the effector indicator (h or m) 
was above the movement indicator (o or c), and the other in which it was below the 
movement indicator. Half o f the participants completed the blocks in the order 
described, and half in the alternative order. Before testing commenced in each block, 
participants completed 10 practice trials consisting o f a random selection o f trial types 
from within that block.
5.1.2. Results and discussion
Practice trials, incorrect responses (3.9%) and response omissions (3.8%) were 
excluded from the analysis, as were all RTs smaller than 100ms and greater than 
1500ms (0.05%). One participant, for whom more than 10% of the data were missing, 
was excluded from the analysis. The RT data from the remaining 12 participants are 
shown in Figures 13 and 14.
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Figure 13: Experiment 5.1. Mean RT on movement compatible (black bars) and 
movement incompatible (grey bars) trials when effector was compatible (left side) and 
when it was incompatible (right side). Vertical bars indicate the standard error of the 
mean.
S - Hand; R- Hand S - Mouth; R- Hand
900 900
850 850 «-----------1 ^ 4
800 800
750 750 .
700 700
650 650
600 600
S - Mouth; R- Mouth S - Hand; R -Mouth
900 900
850 850
800 800
750 750% *■- - . % ♦—  1
700 700
650 650
600 600
Open Close Open Close
Figure 14: Experiment 5.1. Mean RT for open (diamonds and solid lines) and close 
(squares and dashed lines) movement responses for each trial type defined by the 
stimulus effector (S) and response effector (R) mapping.
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The data were subjected to ANOVA in which movement compatibility (compatible 
and incompatible), effector compatibility (compatible and incompatible), response 
movement (open and close), and response effector (mouth and hand) were within- 
subjects variables. There were significant main effects o f movement compatibility 
(F (l,ll)  = 45.1, p<.0001) and effector compatibility (F ( l ,ll)  = 86.0, p<.0001). 
Participants were both faster to respond when the irrelevant stimulus movement was 
response compatible (mean: 752.4 SEM: 24.9) than when it was response incompatible 
(mean: 788.0 SEM: 27.4), and when the irrelevant stimulus effector was response 
compatible (mean: 731.8 SEM: 25.7) than when it was response incompatible (Mean: 
808.6 SEM: 27.0). There were also significant main effects o f response effector 
(F (l, 11) = 32.8, p<.0001), and o f response movement (F (l, 11) = 21.7, p<.0001). 
Shorter RTs were recorded for mouth responses (mean: 728.1, SEM: 26.6) than for 
hand responses (mean: 812.3, SEM: 27.6). Shorter RTs were also recorded for open 
responses (mean: 738.3, SEM: 24.9) than for close responses (mean: 802.1, SEM:
28.8). These main effects demonstrating shorter RTs for open responses and mouth 
responses may not reflect real reaction time differences but may simply be an artefact 
of electrode placement. The FDI muscle may only become active near the end o f a 
close movement but nearer the beginning of an open movement, thus producing shorter 
RTs for an open response. Similarly the OO muscle may become active nearer the 
beginning o f a mouth movement than the FDI does during a hand movement, thus 
producing shorter RTs for mouth movements compared to hand movements.
The effect o f movement compatibility was greater for closing than for opening 
responses (movement compatibility x response movement, F(1,11) = 5.6, p=.04), but 
simple effects analysis confirmed that movement compatible responses were faster 
than movement incompatible responses both when the response was opening (F(l,l 1)
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= 11.2, p<.006, compatible: mean: 727.7, SEM 25.4; incompatible: mean: 748.9, SEM:
24.9) and when it was closing (F(l, 11) = 27.9, p<.0001, compatible: mean: 777.1, 
SEM; 26.4 incompatible: mean: 827.1, SEM: 31.8). Similarly, the effect o f effector 
compatibility was greater when responses were made with the hand than when they 
were made with the mouth (effector compatibility x response effector, F(1,11) = 6.8, 
p=.03), but effector compatible responses were faster both for mouth responses 
(F(l,11) = 42.4, p<.0001, compatible: mean 697.6:, SEM: 25.8; incompatible: mean:
758.6, SEM: 28.1), and for hand responses (F( 1,11) = 69.5, p<.0001, compatible: 
mean: 765.9, SEM: 27.9; incompatible: mean: 858.6, SEM: 28.3).
Of principal interest, given the purpose of the experiment, there was a significant 
movement compatibility x effector compatibility interaction (F (l,l 1)=5.2, p=.044), 
indicating that the movement compatibility effect was greater in the effector 
compatible (52.9ms) than in the effector incompatible (18.2ms) condition. Simple 
effects analysis indicated a significant movement compatibility effect when the 
response effector was compatible with the stimulus effector (F (l, 11) = 35.4, p<.0001, 
but only a trend in this direction when the response effector was incompatible (F(l ,11) 
= 3.5, p=.088).
Thus, the results o f the present experiment indicate that automatic imitation is not 
effector-independent. Opening and closing movements o f an irrelevant action stimulus 
had more impact on the speed o f opening and closing responses when the responses 
were performed with the modelled effector (hand responses to hand stimuli, and mouth 
responses to mouth stimuli) than when they were performed with the alternative 
effector (hand responses to mouth stimuli, and mouth responses to hand stimuli). 
Therefore, they imply that the effector-specificity o f intentional imitation is not
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entirely conventional; it is likely to reflect the operation o f core imitation mechanisms, 
and not to be due solely to inferences about what is expected in the test situation.
However, the results of Experiment 5.1 did not distinguish clearly between the 
predictions o f the generalist and specialist models o f imitation. All three theories 
predicted the observed interaction between movement and effector compatibility, but 
whereas ASL and IM predicted that there would be an effect o f movement 
compatibility in the effector incompatible condition, the AIM model predicted that 
movement compatibility would not influence performance in this condition. The 
results showed that movement compatible responses with the incompatible effector 
were substantially faster than movement incompatible responses with the incompatible 
effector, but this trend was not quite significant (F(l, 11) = 3.51, p=.088).
Experiment 5.2
The principal purpose o f Experiment 5.2 was to discriminate more decisively between 
the predictions o f the generalist and specialist theories. Therefore, Experiment 5.2 
replicated the basic design and procedure used in Experiment 5.1, but with an 
additional sample of participants. Experiment 5.2 had two further purposes: to check 
that the movement compatibility effect observed in Experiment 5.1 was not dependent 
on spatial compatibility, and to investigate the nature o f the effector compatibility 
effects observed in Experiment 5.1.
In Experiment 5.1, hand stimuli moved in a horizontal plane (e.g. the fingers moved to 
the right o f the screen when the hand opened), whereas hand and mouth responses 
were made in a vertical plane (e.g. the fingers and the upper lip moved upwards when 
participants made hand opening and mouth opening responses, respectively).
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Therefore, in hand stimulus trials, the tendency to respond faster on movement 
compatible trials (e.g. hand or mouth opening in response to a hand open stimulus) 
could not have been due to spatial compatibility. However, in mouth stimulus trials, 
up-down spatial compatibility was confounded with movement compatibility. For 
example, in mouth open stimulus trials, the upper lip o f the mouth stimulus moved 
upwards, and correct responses in the movement compatible condition involved 
upward movement of the participants’ fingers or upper lip. To remove this confound, 
in Experiment 5.2 both the hand and the mouth stimuli moved in the horizontal plane. 
Thus, relative to Experiment 5.1, the mouth stimulus was rotated 90 degrees clockwise 
from the canonical position, so that the upper lip appeared on the right o f the lower lip, 
and moved towards the right when the mouth stimulus opened. As in Experiment 5.1, 
responses were made when the participant’s head was upright. If the movement 
compatibility effect observed in Experiment 5.1 was not dependent on up-down spatial 
compatibility, then it should be replicated in Experiment 5.2 where up-down spatial 
compatibility was controlled.
The third purpose o f Experiment 5.2 was to investigate the effector compatibility 
effects found in Experiment 5.1. These effects showed that responses with the 
modelled effector (e.g. hand responses to hand stimuli) were faster, and more 
susceptible to automatic imitation, than responses with the alternative effector (e.g. 
hand responses to mouth stimuli). These effects might indicate that observation o f an 
effector system in motion facilitates responding with an anatomically similar effector 
system, e.g. hand movement observation facilitates hand movements relative to mouth 
movements. However, these effects might indicate, instead or in addition, that 
observation of an effector system in motion facilitates responding at body-centred 
locations typically occupied by that effector system. For example, hand movement
observation may facilitate responses made in the typical locations o f the hands (e.g. 
close to the middle o f the trunk when seated) relative to responses made in the location 
of the mouth. To test the anatomical account against the response location account of 
effector compatibility, Experiment 5.2 varied the location o f the response hand. In the 
‘far’ condition, as in Experiment 5.1, the participant’s responding hand rested on the 
desk top, just in front o f their chest. In the ‘near’ condition, the participant’s 
responding hand was located directly in front o f their mouth. If the effector 
compatibility effects observed in Experiment 5.1 were due to the locations o f the 
responding effectors, and not to the anatomical relationship between the stimulus and 
response effectors, then those effects should be substantially smaller in the near 
condition than in the far condition.
It is also possible, that the effector compatibility observed in Experiment 5.1 was 
related to the fact that participants could see their hand responses, albeit in peripheral 
vision, whereas they could not see their mouth responses. To control for this, in 
Experiment 5.2 a screen was placed between the participant’s body and their 
responding hand, so that neither hand nor mouth responses were accompanied by 
visual feedback.
5.2.1 Method
Participants. Twelve additional participants, with an average age o f 28.2 years (7 
male) were recruited from the same source, and to meet the same requirements, as in 
Experiment 5.1.
Stimuli. The stimuli were identical to those in Experiment 5.1 except that the mouth 
stimuli were rotated by 90° in a clockwise direction from the canonical position, so
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that the upper lip appeared on the right of the lower lip, and moved towards the right 
when the mouth stimulus opened (see Figure 15). As in Experiment 5.1, responses 
were made when the participant’s head was upright. Therefore, for both hand and 
mouth stimuli, the stimulus movement (left/right) was orthogonal to the response 
movement (up/down).
Figure 15: Experiment 5.2. Stimuli depicting a) the neutral warning stimulus, b) and c) 
two examples of imperative stimuli. In Figure 15b the irrelevant stimulus (open mouth) 
is effector compatible and movement incompatible with the required response (close 
mouth). In Figure 15c the irrelevant stimulus (close mouth) is effector incompatible 
and movement incompatible with the required response (open hand).
Procedure. The data recording and analysis were identical to Experiment 5.1. The 
procedure was also the same as in Experiment 5.1, except as follows. Participants 
completed eight blocks of trials over two sessions, between one and three days apart. 
Half o f the blocks were completed in the ‘hand far’ position, where, as in Experiment 
5.1, the hand was located approximately 400mm below the mouth. The remaining 
blocks were completed in the ‘hand near’ condition, where the participant’s right arm 
lay in a horizontal position on a raised armrest such that the hand was as close as 
possible to the mouth in both the horizontal and vertical plane. In both conditions the 
hand was covered by a rigid black screen so that the participant could not see their
139
hand movements. Therefore, in Experiment 5.2, neither hand nor mouth responses 
yielded visual feedback.
Each block contained 64 trials in total, 16 trials o f each o f the four principal types 
(effector and movement compatible; effector compatible and movement incompatible; 
effector incompatible and movement compatible; effector and movement 
incompatible) in random order. In half of the trials o f each type, the hand stimulus was 
on the left o f the mouth stimulus, and in the other half it was on the right. Each 
participant completed four blocks o f trials on each day, two in which the hand was in 
the near position and two in which the hand was in the far position. In one ‘near’ block 
the effector indicator (h or m) was above the movement indicator (o or c), and in the 
other near block it was below the movement indicator. This was also the case for the 
‘far’ blocks. The order o f presentation of the blocks was counterbalanced. Participants 
carried out the same four blocks on both days, but on the second day the order o f near 
and far blocks was reversed.
5.2.2 Results and discussion
Practice trials, incorrect responses (2.9%) and response omissions (3.0%) were 
excluded from the analysis as were all RTs smaller than 100ms and greater than 
1500ms (0.05%). The RT data for the 12 participants is shown in Figures 16 and 17.
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Figure 16: Experiment 5.2. Mean RT on movement compatible (black bars) and 
movement incompatible (grey bars) trials when effector is compatible (left side) and 
incompatible (right side). Vertical bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 17: Experiment 5.2. Mean RT for open (diamonds and solid lines) and close 
(squares and dashed lines) movement responses for each trial type defined by the 
stimulus effector (S) and response effector (R) mapping.
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The RT data were subjected to ANOVA in which movement compatibility (compatible 
and incompatible), effector compatibility (compatible and incompatible) response 
movement (open and close), response effector (mouth and hand) and hand position 
(near and far) were within-subjects variables. There were no significant main effects or 
interactions involving the hand position variable. There were significant main effects 
o f movement compatibility (F(l, 11) = 58.4 p<.0001), and effector compatibility 
(F(l, 11) = 39.0, p<.0001). Participants were both faster to respond when the irrelevant 
stimulus movement was response compatible (Mean: 640.4 SEM: 28.4) than when it 
was response incompatible (Mean: 686.6 SEM 31.6), and when the irrelevant stimulus 
effector was response compatible (Mean: 633.2 SEM 26.9) than when it was response 
incompatible (Mean: 693.8 SEM 33.3). There were also significant main effects of 
response movement (F(l, 11) = 7.5, p=.02) and of response effector (F(l, 11) = 12.4, 
p=.005). Shorter RTs were recorded for mouth responses (Mean 644.3, SEM 30.2) 
than for hand responses (Mean 682.7, SEM 30.6), and for open responses (Mean
650.3, SEM 28.4) than for close responses (Mean 676.7, SEM 32.1).
The effect of movement compatibility was greater for closing than for opening 
responses (movement compatibility x response movement, (F(l ,11) = 11.4, p=.006), 
but simple effects analysis confirmed that movement compatible responses were faster 
than movement incompatible responses both when the response was opening (F (l, 11) 
= 23.2, p=.001), compatible: mean: 633.2; SEM: 27.6; incompatible: mean: 667.4 
SEM: 29.5) and when it was closing (F(l,l 1)=69.8, p<.0001), compatible: mean: 647.6 
;SEM: 30.1 incompatible: mean: 705.9, SEM: 34.3). Similarly, the effect of effector 
compatibility was greater when responses were made with the hand than when they 
were made with the mouth (effector compatibility x response effector, F (l,l 1) = 5.2, 
p=.04), but effector compatible responses were faster both for mouth responses
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(F (l,ll)  = 29.5, p<.0001, compatible: mean: 619.9; SEM 28.0: incompatible: mean: 
668.8 SEM: 32.9), and for hand responses (F(l,11) = 32.8, p<.0001, compatible: mean: 
646.6; SEM 26.6: incompatible: mean: 718.3, SEM:35.2).
Of principal interest, there was a significant movement compatibility x effector 
compatibility interaction (F(l, 11) = 13.4, p=.004), indicating that the movement 
compatibility effect was greater in the effector compatible (67.7ms) than in the effector 
incompatible (24.8ms) condition. Simple effects analysis indicated a significant 
movement compatibility effect when the response effector was compatible with the 
stimulus effector (F(l, 11) = 64.7, p<.0001, and also when the response effector was 
incompatible with the stimulus effector (F(l,l 1) = 8.7, p=.013).
The results o f the present experiment replicated and extended those o f Experiment 5.1. 
Like Experiment 5.1, they showed that movement compatibility has less influence on 
performance when the stimulus and response effectors are incompatible than when 
they are compatible. Additionally, by controlling for any effects o f up-down spatial 
compatibility on movement compatibility, Experiment 5.2 confirmed that the hand and 
mouth movement compatibility effects observed in these experiments were genuine; 
they were due to the relationship between the stimulus and response actions (opening 
and closing), and not simply to the elementary spatial properties o f these actions. 
Similarly, by controlling for the possibility that, for example, hand movement stimuli 
prime movements at canonical hand locations, rather than hand movements per se, 
Experiment 5.2 confirmed that the effector compatibility effects observed in these 
experiments were due to the anatomical, rather that to the spatial, relationship between 
the stimulus and response effectors. Most importantly, the results o f Experiment 5.2 
confirmed that, although the effect of movement compatibility is smaller when the
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stimulus and response effectors are incompatible than when they are compatible, the 
movement compatibility effect is significant in the effector incompatible condition. 
Thus, automatic imitation o f movement trajectory occurs even when participants are 
responding with hand movement to mouth movement stimuli and vice versa. This 
finding, which was predicted by IM and the ASL model, suggests that the core 
mechanisms o f imitation operate in a way that is partially, but not wholly, effector- 
specific.
5.3 General discussion
In everyday life, and in laboratory tasks where participants intend to imitate, 
movements are usually imitated with the modelled effector system, e.g. hand 
movements are imitated with the hands and foot movements with the feet. To 
investigate whether this effector-specific tendency in intentional imitative performance 
reflects the nature o f the core mechanisms o f imitation, a SRC paradigm was used to 
investigate the effector-specificity o f automatic imitation. The results o f two 
experiments indicated an automatic imitation, or movement compatibility, effect both 
when participants responded with the modelled effector system (effector compatible 
condition) and when they responded with an alternative effector system (effector 
incompatible condition), and that the movement compatibility effect was smaller when 
an alternative effector was used. More specifically, opening and closing movements of 
an irrelevant action stimulus had more impact on the speed o f opening and closing 
responses when the responses were performed with the modelled effector (hand 
responses to hand stimuli, and mouth responses to mouth stimuli) than when they were 
performed with the alternative effector (hand responses to mouth stimuli, and mouth 
responses to mouth stimuli).
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Previous studies have demonstrated movement compatibility effects for hand opening 
and closing stimuli when the stimulus and response effectors were compatible (Heyes 
et al., 2005; Press et al., 2005; Sturmer et al., 2000), but the experiments in this chapter 
show for the first time 1) that opening and closing mouth movements are susceptible to 
automatic imitation, 2) that automatic imitation o f opening and closing movements o f 
the hand and mouth transfers across these effector systems, and 3) that the transfer is 
incomplete; automatic imitation of opening and closing movements of the hand and 
mouth is partially effector-specific.
As its name suggests, automatic imitation is likely to be less susceptible to cognitive 
control than imitative performance based on instructions or when a participant intends 
to carry out an imitative act (Press et al., 2006). Therefore, any effector-specificity 
observed in an automatic imitation task is unlikely to be due to the participant inferring 
that they should match both effector and movement. Therefore, the effector-specificity 
o f automatic imitation observed in the present study suggests that, in intentional 
imitation tasks and in everyday life, participants do not imitate with the modelled 
effector purely because they judge effector matching to be conventional. Rather, it 
suggests that the effector-specificity o f imitative performance reflects the structure of 
the core mechanisms of imitation; the mechanisms that solve the correspondence 
problem (Brass & Heyes, 2005) by translating visual input from observed body 
movements into matching motor output.
The active intermodal matching theory (AIM, Meltzoff & Moore, 1997) suggests that 
the mechanisms that solve the correspondence problem operate in two stages. The first 
stage identifies the modelled effector, and, when it is completed, the second stage 
codes the movement performed by that effector. This account implies that the
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mechanism mediating movement imitation, operative in the second stage, is strictly 
effector-specific; that it represents the modelled movement in codes that apply 
exclusively to the modelled effector. If this is correct, then the AIM model is not 
consistent with the results o f  the present study, which indicated only partial effector- 
specificity of automatic imitation.
In contrast, the findings o f the present study are consistent with both the ASL model of 
imitation (Heyes & Ray, 2000; Heyes 2001) and IM (Prinz, 1997; 2002). ASL suggests 
that visual input from the model is translated into motor output by a set of 
bidirectional, excitatory links connecting visual and motor representations of the same 
action components. These ‘vertical associations’ are thought to be established through 
associative learning; formed on the basis o f correlated experience o f observing and 
executing action components. Because stimulus generalization is a ubiquitous feature 
o f associative learning (Pearce, 1994), the ASL model assumes that vertical 
associations are activated, not only by the stimuli experienced during learning, but also 
by other stimuli to the extent that they have physical characteristics in common with 
the learned stimulus (Press et al., 2005; 2006). Similarly, IM proposes a role for visual 
similarity, suggesting that observation o f a perceptual stimulus activates the action 
representation with which it exhibits the most similarity. Therefore, both generalist 
theories would make the same prediction regarding the partial effector-specificity o f 
the mechanisms of imitation. More specifically, these theories would expect some 
facilitation o f mouth opening by observation of hand opening, and vice versa, given 
the visual similarity between the opening movement of a mouth and the opening 
movement o f a hand. Consistent with this prediction, the results o f Experiments 5.1 
and 5.2 indicated partial effector-specificity - a smaller but significant movement 
compatibility effect when the stimulus and response effectors were incompatible.
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While the present findings illustrate the congruence between the two generalist 
theories addressed in this thesis, they also highlight one difference between these 
theories. IM can readily explain automatic imitation o f hand movements because they 
are perceptually transparent, i.e. they yield similar visual effects when observed and 
executed. Automatic imitation of mouth movements, which was demonstrated in adult 
participants for the first time in these experiments, is harder to reconcile with IM. This 
is because mouth movements are perceptually opaque; they yield dissimilar sensory 
input when observed and executed. For example, when I open my mouth I do not 
receive any distinctive visual input, but when I observe someone else opening their 
mouth, I see the lips parting and forming an oval shape. However, IM is able to explain 
imitation of perceptually opaque actions, and partial effector-specificity o f automatic 
imitation, when it is combined with the hypothesis, central to the ASL model, that 
actions acquire their ‘common’, sensory codes through associative learning (Eisner & 
Hommel, 2001; 2004). Associative learning allows perceptually opaque actions to be 
represented by sensory effects which are dissimilar to the direct effects o f action 
execution, but which have been reliably correlated with action execution. For example, 
although the sight of an opening mouth is not a direct and anatomically inevitable 
consequence o f my opening my mouth, I may learn to represent my mouth opening 
movement from a third party perspective as a result o f being imitated, or looking in a 
mirror, while performing this action (Heyes & Ray, 2000). Experiences o f this kind 
establish the third party perspective as part of the representation o f the executed action, 
and thereby allow IM to invoke the principle o f similarity to explain both automatic 
imitation o f perceptually opaque actions, and the partial effector dependence observed 
in the present experiments.
147
In conclusion: The results o f the present study indicate that automatic imitation is 
partially effector-specific: observation o f opening and closing movements of the hand 
and mouth prime execution o f corresponding movements by the modelled effector and 
also by the alternative effector, but the priming effect is smaller when the alternative 
effector is engaged in responding. This finding suggests that, rather than being 
conventional, the effector-specificity o f intentional imitation reflects the nature of the 
mechanisms that mediate visuomotor translation for imitation. The partial effector- 
specificity observed in this chapter is consistent with the ASL and IM theories of 
imitation, and not consistent with the AIM model. This chapter, therefore, provides 
positive support for generalist theories of imitation.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
6.1 Overview
This chapter summarises the findings from the previous chapters with reference to the 
theoretical questions they addressed. The findings in each chapter will be outlined, 
along with likely interpretations o f those findings. Following these summaries, 
implications and limitations of the experiments will be discussed along with 
outstanding questions. Section 6.2 reviews Chapter 2, which investigated the role of 
goals in imitation. Section 6.3 discusses Chapters 3 and 4 which examined imitation 
skills in ASD, and section 6.4 reviews Chapter 5 which examined effector-specificity 
in imitation. Finally, section 6.5 considers the implications o f this whole body of 
experimental work and presents general conclusions.
6.2 Intentional imitation in typically developing individuals
6.2.1 Summary and interpretation
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate how the correspondence problem is 
solved, and thus, how we are able to imitate. The two specialist theories under 
consideration suggest that imitation is mediated by a special-purpose mechanism 
whereas the two generalist theories suggest that imitation is mediated by general 
learning and motor control mechanisms.
Both o f the specialist theories highlight the role o f goals in explaining how we imitate. 
The goal-directed theory o f imitation (GOADI) provides the most explicit statement of 
this view. Some evidence in favour of this theory has been provided by the well- 
replicated finding that, when they are required to imitate, children and adults more
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accurately reproduce the goal of the action than the means used to carry out that action. 
For example, in the pen-and-cups task, participants imitate object selection more 
accurately than effector selection, which is imitated more accurately then grip 
selection.
However, an alternative explanation of these findings has been provided by a ‘general 
process account’, which suggests that task-general processes, o f perception and 
attention, can explain the types o f imitative behaviour that are commonly thought to 
support a goal-directed view. According to this account, goals are not necessary to 
explain the findings from imitation tasks such as the pen-and-cups task.
Some evidence in favour of the general process account was provided by Bird et al. (in 
press) who demonstrated that when the colour cue was moved from the cups to the 
hands or the grips, these components became the most accurately imitated components 
of the action, thus demonstrating a colour minimum error pattern. However, the results 
from this study only undermine the claim that goals guide performance on this task if 
one assumes that goals are action end-states. On the contrary, the mentalistic version of 
GOADI (mGOADI) claims that goals are inferred mental states of the model. This 
interpretation o f the GOADI model is compatible with the results o f Bird et al. because 
it is possible that the colour cue in these experiments affected imitative performance by 
changing the action component inferred by the participant to be the goal o f the 
movement.
Therefore, Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 tested mGOADI against a general process account 
using the pen-and-cups task. In Experiment 2.1, participants were either required to 
respond to naturalistic or moving geometric stimuli. Geometric stimuli are unlikely to
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support the attribution of mental states and yet the colour minimum error pattern was 
observed in both versions o f this task. This result is consistent with the general process 
account but inconsistent with mGOADI. In Experiment 2.2 static geometric shapes 
were used to reduce further the possibility that participants attributed intentions to the 
shapes. Furthermore, in this task, participants either carried out movements or 
responded verbally. The colour minimum error pattern was observed in both tasks 
providing further evidence consistent with a general process account and inconsistent 
with mGOADI.
In the geometric version o f the task, where mental state attribution is unlikely, it is 
highly probable that error patterns arise from general perceptual and attentional 
processes. Given that the same error patterns were observed in both geometric and 
naturalistic versions of the task, it is likely that error patterns in the naturalistic version 
of the task also arise from general processes. Thus, the findings from this chapter 
suggest that mentalistic goals are not necessary to explain the colour minimum error 
pattern. Rather, general processes, which mediate performance in a range of tasks, can 
account for the error patterns seen in the pen-and-cups task. Consequently, error 
patterns, such as those demonstrated in this task, cannot be used as evidence for goal 
directed accounts.
Therefore, the findings from Chapter 2 challenge one line o f evidence that has been put 
forward to support specialist theories o f imitation. Furthermore, in demonstrating that 
task-general processes can explain imitation errors, the present findings are consistent 
with generalist theories o f imitation which suppose that there are no imitation-specific 
processes.
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6.2.2 Limitations and outstanding questions
The principle finding o f this chapter was similar error patterns in geometric and 
naturalistic versions o f the pen-and-cups task. On the basis o f this finding, I have 
concluded that performance on the naturalistic task does not rely on the attribution of 
intentions. However, it is possible that different processes guide performance in the 
naturalistic version and in the geometric version, and that these processes happen to 
result in similar error patterns. More specifically, when imitating human action stimuli, 
one may be guided by inferences about the intentions of the model, but when reacting 
to abstract geometric shapes, one may be guided by more general perceptual and 
attentional processes.
This explanation for the results of Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 is unparsimonious, but it 
cannot be ruled out with reference to these data alone. However, some findings from 
Chapter 3 suggest that this alternative explanation is unlikely to account for the current 
findings. Chapter 3 provided further evidence that is inconsistent with the view that 
performance on the pen-and-cups task is guided by inferences about intentions. In 
Experiment 3.1, individuals with ASD carried out the naturalistic version o f the pen- 
and-cups task. These individuals have well-documented difficulties in inferring the 
intentions of others (e.g. Frith & Frith 2003). Therefore, if performance on this task 
relies on such a skill, we may expect to see different error patterns in these individuals 
compared with controls. Contrary to this prediction, in Experiment 3.1, individuals 
with ASD showed the typical cup<hand<grip error pattern, providing further evidence 
that intention reading is not involved in this task.
Chapter 2 highlights the role o f general processes rather than goals in imitation but it 
does not identify the exact nature o f the general processes that generate the colour
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minimum error pattern. It has been suggested by Bird et al. (2007) that these general 
processes are perceptual and attentional. In Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, a stimulus 
variable, colour, modulated accuracy of performance. Thus, the colour cue could have 
improved performance in several ways. For example, differential colouring o f the two 
levels o f an action variable (cup, hand or grip) could have enhanced their 
discriminability directly, making it easier to see on each trial which variant had been 
selected by the model. Alternatively, colouring of an action variable may draw a 
participant’s attention to a particular component resulting in that component being the 
focus of spatial attention. Further investigation may shed light on exactly which 
processes influence performance. However, the failure to identify exactly which 
general processes have the greatest influence on performance does not detract from the 
principle message o f this chapter. The processes mentioned above are task-general. 
Perceptual discrimination and attentional selection occur in a range o f perceptual- 
motor tasks, not just in those requiring imitation. Therefore, whatever range and 
combination o f these processes was responsible for the effects observed in the present 
experiments, the present results support the view that general mechanisms, rather than 
imitation-specific processes of goal-selection, explain imitation errors.
The findings from Chapter 2 challenge one set of results that have been suggested to 
support GOADI. Other similar results using different paradigms have also been 
suggested to support GOADI. For example, the authors o f GOADI have said that 
contralateral-to-ipsilateral error patterns observed in the dots and hand-to-ear tasks 
demonstrate goal-directedness in imitation (e.g. Bekkering et al., 2002). Like the error 
patterns in the pen-and-cups task, it is possible that these results may also be explained 
with reference to a general process account. It is plausible that, in the hand-to-ear and 
dots tasks, contralateral-to-ipsilateral errors are common because, during the trials in
which they occur, the locations o f the two objects (ears or dots) are fixed, whereas the 
locations of the two effectors (hands or fingers) change in the course of the trial (e.g. 
from left to right hemispace and back again). Consequently, effector selection is likely 
to be harder to discriminate than object selection, and therefore trials in which object 
selection is correct and effector selection incorrect (contralateral-to-ipsilateral errors) 
will occur more frequently than, for example, trials in which effector selection is 
correct and object selection incorrect (ipsilateral-to-contralateral errors). Appropriate 
experiments would be necessary to verify these predictions, but given the findings 
from Chapter 2, it is likely that error patterns in paradigms, like the dots and hand-to- 
ear tasks, can also be explained by general processes.
The findings from Chapter 2 have implications for research which uses performance 
on imitation paradigms as an indicator o f theory o f mind skills. For example, Want and 
Gattis (2005) argued that children with impaired theory o f mind should also 
demonstrate impaired goal-directed imitation, that is, they should not show the typical 
error patterns on the dots task. They tested the imitative abilities of late-signing deaf 
children with suspected theory o f  mind impairments and found their performance to be 
equivalent to control children. This finding prompted Want and Gattis to conclude that 
late-signing deaf children had inferred the goals o f the demonstrator, and therefore that 
an early form of mental state understanding was intact in these children. In opposition 
to this view, the results o f Chapter 2 suggest that an understanding of mental state 
goals is not necessary to explain performance in some imitation tasks. Thus, 
conclusions about theory o f mind ability based on tests of imitative performance may 
be unwise.
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6.3 Imitation in ASD
6.3.1 Summary and interpretation
Chapters 3 and 4 investigated imitative abilities in ASD. Whether or not an imitation 
impairment exists in ASD is relevant to the topics discussed in this thesis. Special- 
purpose mechanisms should be susceptible to selective impairment. That is, an 
impairment in one task domain that is not associated with more generalised deficits in 
other task domains. Therefore, compelling evidence of a selective imitation 
impairment in ASD may provide support for specialist theories o f imitation.
Although the majority of studies have reported impaired imitation performance among 
individuals with ASD, there have been some conflicting findings, with some studies 
failing to show impairments. One source of the variance in imitation performance 
across studies may be the type of tasks used to measure imitation. The majority of 
tasks used to date have been complex intentional imitation tasks requiring a number of 
abilities in addition to imitation which may influence performance on these tasks.
Chapters 3 and 4 examined two possible explanations for the mixed findings in the 
ASD imitation literature. First, there is a genuine imitation-specific impairment in 
ASD. Second, there is no specific imitative impairment in ASD; rather, poor 
performance on tests o f imitation is due to impairments of non-specific abilities which 
are required for successful performance on these tests. Chapters 3 and 4 aimed to 
distinguish between these possibilities by examining imitation performance in an 
intentional (Chapter 3) and an automatic imitation (Chapter 4) paradigm.
155
6.3.1.1 Intentional imitation in individuals with ASD
The majority o f studies demonstrating impaired performance on imitation tasks have 
used complex intentional imitation paradigms. Chapter 3 sought to replicate one such 
finding of impaired performance and to investigate the source of this impairment. 
Employing the pen-and-cups task, Experiment 3.1 replicated previous findings of 
impaired performance on an intentional imitation task. Experiment 3.2 investigated the 
source of this poor performance using non-imitative versions o f the pen-and-cups task. 
In Experiment 3.2, one task involved action responses being made to abstract 
geometric stimuli, while the other required participants to describe the original action 
stimuli. If the poor performance on the imitative version of the task was due to an 
imitation-specific impairment, one would expect improved performance when the task 
is changed so that it presents equally challenging general task demands but is non- 
imitative. However, contrary to this prediction, the ASD group was as impaired, 
relative to the control group, on each o f the non-imitative versions o f the pen-and-cups 
task. This pattern of results is inconsistent with claims o f an imitation-specific 
impairment in ASD. Rather it suggests that, at least in the pen-and-cups task, the 
observed imitation impairment can be fully explained by processes that are not specific 
to imitation.
6.3.1.2 Automatic imitation in individuals with ASD
The results from Chapter 3 suggested that impaired imitation performance in 
individuals with ASD could be explained by processes not specific to imitation. These 
processes are necessary for carrying out complex intentional imitation tasks such as the 
pen-and-cups task. In order to minimise demands made on non-specific processes, a 
simple automatic imitation paradigm was used. I£ as the results from Chapter 3
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suggest, poor performance on imitation tasks results from impairments in non­
imitation-specific processes, we should not expect poor performance in an imitation 
task where demands on these non-specific processes are minimised.
In Experiment 4.1, participants were required to make a pre-specified response (open 
or close hand) to an open or closed hand on the screen. The stimuli were either human 
or robotic hands and the movement of the hand stimulus was either the same as, or the 
opposite of, the pre-specified response. The principal finding of this experiment was 
that individuals with ASD showed intact automatic imitation. This was demonstrated 
both by a compatibility effect and an animacy bias comparable to the effects observed 
in controls. By reducing non-specific task demands, the results from this chapter 
provided evidence suggesting that individuals with ASD do not have an imitation- 
specific impairment.
6.3.2 Limitations and outstanding questions
In Experiment 3.1, the ASD group made more errors than controls in the imitative 
version o f the pen-and-cups task, whereas Experiment 4.1 demonstrated intact 
performance on an automatic imitation task. Accordingly, it could be argued that 
Chapters 3 and 4 have demonstrated impaired intentional imitation and intact 
automatic imitation. As a result, it could be claimed that individuals with ASD have a 
specific impairment in intentional imitation with spared automatic imitation 
capabilities. This may imply a selective imitation impairment in ASD which is more 
consistent with a specialist than with a generalist view o f imitation. However, there are 
a number o f reasons to doubt this interpretation.
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First, McIntosh et al. (2006) investigated intentional and automatic imitation o f facial 
movements in individuals with ASD. In this study, the opposite pattern was 
demonstrated, whereby individuals with ASD showed impaired automatic and intact 
intentional imitation.
Second, there is no reason to suppose that the core mechanisms that mediate 
intentional imitation differ from those that mediate automatic imitation. In both 
automatic and intentional imitation, one is required to translate a visual representation 
from observing an action into the motor output necessary to execute that action. In 
addition, there is some evidence that both intentional and automatic imitation rely on 
the same cortical areas. That is, similar cortical activation is observed both when 
observing and executing action and when intentionally imitating (Rumiati, Weiss, 
Tessari, Assmus, Zilles, Herzog, & Fink 2005; Iacoboni et al., 1999). Therefore, it 
appears that both intentional and automatic imitation rely on the same psychological 
and neurological mechanism. Consequently, it is difficult to conceive o f an impairment 
in an imitation-specific process that affects intentional but not automatic imitation.
The crucial difference between intentional imitation and automatic imitation is the 
intention or will to imitate. Therefore, if individuals with ASD show particularly poor 
performance on tasks o f intentional imitation, it is likely that it is this intention to 
imitate that is atypical. That is, individuals with ASD are not as motivated to imitate as 
are typically developing individuals. This idea is consistent with the message of 
Chapters 3 and 4. An abnormal intention to imitate would not constitute an imitation- 
specific impairment as motivation to imitate is likely to be part o f a larger impairment 
in social interaction.
158
Experiments 3.1, 3.2 and 4.1 examined imitation performance in an ASD sample of 
adults with above average IQ. It could be argued that a specific impairment would 
have been detected if children or individuals with lower IQ had been tested. While it is 
possible that different populations within the autism spectrum may show an alternative 
pattern of results, this possibility may not undermine the conclusions drawn in this 
thesis.
First, if imitation impairments were observed in individuals with lower IQ then this 
would not constitute a selective imitation impairment in ASD, since imitation 
impairments would co-exist with generalised deficits. Impairments in a particular 
domain only constitute support for specialist claims if those impairments are selective 
(e.g. Gopnik 1990; Leslie, 1992; Karmiloff-Smith, 2000). More specifically, any 
imitation impairments in individuals with low IQ could result from generalised 
cognitive impairments rather than a specific imitation deficit. Consequently, such a 
pattern of results would not be able to provide support for specialist theories.
Second, if imitation impairments were observed in children with ASD, this would 
indicate that imitation impairments in ASD are delayed rather than deviant. Consistent 
views have been presented by Whiten & Brown (1999) and by Williams et al. (2004). 
If development o f a particular skill is delayed, this implies an important role for 
learning and environmental input, which is consistent with generalist theories and not 
specialist views o f imitation. In particular ASL, which highlights the role of learning in 
imitation, may expect some delayed development of imitative ability in individuals 
with ASD. If  as ASL suggests, the sensorimotor links necessary for imitation are 
formed through experience, young children with ASD may show impaired 
performance. Since they spend less time attending to social stimuli, children with ASD
159
may have been exposed to fewer social situations in which they could gain concurrent 
experience o f seeing and doing. One may expect especially poor imitation skills for 
opaque actions such as facial expressions and whole body movements since the 
relevant experience needed to learn how to imitate these actions cannot be gained 
through self observation. If individuals with ASD prefer not to look at others they may 
not have gained enough relevant experience to learn associations between visual and 
motor representations o f opaque actions. Therefore, further investigation into the 
source o f imitative abilities in younger individuals with ASD is necessary and this 
investigation should focus on imitative abilities both in opaque and transparent actions.
Although delayed development of imitation skills implies an important role for 
learning, it is not wholly inconsistent with a specialist view o f imitation. It is plausible 
that a specialised imitation mechanism is only ‘switched on’ later in development in 
ASD resulting in delayed acquisition of imitation skills (Baron-Cohen, 1992). 
Therefore, in order to clarify this matter, it is necessary to carry out further studies with 
children with ASD. These studies should aim to minimise task demands, like 
Experiment 4.1, in order to ascertain whether any observed imitation impairments in 
children arise from a specific imitation impairment or from impairments in more 
general processes.
The findings from this thesis suggest that there is no imitation-specific impairment in 
ASD but they do not lend support to any particular theory regarding the core deficit in 
ASD. There are a number of candidate impairments that would be consistent with the 
findings in this thesis.
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For example, individuals with ASD may have abnormalities in the perception of 
dynamic stimuli (e.g. Milne, Swettenham, Hansen, Campbell, Jeffries & Plaisted, 
2002). All o f the stimuli used in Chapter 3 were complex dynamic stimuli, and 
therefore difficulty in perceiving such stimuli could have resulted in impaired 
performance on these tasks. Alternatively, impairments in motor planning or motor 
control may explain some o f the poor performance. However, this would not explain 
why poor performance was also observed on the verbal task in Chapter 3, because 
demands placed on motor control and planning were reduced in this task. Furthermore, 
attentional impairments may explain some of the poor performance observed in 
Chapter 3. More specifically, individuals may have impairments in the rapid shifting of 
attention between the three action components inherent in all versions o f the pen-and- 
cups task. Many studies have detailed attentional impairments in ASD; examples 
include prioritizing dynamic stimuli (Greenaway & Plaisted, 2005), allocating 
attention in the presence o f distracters (Burack, 1994), and switching the attentional 
focus rapidly between spatial locations (Wainwright & Bryson, 1996; Landry & 
Bryson, 2004), and object features (Courchesne, Townsend, Akshoomoff, Saitoh, 
Yeung-Corchesne, Lincoln, James, Haas, Schreibman & Lau, 1994). However, it is not 
within the scope of this thesis to pin down the exact nature o f impairments in ASD and 
further exploration of candidate abilities is necessary.
6.4 Automatic imitation in typically developing individuals
6.4.1 Summary and interpretation
The final empirical chapter examined effector-specificity in imitation. In everyday life, 
when we intend to imitate, movements are usually imitated with the modelled effector 
system, e.g. we imitate hand movements with our hands and foot movements with our
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feet. To investigate whether this effector-specific tendency in imitative performance 
reflects the nature o f the core mechanisms of imitation, a SRC paradigm was used to 
investigate the effector-specificity o f automatic imitation, and thereby the specialist or 
generalist nature of the core mechanisms o f imitation.
Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 indicated an automatic imitation, or movement compatibility, 
effect both when participants responded with the modelled effector system (effector 
compatible condition) and when they responded with an alternative effector system 
(effector incompatible condition), and that the movement compatibility effect was 
smaller when an alternative effector was used.
The findings from this chapter are inconsistent with the claims made by AIM, which 
would predict complete effector-specificity in this task. AIM supposes that the 
mechanisms that solve the correspondence problem operate in two stages. The first 
stage identifies the modelled effector, and, when it is completed, the second stage 
codes the movement performed by that effector. This account implies that the 
mechanism mediating movement imitation, operative in the second stage, is strictly 
effector-specific; that it represents the modelled movement in codes that apply 
exclusively to the modelled effector.
The findings in this chapter were consistent with ASL and IM which both predict 
partial effector specificity in this task. ASL suggests that visual input received from 
observing action is translated into motor output by a set of bidirectional, excitatory 
links connecting visual and motor representations o f the same action components. 
These ‘vertical associations’ are thought to be established through associative learning; 
formed on the basis o f  correlated experience of observing and executing action
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components. Because stimulus generalization is a ubiquitous feature of associative 
learning (Pearce, 1994), the ASL model assumes that vertical associations are 
activated, not only by the stimuli experienced during learning, but also by other stimuli 
to the extent that they have physical characteristics in common with the learned 
stimulus (Press et al., 2005; 2006).
Similarly, IM suggests that actions are represented in terms o f their sensory 
consequences, and that action observation primes performance o f an action to the 
extent that the observed and executed actions have similar sensory consequences. 
Therefore, the observation o f a hand opening will be most likely to prime performance 
of a hand opening response as the sensory consequences o f these two events are most 
similar. However, since the sensory consequences of mouth opening and hand opening 
have features in common, observation o f a hand opening action may prime a mouth 
opening response, but to a lesser extent than it primes a hand opening response.
Therefore, in demonstrating partial effector-specificity, the results from this chapter 
provide support for generalist theories of imitation.
6.4.2 Limitations and outstanding questions
The findings from Chapter 5 have been suggested to support generalist, rather than 
specialist theories o f imitation. However, it could be argued, in line with the specialist 
theories examined in this thesis, that the reason why automatic imitation effects were 
observed even when the effector was incompatible was because the actions were coded 
in terms o f their goal. For example, one might be quicker to open one’s hand in 
response to an open mouth than to a closed mouth because one codes the observed
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action in terms o f its outcome, in this case ‘open’. However, if, as this interpretation 
suggests, we code actions exclusively in terms of their outcomes, then we should not 
expect any effect o f effector; there should be no effector-specificity in this task. 
Contrary to this predication, significant effector compatibility effects were found in 
Experiments 5.1 and 5.2.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the results of Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 do not 
arise from relationships between the irrelevant stimuli and the responses (stimulus- 
response or S-R compatibility) but rather from the relationships between the irrelevant 
stimuli and the imperative stimuli (stimulus-stimulus or S-S compatibility). For 
example, when one sees a hand moving one may be faster to process the ‘h’ stimulus 
than the ‘m’ stimulus, or vice versa. If this is the case then the result o f experiments
5.1 and 5.2 have little to do with imitation because imitation requires a translation o f a 
visual stimulus into a motor response. S-S relationships arise from the processing of 
one visual stimulus interfering with the processing o f another visual stimulus. Effects 
that are solely due to S-S relationships therefore cannot provide evidence that is 
directly relevant to theories of imitation that address the correspondence problem.
The S-S compatibility interpretation cannot be ruled out on the basis o f the results of 
Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 alone. However, it is implausible for a number o f reasons.
First, in previous SRC procedures used to examine automatic imitation, similar 
compatibility effects have been obtained both when simple RT and choice RT 
paradigms were used (e.g. Press et al., 2006). Whereas in choice RT paradigms 
compatibility effects may arise from S-S or from S-R relationships, in simple RT 
paradigms there is only one stimulus type (imperative stimulus) present. Therefore,
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effects observed in simple RT paradigms must be due to the relationship between the 
stimulus and the response.
Second, the procedure used in Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 can be formally described as a 
Simon SRC task or, according Komblum’s taxonomy, a Type-3 ensemble (Komblum 
1992; 1994). Many studies have revealed parallels between SRC effects in experiments 
with body movements, that are used to study imitation, and SRC experiments with 
arbitrary stimuli in the general SRC literature (e.g. Heyes & Ray, 2004). Therefore, it 
is reasonable to expect that the principles established using arbitrary stimuli and Simon 
tasks in the general SRC literature will also apply to experiments, like 5.1 and 5.2, that 
use similar procedures to study imitation. The general SRC literature suggests that the 
compatibility effects that occur in Simon tasks are due primarily to S-R, rather than S-
5 relationships (e.g. Hommel, 1993; 1995; 1997; Komblum, Hasbroucq & Osman, 
1990; Lu & Proctor, 1995). For example, Simon effects are observed even when there 
is no consistent relationship between the imperative stimulus and the irrelevant 
stimulus dimensions (Hommel, 1995). Therefore, it is likely that in the SRC tasks used 
to investigate imitation, such as those in Experiments 5.1 and 5.2, any compatibility 
effects are also due to the S-R relationships.
In addition to demonstrating the effector specificity o f automatic imitation for the first 
time, Chapter 5 also constitutes the first demonstration of automatic imitation of 
opaque actions. Some previous studies have shown automatic imitation of facial 
expressions but in these studies emotional stimuli were used (e.g. Dimberg, Thunberg
6  Elmehed, 2000; Platek, Mohamed & Gallup, 2005). Therefore, it is not clear 
whether the effects demonstrated in these previous studies were genuinely automatic 
imitation effects, or instead whether they resulted from emotional contagion. In
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Chapter 5, mouth opening and closing stimuli were used which are less likely to be 
associated with emotions than the stimuli used in previous studies. Thus, the present 
results demonstrate that even for perceptually opaque actions, where the 
correspondence problem is most challenging, action observation automatically leads to 
motor activation.
6.5 Conclusions
The experiments described in this thesis have used a number of new experimental 
methods to generate novel findings with respect to automatic and intentional imitation. 
First, this research has used a novel geometric variant o f the pen-and cups task to show 
that mentalistic goals are not an intrinsic part of the core mechanisms o f imitation. 
Second, this novel task has been used to provide evidence which suggests that there is 
no imitation-specific impairment in ASD. Third, this research has demonstrated intact 
automatic imitation in individuals with ASD for the first time. Finally, automatic 
imitation o f opaque actions and partial effector-specificity o f automatic imitation has 
been demonstrated for the first time.
Furthermore, the collective results from these experiments have allowed me to address 
the central issue discussed in this thesis, that is, how we are able to imitate. Successful 
imitation requires translation of a visual representation into a matching motor output. 
A number o f theories have been suggested to explain how this correspondence 
problem may be solved. These theories are either specialist or generalist theories. The 
principle aim o f this thesis was to discover whether specialist or generalist theories can 
best explain how we are able to imitate.
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Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examined two lines o f evidence that have been suggested to 
support specialist theories o f imitation, the role of goals in imitation and the existence 
of a selective imitation impairment ASD. The results from the experiments presented 
in these chapters have challenged this evidence. These findings imply that neither line 
o f evidence can be used to support specialist claims. Finally, Chapter 5 provided some 
specific support for both generalist theories addressed in this thesis.
Therefore, the results presented in this thesis are more consistent with a generalist view 
of imitation. From the present experiments, there appears to be little compelling 
evidence of a special-purpose mechanism dedicated to imitation. Instead, the data 
presented here support the generalist view that imitation is mediated by general 
learning and motor control mechanisms.
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